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Abstract
We live in the “inverse-privacy” world, where service providers derive insights from users’
data that the users do not even know about. This has been fueled by the advancements
in machine learning technologies, which allowed providers to go beyond the superﬁcial
analysis of users’ transactions to the deep inspection of users’ content. Users themselves
have been facing several problems in coping with this widening information discrepancy.
Although the interfaces of apps and websites are generally equipped with privacy indicators
(e.g., permissions, policies, . . . ), this has not been enough to create the counter-effect.
We particularly identify three of the gaps that hindered the effectiveness and usability of
privacy indicators:
– Scale Adaptation: The scale at which service providers are collecting data has been
growing on multiple fronts. Storage technologies are increasingly capable and less costly.
The proﬁtable data economy has contributed to the birth of new data collectors. Users,
on the other hand, have limited time, effort, and technological resources to cope with
this scale.
– Risk Communication: Although providers utilize privacy indicators to announce what
and (less often) why they need particular pieces of information, they rarely relay what
can be potentially inferred from this data. Users have become habituated to repetitive
dialogs that do not communicate the potential risks. Without this knowledge, users
are less equipped to make informed decisions when they sign in to a site or install an
application.
– Language Complexity: The information practices of service providers are buried in
complex, long privacy policies, which are aimed to cover the company from a legal
perspective. Generally, users do not have the time and sometimes the skills to decipher
such policies, even when they are interested in knowing particular pieces of it.
In this thesis, we approach usable privacy from a data perspective. Instead of static privacy
interfaces that are obscure, recurring, or unreadable, we develop techniques that bridge the
understanding gap between users and service providers. Towards that, we make the following
contributions:
– Crowdsourced, data-driven privacy decision-making: In an effort to combat the grow-
ing scale of data exposure, we consider the context of ﬁles uploaded to cloud services.
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We propose C3P, a framework for automatically assessing the sensitivity of ﬁles, thus
enabling realtime, ﬁne-grained policy enforcement. C3Pworks on top of unstructured
data and allows privacy preserving crowdsourcing of users’ sharing decisions.
– Data-driven app privacy indicators: We introduce PrivySeal, which involves a new
paradigm of dynamic, personalized app privacy indicators that bridge the risk under-
standing gap between users and providers. Through a variety of data analysis and
visualization techniques, PrivySeal communicates risks by showing users the far-
reaching insights that can be inferred from their data. Through PrivySeal’s online
platform, we also study the emerging problem of interdependent privacy in the context
of cloud apps and provide a usable privacy indicator to mitigate it.
– Automated question answering about privacy practices: We introduce PriBot, the
ﬁrst automated question-answering system for privacy policies, which allows users to
pose their questions about the privacy practices of any companywith their own language.
PriBot is based on a novel deep learning architecture of classiﬁers that we developed.
Through a user study, we show its effectiveness at achieving high accuracy and relevance
for users, thus narrowing the complexity gap in navigating privacy policies.
A core aim of this thesis is paving the road for a future where privacy indicators are not bound
by a speciﬁc medium or pre-scripted wording. We design and develop techniques that enable
privacy to be communicated effectively in an interface that is approachable to the user. For
that, we go beyond textual interfaces to enable dynamic, visual, and personalized privacy
interfaces that are ﬁt for the variety of emerging technologies.
Key words: privacy, machine learning, human-computer interaction, anonymity, privacy
indicators, interdependent privacy, deep learning, chatbots, privacy policies, internet of
things, decision-making
Résumé
Nous vivons dans le monde de la “conﬁdentialité inversée”, où les fournisseurs de services
acquièrent des connaissances sur leurs utilisateurs à partir de leurs données, sans même que
ces derniers n’en soient conscients. Ce nouveau monde est possible grâce aux progrès réalisés
dans les techniques d’apprentissage automatique, qui permettent aux fournisseurs d’aller
au-delà de l’analyse superﬁcielle des actions de leurs utilisateurs pour aboutir à une inspection
approfondie du contenu des utilisateurs. Bien que les interfaces des applications et des sites
Web soient généralement équipées d’indicateurs de conﬁdentialité (p. Ex., Autorisations,
politiques, . . . ), cela n’est généralement pas sufﬁsant pour contrer ces problèmes.
Nous identiﬁons en particulier trois lacunes qui entravent l’efﬁcacité et l’utilité des indicateurs
de conﬁdentialité :
– Adaptation à grande échelle : L’échelle à laquelle les fournisseurs de services collectent
des données a augmenté de plusieurs façons. Les technologies de stockage ont accru
en capacité et sont devenues moins coûteuses. L’économie des données, devenue très
rentable, a contribué à la naissance de nouveaux collecteurs de données. Les utilisateurs
ont, en revanche, un temps, des efforts et des ressources technologiques limités pour
faire face à une telle échelle.
– Communication de risque : Bien que les fournisseurs utilisent des indicateurs de conﬁ-
dentialité pour annoncer le quoi et (moins souvent) le pourquoi ils ont besoin d’infor-
mations particulières, ils relèvent rarement ce qui peut potentiellement être déduit de
ces données. Les utilisateurs sont devenus habitués à des dialogues répétitifs qui ne
communiquent pas les risques potentiels. Sans cette connaissance, les utilisateurs sont
moins équipés pour prendre des décisions éclairées lorsqu’ils se connectent à un site
ou installent une application.
– Complexité du langage : Les pratiques en matière d’informations des fournisseurs de
services sont camouﬂées dans des politiques de conﬁdentialité complexes et longues qui
visent à couvrir l’entreprise d’un point de vue juridique. Généralement, les utilisateurs
n’ont ni le temps et parfois ni les compétences nécessaires pour déchiffrer de telles
politiques, même s’ils s’intéressent à des parties en particulier.
Dans cette thèse, nous abordons la conﬁdentialité utilisable du point de vue des données.
A la place d’interfaces de conﬁdentialité qui sont obscures, récurrentes ou illisibles, nous
développons des techniques qui permettent de combler l’écart de compréhension entre les
v
vi RÉSUMÉ
utilisateurs et les fournisseurs de services. Pour ce faire, nous apportons les contributions
suivantes :
– Prise de décision en matière de conﬁdentialité dépendante des données : Dans le
but de lutter contre l’augmentation de l’exposition aux données, nous considérons le
contexte des ﬁchiers téléchargés sur les services en nuage. Nous proposons C3P, un
cadre pour évaluer automatiquement la sensibilité des ﬁchiers, permettant ainsi une
mise en application très détaillée et en temps réel de la politique de conﬁdentialité.
C3P fonctionne sur des données non structurées et permet de collecter les décisions de
partage des utilisateurs tout en préservant la conﬁdentialité.
– Indicateurs de conﬁdentialité de l’application axés sur les données : Nous introdui-
sons PrivySeal, qui propose un nouveau paradigme d’indicateurs dynamiques et
personnalisés de la conﬁdentialité des applications, permettant de combler le fossé
entre les utilisateurs et les fournisseurs. Grâce à une variété d’analyses de données et
de techniques de visualisation, PrivySeal communique les risques en montrant aux
utilisateurs les connaissances approfondies qui peuvent être déduites de leurs données.
Grâce à la plate-forme en ligne de PrivySeal, nous étudions également le problème
émergent de la conﬁdentialité interdépendante dans le contexte des applications en
nuage et fournissons un indicateur utilisable de conﬁdentialité pour atténuer ce pro-
blème.
– Système de questions-réponses automatiques sur les pratiques de conﬁdentialité :
Nous présentons PriBot, le premier système automatisé de réponses aux questions sur
les politiques de conﬁdentialité, qui permet aux utilisateurs de poser leurs questions
avec leurs propres mots sur n’importe quelle entreprise. PriBot utilise une nouvelle
architecture de classiﬁeurs basés sur l’apprentissage profrond. Grâce à une étude menée
sur des utilisateurs, nous montrons son efﬁcacité à atteindre une grande précision et
une pertinence dans les réponses, réduisant ainsi l’écart de complexité dans la lecture
des politiques de conﬁdentialité.
L’objectif principal de cette thèse est d’ouvrir la voie à un avenir où les indicateurs de conﬁden-
tialité ne sont pas limités à un support spéciﬁque ou un message préétabli. Nous concevons
et développons des techniques permettant à la conﬁdentialité d’être communiquée efﬁcace-
ment avec une interface accessible à l’utilisateur. Pour cela, nous allons au-delà des interfaces
textes pour proposer des interfaces de conﬁdentialité dynamiques, visuelles et mains libres
qui conviennent à la variété des technologies émergentes.
Mots clefs : vie privée, apprentissage automatique, interactions homme-machine, anonymat,
indicateurs de conﬁdentialité, interdépendance dans la protection des données, apprentis-
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1.1 A Tale of Two Viewpoints
Historically, there has never been a consensus onwhether privacy is an innate need for humans.
On the one hand, prominent ﬁgures, including Vint Cerf (one of the internet pioneers), claim
that privacy may be an anomaly of the 20th-century [Sha15, Fer13, Fer15]. Proponents of this
opinion argue that, for thousands of years, people have been prioritizing money, prestige,
or convenience over solitude or privacy. For instance, until 1500 A.D., most homes in the
western world did not have internal walls separating rooms. The desire for warmth lead to
the development of the brick chimney, along with the needed support beams. Only then did
walls start to spread inside homes [Fer15]. A single bed for the whole family and its guests was
also the norm in Europe until families could afford to buy multiple beds. This transition was
mainly driven by hygiene reasons and by the spread of contagious diseases [Fer15].
This standpoint has its opponents. Despite the socioeconomic factors that have contributed
to the evolution of privacy, prominent scholars, like Irwin Altman, perceive it as a universal
human characteristic [ABL15, Alt77]. It is also regarded as a necessary ingredient in guarding
human dignity [Blo64], enabling relationships’ intimacy [Ger78], and protecting personal
liberty [All11]. Moreover, ancient religious texts contained several references to privacy as a
trait to aspire to. In the Old Testament (Numbers 24:5), the biblical Israelites are praised for
not positioning their tents’ openings facing each other: “How fair are your tents, O Jacob . . .”.
The Quran (49:12) has also tackled the right for privacy: “. . . do not spy or backbite each other.
Would one of you like to eat the ﬂesh of his brother when dead? You would detest it.”
The activity of reading itself has seen an interesting historical evolution that illustrates how
privacy preserving options emerge. According to Nicholas Carr, in the world that predated the
commoditization of books, reading has mostly been a public, vocal activity [Car11]. Scribes
wrote books based on hearing, and they neither separated the word with spaces nor paid
attention to word order. Silent reading, as we know it today, did not become the standard until
well after the collapse of the Roman Empire. However, once people witnessed the proliferation
of books, their ability to read privately became a key factor for personal instruction and im-
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provement. Interestingly, this could have been much more difﬁcult without the modiﬁcations
in how text is inscribed. The inter-word spaces, the punctuation marks, and the word order
were some of these new features that enabled private reading [Car11].
Despite the differing viewpoints, this historical prologue has a few takeaways. First, privacy-
enhancing technologies of the ancient times, like the internal walls or —loosely speaking —the
inter-word spaces, were not solely motivated by privacy per se. Second, the level of privacy
has always been a result of compromises that people face in their daily life, whether related to
their purchasing power or their desire for recognition. Third, it has rarely been the case that
people voluntarily chose the privacy-invading tools or technologies as the norm for their life
despite having a choice of something else. When privacy-equipped options became affordable
(e.g., private baths or individual rooms), people generally adopted such options. Even in our
times, when an app like Whatsapp introduced end-to-end encryption to a billion users, we
did not see people ﬂeeing away from the app. It was an additional feature that strengthened
the bond with the app for many.
1.2 An Intellectual Luxury Good?
Despite people’s tendency to go with the privacy preserving option, this is not always feasible.
In fact, privacy has frequently been described as a luxury good [McG59, Sch68]. The essayist
Phyllis McGinley puts it nicely:
“The poor might have to huddle together in cities for need’s sake, and the fron-
tiersman cling to his neighbor for the sake of protection. But in each civilization,
as it advanced, those who could afford it chose the luxury of a withdrawing place.
Egyptians planned vine-hung gardens, the Greeks had their porticos and seaside
villas, the Romans put enclosures around their patios. . . . Privacy was considered
as worth striving for as hallmarked silver or linen sheets for one’s bed” [McG59]
With time, emerging privacy solutions continued to suffer from the same issue: limited
accessibility, whether this is ﬁnancial, intellectual, political, or other types of accessibility.
Even today, ﬁnancial affordability cannot be neglected whenever we analyze the adoption
of privacy- or security-enhancing technologies. Access to home internet is still subject to
restrictive quota limits in a lot of developing countries. Hence, a security measure, which is as
simple as updating a computer with the latest packages, is seen as an economic burden. The
same goes for upgrading a smartphone to a newer model to be eligible for continued security
updates.
In the recent years, several important factors have exacerbated the problem of privacy accessi-
bility, going beyond the ﬁnancial aspect. From the scale at which data is being collected to
the advanced machine learning models extracting insights from this data, privacy has further
emerged as an intellectual luxury good. Its affordability is limited to the few who know the
3far-reaching implications of their activities and the actual shareholders of their data.
1.3 Orwell vs. Kafka
Daniel Solove differentiates in his book “Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff Between Privacy
and Security” between two ways in which privacy is perceived: the Orwellian view and the
Kafkaesque view [Sol11]. In the Orwellian view (based on George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-
Four [Orw09]), privacy is the protection against surveillance and its associated harms, such as
inhibition and social control. The government (a.k.a. the Big Brother) is the main presumed
adversary, and people are less concerned about protecting information which they do not
mind being known, such as their demographics or the places they visit.
The Kafkaesque view, named after Franz Kafka, embodies the other aspects of privacy that
frequently go unnoticed. This view is inspired by The Trial, a novel by Kafka about a man who
is investigated and prosecuted —for reasons he does not know —by a mysterious, inaccessible
authority. According to Solove, this perspective on privacy highlights the problems due to
information processing (storage, use, or analysis) rather than information collection.
Under the Kafkaesque umbrella falls data aggregation, i.e., the ability to combine seemingly
benign data from multiple sources and to repurpose it in new contexts. For example, the
industry of data brokering has the sole purpose of linking as much data as possible through
a large set of heuristics, before selling it to interested parties. Second, user exclusion occurs
when people are not allowed to know how their information is handled, nor given a choice to
correct it. Third, the secondary use of data is another aspect where information is processed
for reasons that it has not been intended for. Fourth, personal data can suffer from distortion,
where the data depicts an incomplete and often wrong picture about individuals by reducing
them to a limited, subjective set of features [Sol11].
These practices get another name when they are viciously used to advance the beneﬁts of the
big corporations and induce unfairness in the society. The writer Cathy O’Neil calls them the
“Weapons of Math Destruction” [O’N16]. From the models used for screening job applicants
to those used to create e-scores for people —thus deciding their loans’ interest rates and
insurance premiums —the repercussions are directly impacting lives in one way or another. In
an algorithmic world where the past of individuals and groups determines their future, users’
privacy, through minimal exposure to data hunters, becomes more and more essential.
1.4 Problems
On a high level, in this thesis, we ask the following question:
In the age of large-scale data analysis, how can we empower users to make better
privacy decisions without loading them with a huge cognitive burden?
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We consider privacy in its broad sense, which includes the Orwellian interpretation in addition
to the (often marginalized) Kafkaesque one. In fact, the majority of users understand the
presence of government as a surveillance power, which makes them aware of the Orwellian
aspect. Nevertheless, the very reasons that are molding privacy into an intellectual luxury good
make the Kafkaesque aspects of privacy more crucial than ever. Highlighting such aspects is a
core part of this thesis, and addressing them contributes towards mitigating the problem of
privacy inaccessibility itself.
In our work, we have identiﬁed and worked towards bridging the following major gaps that
users encounter in their digital environments: (i) the scale adaptation gap, (ii) the risk un-
derstanding gap, and (iii) the language complexity gap.
The Scale Adaptation Gap
The scale at which people’s data is being collected has seen orders of magnitude increase since
the beginning of the digital revolution. One reason for that is the advancement in storage
technologies, which can now comfortably hold the records of billions of users. Together with
the increasing efﬁciency of database technologies, hosting data and querying it are no more
the bottlenecks for data collectors.
The data collectors themselves have proliferated. Instead of solely worrying about govern-
mental surveillance or being watched by their neighbors, people have to deal with an increas-
ing number of potential adversaries. For someone who buys a smartphone, these adversaries
include the entity that sold them the device, the device manufacturer, the third party service
providers that their device supports, the advertisement providers incorporated with the apps,
etc.
The sources from which data can be analyzed have expanded too. Instead of solely depend-
ing on structured data records, providers have bolstered their analytics arsenal to target
unstructured data, which is present in documents, photos, videos, etc. They beneﬁted from
the huge advancements in natural language processing and visual computing, which have
taken a recent boost with the deep learning era. Images are now an important source for
recognizing objects [SVI+16], activities [YNS+15], landmarks [CLLH16], faces [TYRW14], emo-
tions [CBDC14], etc. Documents are also a huge trove for deciphering opinions [Cam16],
interests [CLL+15], connections [SKV15], etc.
The increased capabilities of service providers fueled the asymmetry of their relationship with
users. On one end are the automated services with vast computing powers. On the other
end are the users with limited time and cognitive capabilities, a phenomenon that has been
termed as “bounded rationality” [Sim72]. The vast majority of users have not been able to
cope with the scale at which the data collection is happening. Although the human brain itself
has been shown to manifest plasticity properties [Car11], where it neurologically adapts to
new media, the scale and diversity of data collection has so far rendered that phenomenon
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The Risk Understanding Gap
In addition to the vast scale data collection, the types of insights that could be inferred from
the data have also become beyond the grasp of most users. With the emergence of machine
learning as the mainstream method of user understanding and proﬁling, the accessibility of
privacy has suffered a new major setback. Bathing in public, reading aloud, or publishing
an article under one’s name are activities for which the repercussions are relatively well-
understood by the users. This is not the case with granting access to an over-privileged
application or consenting to share personal information with third parties. Such activities
might seem benign to the majority of users, who might not notice their potential negative
impacts until they are personally affected.
The opacity of data analysis has escalated to the extent that it warranted itself a new term:
“Inverse Privacy”. Depicted by Gurevich et al., a piece of data is inversely private if some party
has access to it, but you do not [GHW16]. This typically results from the legitimate analysis
of data collected by banks, healthcare providers, governmental agencies, shopping malls,
employers, etc. Derived from this data are insights such as the health status or the credit score
of an individual. Such information has been so far siloed inside the institutions generating it,
due to business and privacy reasons. Gurevich et al., contrast this concept against the more
traditional “Partial Privacy”, where the user has access to the data, but a limited number of
other parties does too.
Faced with this new reality, Hubaux and Juels proposed that researchers should prepare a
post-conﬁdentiality agenda. They suggested the development of a new category of privacy-
enhancing technologies, namely “Fair-use PETs” (F-PETS), which allow users to verify the fair
use of their information by service providers [HJ16]. One example they give is introducing
protocols into algorithmic decision making, which allow proving that the decisions taken do
not violate social norms expressed as laws, policies, or regulations. This is in comparison
to the “Conﬁdentiality-oriented PETs” (C-PETS) that solely focus on conﬁdentiality, such as
encrypted email, ad blockers, or location obfuscation techniques.
Nevertheless, the need for the veriﬁability of the decisions made by algorithms does not
preclude the need for better communicating the possibilities of such decisions. The mere
existence of such practices is obscure for the majority of users, and this obscurity is for a
reason: relaying the real possibilities with today’s data could result in discouraging users from
using certain applications.
To put this in perspective, consider the analogy between the need of data for service providers
and the need of cadavers (corpses for dissection) for medical researchers. Both data and
corpses are indispensable for the respective parties. In the early 19th century, due to the
shortage of cadavers, some resorted to the business of secretly murdering people (e.g., by
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suffocation) before selling the bodies for dissection purposes. Grave robbing was the less bad
and more common practice for achieving the same goal, to the extent that special techniques
were used to deter grave robbers (such as guards, graveyard watchtowers, or huge stone slabs
to cover the graves). It was only later that medical schools started rejecting grave robbing as a
means for anatomists to get corpses, and body donors had to provide their consent a priori.
Even today, whether that consent is an informed one is not that clear. In his book, “When
Breath Becomes Air”, the neurosurgeon, Paul Kalanithi, puts this as follows [Kal16]:
Yet the best-informed people—doctors—almost never donated their bodies. How
informed were the donors, then? As one anatomy professor put it to me, “You
wouldn’t tell a patient the gory details of a surgery if that would make them not
consent.” Even if donors were informed enough—and they might well have been,
notwithstanding one anatomy professor’s hedging—it wasn’t so much the thought
of being dissected that galled. It was the thought of your mother, your father,
your grandparents being hacked to pieces by wisecracking twenty-two-year-old
medical students.
Replacing medical students by the analysts crunching people’s data, one can get to the status
of risk communication nowadays. There are two differences though. First, data looting —a
practice that is well and alive in the unregulated part of the industry—is not regarded as
nefariously as grave robbing. Second, those analysts are mainly optimizing the beneﬁts of
their companies, compared to the researchers advancing the medical ﬁeld and saving lives.
The Language Complexity Gap
Even when the service provider aims to communicate all the potential privacy risks to the
users, the means might fall short. Language is at the core of this problem. Consider privacy
policies, the de facto standard for notice and choice online. They are intended to inform
users how companies collect, store, and manage their personal information. Such policies
are typically excessively long and hard to follow [Cat10, Fed12, GSF+16, MC08, Pre14]. In
2008, McDonald et al. estimated it would take an average user 201 hours to read all the
privacy policies encountered in a year [MC08]. Since then, we have witnessed the smartphone
revolution and the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT). Thus, in 2017, users would likely have
to spend substantially more time on reading the privacy policy of each website, app, device, or
service they interact with.
The issue is not only limited to the length and the presentation. Policies are also rife with
legal jargon that is meant to protect the provider on the legal front [MEAS13, Mei13]. Such
language is usually different from that of ordinary users, who are supposedly the intended
audience of such policies. Attempting to be informative to users and compliant with the law
at the same time, these policies have so far signiﬁcantly leaned towards the latter role.
To handle this, signiﬁcant works have been done towards standardization (via labels [CLM+02,
7KBCR09], icons [CGA06, HZH11], etc.). Their intuition is that standardized interfaces with
less text result in reducing the language complexity. However, these attempts have also seen
limited spread/usage. The main reason behind that was the rare adoption from the service
providers, especially with the lack of incentives and the absence of regulations. Another
reason is the difﬁculty of shaping a standard interface that appeals to the vast majority of users
coming from different countries and educational backgrounds.
This leads us to observe that current mechanisms for relaying privacy practices are static in
nature. Be it app permissions or privacy policies; such interfaces cannot easily capture the
growing complexity of information processing while remaining swiftly comprehensible and
skimmable by the average user. The response to having more information to say with more
text to show is clearly not the path forward. Moreover, due to this static nature, repeatedly sub-
jecting the user to similar content with each privacy decision leads to undesirable habituation
effects [SBDC15]; i.e., the effectiveness of the static notices decays with time.
This becomes even more challenging with the miniaturization trend of electronic devices that
started with mobile phones and reached its peak with the Internet of Things (IoTs) [Fed15].
The less the screen estate is, the more difﬁcult it is to communicate via written text. Coupling
the long, complex text with a voice interface —which is a natural alternative —is a match
“made in hell”; together they result in multiplying the required cognitive load on users’ behalf.
1.5 Contributions
This thesis has culminated in the development of three main systems, each of them contribut-
ing to bridging one or more of the gaps above:
C3P: Context-Aware Crowdsourced Cloud Privacy
C3P is our answer to the growing scale of privacy decisions that users should make [HRA14]. It
is motivated by Nissenbaum’s approach to privacy through contextual integrity [Nis04]: the
sensitivity of a piece of data is dependent on the context in which the data is shared.
We developed C3P as the ﬁrst automated sensitivity assessment framework for unstruc-
tured data —namely users’ ﬁles (documents, photos, etc.). C3P leverages the wisdom of the
crowd —in a privacy-preserving way —to compute a ﬁle’s sensitivity without accessing the
ﬁle itself. This is achieved by (1) modeling each unstructured ﬁle through a bag of features,
extracted from its content, metadata, and sharing environment, (2) querying the service about
sensitivity in an anonymizedway, and (3) contributing privacy decisions to the service provider
through an anonymized protocol. To determine the sensitivity of ﬁles —while accounting
for variable user attitudes towards privacy —we use Item Response Theory, a psychometric
technique for modeling latent traits of people and items. We show the efﬁcacy of C3P in the
context of privacy-preserving ﬁle sharing within cloud storage services.
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On a high level, C3P’s goal is automating privacy decisions based on the user’s context to reduce
the number of interventions the user has to take. This framework is a general one, which
naturally extends to other domains. For example, it can be easily transplanted to dynamically
adjust the level of access that smartphone apps have to users’ ﬁles.
C3P, which will be the topic of Chapter 2 has appeared in this paper [HRA14]:
C3P: Context-aware CrowdSourced Cloud Privacy.
Hamza Harkous, Rameez Rahman, and Karl Aberer.
In: Privacy Enhancing Technologies. PETS 2014.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8555. Springer, Cham.
PrivySeal: A Personalized Privacy Assistant for Cloud Apps
The next part of the thesis is mainly focused on bridging the risk communication gap between
the users and the service providers. To further motivate this part, we note that there is a clearly
uneven power balance in the existing digital ecosystems, whether in the mobile case (e.g.,
Android and iOS), in the cloud case (e.g., Google Drive and Dropbox), or in other similar
platforms.
The Economist Magazine reported in 2014 on the current state of things [Eco14]:
“Today the IT sector looks like a very ﬂat inverted pyramid: the bottom, where
economies of scale rule, is made up of just a few powerful platforms; the top,
where creativity and agility are at a premium, is becoming ever more fragmented.
There is not much in between.
As software eats more and more industries, they will increasingly take on this
shape, predicts Philip Evans of Boston Consulting Group. By lowering transaction
costs, IT allows big chunks of the economy to reshape themselves and turn into
what he calls “stacks”—industry-wide ecosystems that will have large platforms
at one end of their value chains and a wide variety of modes of production at
the other, from startups to social enterprises and communities to user-generated
content.”
Accordingly, from a business and growth point of view, the platforms itself are interested in
scaling their ecosystems with more apps so that they attract a wider user base and reap the
beneﬁts of the network effect. The current status of privacy notices is directly impacted by the
fact that platforms tend to favor such a steady growth over slow, but privacy-focused steps.
This is also one reason why a lot of platforms tolerate the presence of over-privileged apps, i.e.,
those which access more data than is needed for them to function.
PrivySeal, our next contribution, looks at the possibilities of breaking this imbalance. As
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the ﬁrst to anatomize. By analyzing the top Google Drive apps on Chrome Store, we discovered
that around two-thirds of them are over-privileged and that 79% require full access to users’
data [HRKA16].
We divide our contributions into two parts:
– Exposing the far-reaching implications of data sharing: Our primary goal is to assess
the efﬁcacy of the current models in deterring users from installing over-privileged
apps and to test alternative models that could improve that efﬁcacy. We analyze three
different permission models. In experiments with 210 real users, we discover that
the most successful permission model is our novel ensemble method that we call
Far-reaching Insights. Far-reaching Insights inform the users about the data-driven
insights that apps can make about them (e.g., their topics of interest, collaboration and
activity patterns, etc.). Thus, they seek to bridge the gap between what third parties
can potentially know about users and users’ perception of their privacy leakage. The
efﬁcacy of Far-reaching Insights in bridging this gap is demonstrated by our results, as
Far-reaching Insights prove to be, on average, twice as effective as the current model in
discouraging users from installing over-privileged apps.
In an effort to promote general privacy awareness, we deployed PrivySeal, a publicly
available, privacy-focused app store that uses Far-reaching Insights. Based on the
knowledge extracted from data of the store’s users (over 115 gigabytes of Google Drive
data from 1440 users with 662 installed apps), we also delineate the ecosystem for 3PC
apps from the standpoint of developers and cloud providers. Finally, we present several
general recommendations that can guide other future works in the area of privacy for
the cloud.
This study, which we will detail in Chapter 4 has appeared in [HRKA16]:
The Curious Case of the PDF Converter that Likes Mozart:
Dissecting and Mitigating the Privacy Risk of Personal Cloud Apps.
Hamza Harkous, Rameez Rahman, Bojan Karlas, and Karl Aberer. In
Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PoPETs), 2016.
– Exposing the impact of collaborators on the user’s privacy: Another risk that is rarely
evident and poorly communicated to 3PC apps’ users is that their privacy is not solely
determined by their own decisions. Whenever a user grants access to a new vendor,
she is inﬂicting a privacy loss on herself and on her collaborators too. We study this
issue, beneﬁting from PrivySeal’s platform. By analyzing a real dataset of 183 Google
Drive users and 131 third party apps, we discover that collaborators inﬂict a privacy loss
which is at least 39% higher than what users themselves cause. We take a step toward
minimizing this loss by introducing the concept of History-based decisions. Simply
put, users are informed at decision time about the vendors which have been previously
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granted access to their data. Thus, they can reduce their privacy loss by not installing
apps from new vendors whenever possible.
Next, we realize this concept by introducing a new privacy indicator, which can be
integrated within the cloud apps’ authorization interface. Via a web experiment with
141 participants recruited from CrowdFlower, we show that our privacy indicator can
signiﬁcantly increase the user’s likelihood of choosing the app thatminimizes her privacy
loss.
Finally, we explore the network effect of History-based decisions via a simulation on top
of large collaboration networks. We demonstrate that adopting such a decision-making
process is capable of reducing the growth of users’ privacy loss by 70% in a Google
Drive-based network and by 40% in an author collaboration network. This is despite the
fact that we neither assume that users cooperate nor that they exhibit altruistic behavior.
To our knowledge, our work is the ﬁrst to provide quantiﬁable evidence of the privacy
risk that collaborators pose in cloud apps. We are also the ﬁrst to mitigate this problem
via a usable privacy approach.
This work —portrayed in Chapter 5 —has been published in this paper [HA17]:
“If You Can’t Beat Them, Join Them”:
A Usability Approach to Interdependent Privacy in Cloud Apps.
Hamza Harkous and Karl Aberer. In Proceedings of the Seventh ACM on
Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy, CODASPY ’17,
pages 127–138, New York, NY, USA, 2017. ACM.
To pave the way for these two chapters, we give an overview of the ecosystem of third party
cloud apps in Chapter 3.
PriBot: A Question Answering Chatbot for Privacy Policies
The last core component of this thesis is focused on the third major gap we identiﬁed: how to
deal with the prevalent language complexity problem in privacy notices? We turn our focus on
the ﬂagship case of this issue: privacy policies.
We address this problem by proposing PriBot, the ﬁrst question-answering (QA) system for
privacy policies. In a fully automated approach, PriBot takes a previously unseen privacy
policy and uses it to answer, in real time with high accuracy and relevance, user questions that
are posed in free form.
We make multiple contributions to overcome challenges related to the discrepancy of language
between user’s questions and policies as well as the lack of privacy-related QA datasets. In
particular, we propose two algorithms based on deep learning for extracting answers from a
privacy policy for a given question.
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Our user study, with 1,186 participants, shows that PriBot’s top three responses are relevant
answers for 91% of 120 real-world privacy questions posted on Twitter. Our best algorithm
further outperforms traditional methods by 15% regarding the accuracy of generated results.
We present a practical implementation of PriBot, which is ready for public use and discuss
real-world applications of the proposed approach.
At the time of writing of this thesis, PriBot is under submission [HFL+17]:
PriBot: Answering Free-form Questions about Privacy Policies with Deep Learning
Hamza Harkous, Kassem Fawaz, Rémi Lebret, Florian Schaub,
Kang G. Shin, and Karl Aberer. Technical report, 2017
We have outlined the vision for PriBot in [HFSA16]:
Pribots: Conversational Privacy with Chatbots.
Hamza Harkous, Kassem Fawaz, Kang G. Shin, and Karl Aberer.
In Workshop on the Future of Privacy Notices and Indicators, SOUPS 2016,
Denver, CO, USA, June 22, 2016. USENIX Association, 2016.
PriBot will be the subject of Chapter 6. We conclude this thesis in Chapter 7, by giving a
summary of our ﬁndings and an overview of potential future directions.







In this chapter, we embark on the task of bridging the scale adaptation gap: i.e., how to help
users manage their privacy with the expanding amount of data that is being shared and the
limited time available?. Towards that, we consider the case of cloud storage providers, provided
that they have acquired a ubiquitous presence in our digital lives. Given the pervasiveness of
useful cloud services such as storage, online document editing, media streaming, etc., data
which would normally be on the user’s local machine, now invariably lies in the cloud. As
we have seen in the previous years, these platforms are not always a safe haven, especially
with the large-scale exposure of data to governmental agencies by the big players in this
domain [GM13].
2.1.1 Motivation and Challenges
In order to inform potential solutions, we identify three major stumbling blocks towards
privacy provision in the cloud:
a) Privacy vs. Services Dilemma: To tackle privacy concerns, some cloud computing com-
panies provide the users with the option of client-side encryption to protect the data before
it leaves the users’ device, thus preventing any other entity from data decryption, including
the cloud provider itself. However, while this approach eliminates most of the data privacy
concerns, its main disadvantage is that the user cannot readily utilize existing cloud services.
For some services, attempts exist at designing alternatives that operate over encrypted data,
beneﬁting from the recent breakthroughs in homomorphic encryption [Gen09]. In addition
to resulting in services orders of magnitude less efﬁcient than their counterparts, homomor-
phic encryption is provably not sufﬁcient for constructing several essential services involving
multiple users [VDJ10]. Furthermore, resorting to homomorphic encryption as the ultimate
solution requires rewriting most of the cloud applications’ code to operate over the encrypted
data. New versions of existing LATEXcompilers, photo ﬁlters, music recommenders, etc., based
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on homomorphic encryption, will need to be programmed with the goal of keeping all data
private, which is evidently non-realistic.
b) Difﬁculty of manually assessing data privacy levels: Users cannot be expected to individ-
ually assess the sensitivity level for each item before they share it as that can require a lot
of investment in terms of time and effort, coupled with technical expertise. A recent sur-
vey [Pro13] has shown that, in one out of four organizations, the management has little or no
understanding of what constitutes sensitive data. Evidently, this fraction is expected to be
signiﬁcantly higher for individual users.
c) General lack of awareness about privacy: This includes limited notions about privacy
being restricted to hiding “sensitive” content, such as personal identiﬁcation numbers, credit
card details, etc. Often, the metadata associated with the data item, the location and device
from which the item is shared, the entity with whom the data is shared, etc., can be as
important as the content of the data itself.
In our solution for privacy provision in the cloud, we seek to overcome the above hurdles.
2.1.2 Approach and Contributions
How do we address the “stumbling blocks” that we identiﬁed in Section 2.1.1? First, we show
how we can use a centralized solution to facilitate crowdsourcing for privacy without requiring
the revelation of users’ preferences. We argue that to achieve this, cryptographic methods
are infeasible, and we present a novel design that allows users to reveal their preferences
to the central server privately. We show how an existing psychologically grounded method
for analyzing users’ preferences and data properties, can be rigorously used to analyze this
crowdsourced information. Users can then reap the beneﬁts of this crowdsourced information
as the server analyzes it to provide them with sensitivity indicators when they share new data.
By crowdsourcing the solution, users are no longer isolated individuals who lack privacy
awareness. They can now be guided by the Wisdom of the Crowd. Also, they do not have to
exertmanual effort to ﬁnd the sensitivity associatedwith each item they share, as the server can
guide them automatically. Furthermore, they need not worry about getting stuck with “bad”
crowdsourced information, i.e., about the majority of users being as clueless about privacy as
them. This is because the psychometric method we use for analyzing this information, Item
Response Theory, ensures that computed parameters of data items do not only apply to a
speciﬁc sample of people. The solution would ensure, for example, that sharing compromising
photos of oneself with the public is deemed risky even when the majority of the participants
in the system are doing so. Only a few conservative users in the system are enough to keep the
system risk-averse. Finally, we validate our design with both simulation and empirical data,
thus showing the feasibility of our solution.
Speciﬁcally, we make the following main contributions in this chapter:
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– We propose a privacy framework, called Context-aware Crowdsourced Cloud Privacy
(shortly C3P), which is speciﬁc to the cloud scenario and incorporates the nuances of
data sharing, such as the Privacy vs. Services Dilemma and Lack of Privacy Awareness
and Effort on the part of most users.
– We create a realistic vocabulary for a personal cloud, and use it to create “Human
Intelligence Tasks” on the Amazon Mechanical Turk. We measure people’s responses,
in terms of their privacy attitudes, against the Item Response Theory (IRT) and ﬁnd a
good ﬁt. We thereby demonstrate that Item Response Theory, a well-used psychometric
model for diverse purposes, can be applied fruitfully in the cloud scenario.
– Our solution depends on crowdsourcing the contexts and policies associatedwith shared
items. The sensitivity associated with different items is determined by grouping together
same (or similar) contexts and analyzing different policies set by people with different
privacy attitudes. However, we also have to ensure the privacy of this aggregated context
information. Towards that aim, we provide a lightweight mechanism based on K-
Anonymity [Swe02] for privately calculating the similarity between items in a centralized
way, without depending on infeasible cryptographic methods.
– We perform a set of experiments using synthetic data, with various graphs for user
activities, item distribution, and types of users (honest vs. malicious).
– Finally, we use the Enron email dataset for evaluating C3P [Nui]. This dataset gives us a
good model of users sharing activities and the diversity of data items (and their contexts).
Under both datasets, we show that our scheme bootstraps quickly and provides accurate
privacy scores in varying conditions.
2.2 System Model
2.2.1 Interacting Entities
We consider a system involving interactions between two types of entities: end-users and cloud
service providers (CSPs). The end-user can play one of two roles: data sharer or data observer
while the cloud provider can only be a data observer. A data sharer is an end-user who shares
data items she possesses. A data observer is any entity that is given access to observe the
shared items by the data sharer.
We assume that the user sends her data to a single CSP, called the intermediary that acts as the
repository for this user’s data. The user can select to give other 3rd party providers access to her
data through that CSP (e.g. when the latter has an API that the other providers can use). The
interaction between these two types of entities is in the form of data sharing operations. Each
such operation is initiated by an end-user s0 who shares a data item d (e.g. document, picture,
etc.) with a CSP or another user s1. Additionally, the data sharer intends from the sharing
operation to obtain a certain service of interest, such as music streaming, document viewing,
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ﬁle syncing, etc. The network is dynamic, in the sense that these entities can enter and leave
the network, and the user items can be shared over time, not necessarily concurrently.
2.2.2 Threat Model
We assume that the user is interested in hiding her sensitive data from the CSPs. Existing
privacy threat models, concerned with structured data, consider an adversary who attempts at
discovering quantiﬁable sensitive information, such as location, browsing history, credit card
information, etc. In our model, we do not set an a priori deﬁnition of sensitive information due
to the heterogeneity of the shared data items we consider. Instead, we develop a protocol that
quantiﬁes the sensitivity of a certain sharing operation (determined by its context), based on
the protection mechanisms that people use. Furthermore, we assume that the CSP is honest
but curious, in the sense that it follows the protocol, but it can arbitrarily analyze the protocol
transcript ofﬂine to infer extra information.
2.2.3 Our Conceptual Framework
We now discuss the key concepts and components that underlie C3P, our conceptual frame-
work for privacy provision in the cloud.
Context Vocabulary In Section 2.3, we use the notion of Context vocabulary to deﬁne the
contexts of items shared in a given domain. A context accounts for the content features of
the items, the metadata associated with it, and the environment of the sharing operation (e.g.
data observers, the device used, etc.).
Sharing Policy People can share different data items with different policies, where a policy is
in the range [0,1] and 0 signiﬁes full transparency while 1 signiﬁes full obscurity. We discuss
this in more detail in Section 2.3.2.
Crowd-Sourcing In C3P, after each sharing operation, the context of the item and the policy
applied are eventually aggregated at the cloud via a privacy preserving mechanism. This
aggregation is required so that the Lack of Privacy Awareness may be overcome, and individual
decisions could be guided by the Wisdom of the Crowd.
Risk Evaluation Based on the processing and analysis of the crowdsourced information, the
system can guide others about the privacy risk that is posed by sharing different items in
different contexts. Towards that aim, we use Item Response Theory (IRT) which is a well-known
psychometric function that has been widely used in psychology, education, public health, and
computerized adaptive testing.
Policy Recommendation The ﬁnal component in C3P is a suite of risk mitigation applications.
By this, we mean system recommended policies that can guide the general user in minimizing
































Figure 2.1 – Sequence diagram of the system
leave it for future work.
In Figure 2.1, we show a sequence diagram summarizing the steps taken in one run of the
system. The client contacts the server with a private query about the sensitivity of the current
context (t=1), in a way that the server remains oblivious to the actual context. Upon receiving
the responsewith the sensitivity (t=2), the client locally computes the privacy risk of sharing the
data (t=3) and decides on the relevant protection mechanism (t=4). Next, the client sends the
data at t=5. At a later round (t=i), the client sends the context along with the used policy after it
makes sure that the server cannot associate the context with the actual sharing operation. The
server determines the similarity of this item with other items that users have crowdsourced to
it. Using psychometric functions, the server computes the sensitivity associated with the item
being shared, which is used to respond to future sensitivity queries.
2.3 Context Vocabulary and Sharing Policies
We begin by describing the fundamental C3P building blocks, which refer to the context in
which an item is shared and the policy with which the item is shared.
2.3.1 Context Vocabulary
We introduce the technical notion of “Context”, which includes the metadata associated with
a particular data item, user supplied information about the data item (such as tags), and
the environment features in which the data is being shared (such as the device information
or the relationship with the observer). Furthermore, “Context” also includes information










Figure 2.2 – An example vocabulary for data sharing in the personal cloud
extracted through content analysis of the data item, such as topic modeling in the case of a
text document and face recognition in the case of images.
For an illustration of “Context”, consider a casewhere Bob shares aword document on ﬁnancial
risk, authored by the sharer (i.e. Bob himself) on Bob’s laptop and shared with a colleague.
The words in italics capture the context of the data item. For a speciﬁc domain, “Context
Vocabulary” is the set of all features that can be used to represent any shared item in that
domain. Put in another way, the context vocabulary is the vocabulary that can be used to
represent all possible contexts in a given domain. We give an example of such a vocabulary in
Figure 2.2.
The general template for a context of an item would be a tuple of the general form:
(f1=value1, f2=value2,..., fm= value3)
containing m features. Thus, the context of the data item in the above example would be
(file_type=word document, topic=financial risk, sender_device=laptop,
author=sender, observer=colleague).
It should be noted that there are usually two kinds of features associated with a data item. The
ﬁrst are those which are by default associated with the data item, e.g., data type, and other
metadata information, e.g., author, which are available (or can be extracted by anyone) if
the data item is shared completely transparently as in plaintext. We term these as explicit
features. The second are deﬁned by the sharer when sharing the data item or are based on a
private knowledge base (e.g. observer or other tags associated with the item). We term these as
implicit features.
We note here that it is not necessary (or even usual) for all data items to have all context
features available. An item’s context is deﬁned by whatever features are available. For example,
if we have a pdf ﬁle which does not have its author present, then obviously the author feature
in the ﬁle’s context would be empty.
2.3.2 Sharing Policies
When a user decides to share a data item, this is done with a policy. This policy ranges from
0 to 1, where 0 signiﬁes full transparency while 1 signiﬁes full obscurity. For example, if the
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user decides to encrypt a ﬁle, then this would be symbolized by a policy value of 1. On the
other hand, sharing an unencrypted ﬁle while hiding some meta-data features (e.g., author,
modiﬁed_by, etc.) would result in a policy value between 0 and 1. Between these two extremes
lie the other obfuscation methods.
2.4 Crowd-Sourcing and Risk Evaluation
As shown in Figure 2.1, a client can privately query the server about the sensitivity of a speciﬁc
sharing operation and get a response based on that. In this section, we describe these parts of
C3P in more detail. Informally speaking, the privacy guarantee that we achieve throughout is
that, at any time, the server has multiple contexts that can be associated with each sharing
operation. Accordingly, the context of each operation is never deterministically disclosed to
the server.
2.4.1 Privacy Aware Querying
Directly sending the context to the server allows it to associate the sharing operation with that
context, which we aim to avoid. Instead, we describe a scheme, where the client queries the
server about multiple dummy contexts, in a way that hides the actually requested one1.
QuerySet Formation
We denote by targetContext the context for which the client is querying. This context is
sent as part of a QuerySet, containing other contexts, which we term as homonyms. As shown
in Figure 2.3a, suppose that the targetContext is c1: (f1=x1,f2=v1,f3=w1). The client
forms a list of alternative values for each feature, e.g. L = [{x1,x2,x5}, {v1,v3,v6}, {w1,w2,w3}]
so that, in total, each feature has k possible values. Then the homonyms are formed by
producing the cartesian product of all the sets in L. This results in contexts having different
combinations of feature values. With m features per context, L has km contexts in total.
The choice of the alternative feature values is not totally at random. In order to allow
targetContexts to appear faster in multiple QuerySets, thus approaching the privacy con-
dition formalized in this section, the client keeps a Pending List (PL), containing previously
queried targetContexts. The feature values of those contexts are used in forming the set
L (cf. Figure 2.3a). In particular, we select at random a maximum of p×k values2 of those
values per feature. The rest of the potential feature values are sampled at random from the
domain of each feature.
The client sends this QuerySet to the server. The server, on receiving a QuerySet, responds
1This querying step is partially similar to other obfuscation techniques (e.g., [HN09]), but its guarantees differ
due to the speciﬁcs of our context.
2p is a constant (0< p < 1) (we take p = 2/3 in our experiments).
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with a subset of all those contexts for which it knows the sensitivity3. If the sensitivity of
the targetContext is also returned by the server, the client decides to apply a policy on the
data item based on the sensitivity value; otherwise, the client can choose to do the same
uninformed. From an implementation perspective, this sharing policy can either be applied
automatically or used to suggest settings that the user can approve. In this work, we focus
on computing the sensitivity, and we give a practical example of how it can be practically
integrated in Section 2.6. Next, the actual data item is sent to the server. Once the server
receives the actual data item, it can try to infer as much as it can from the targetContext
and the item. We distinguish between two parts of the targetContext:
– exposed part: This part consists of those explicit features as deﬁned in Section 2.3.1,
which the client did not choose to hide.
– unexposed part: This part contains all the implicit features and the subset of the explicit
features which have been hidden by the client according to the sharing policy.
It is evident to notice that, by the construction of the QuerySet, the server is not able to
deterministically infer any feature of the unexposed part of the context. In particular, the
server has k possible values for each unexposed feature. Accordingly, assuming there are u
features in the unexposed part, we will have ku contexts that match the exposed part of the
targetContext (remember that each feature had k values in the QuerySet). We call this set of
contexts the Anonymity Subset (Ai ) of the targetContext ci , and we illustrate its contents
with an example in Figure 2.3b. With respect to the server, one of the elements of this subset is
the targetContext, but no element can be ruled out without further information.
To formulate our ﬁndings, we present the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1. We say that a context c can be validly associated with the sharing operation of
item di if c has appeared in Ai and if the server cannot assert with certainty that c exclusively
belongs to one or more Anonymity Subsets other than Ai .
For example, based on Figure 2.3, c1, c4, c5, and c6 are example contexts that can be validly
associated with the current sharing operation. Given what the server currently receives (i.e.,
the queries and the data), it cannot gain any evidence that these contexts are dummy contexts.
Hence, at this stage, we have the following guarantee:
Guarantee 1. At the querying phase, the server receives ku contexts that can be validly associated
with the current sharing operation.





















(a) QuerySet formation: Consider the given
targetContext. We ﬁrst populate the possible
feature values from the Pending List, to get
{x1,x2}, {v1,v3}, and {w1,w2,w3}. Our goal is to
have k = 3 values per feature. Hence, we amend
these values with random feature values from
the domain (i.e., x5 and v6 in this case). The
list L contains k possible values for each feature.
The QuerySet is formed from cartesian product















(b) Anonymity Subset deﬁnition: We start with
QuerySet that has been formed in Figure 2.3a
(we show 4 of its members). The actual value of
feature f1 has been exposed (e.g., when f1 cor-
responds to the ﬁle author, and the user did not
hide this metadata feature). Hence, the contexts
which have f1 = x1 (e.g., c5) are excluded. There
are ku contexts still included as a result (u = 2 is
the number of unexposed features.)
Figure 2.3 – An example showing the formation of the QuerySet and of the Anonymity Subset
Crowdsourcing
Up till now, we have shown how the client privately queries the server about the sensitivity.
In order to compute this sensitivity, the server relies on crowdsourcing, through privately
collecting targetContexts along with the corresponding sharing policies (together called
the Crowdsourcing Information (CI )) from different clients. We alternatively say that a
context c is crowdsourced when CI (c) is sent to the server.
A (non-malicious) client should not send dummy information in this phase in order not to
affect the accuracy of the sensitivity computation4. Hence, the server should receive the
correct contexts and sharing policies from the client. Thus, we now present the scheme in
which client sends the CI in a way that continues to maintain Guarantee 1 for all the sharing
operations. As a result, the server will be able to know, for example, that a client Bob shared
a ﬁnancial document with a colleague in a plaintext form, but it will not be able to link the
document topic or his relationship with the observer to a speciﬁc sharing operation.
One way that guarantee might be weakened is if the client sends theCI in a way that allows the
server to discover the Anonymity Subset in which the context was the targetContext. For
example, sending CI (c) directly after c has appeared in a single Anonymity Subset A1 will
reveal to the server that c corresponds to data d1. In this case, all the other homonyms in A1
4We do not discuss the case of malicious clients here, but we do study the effect of such clients in the simulations
later.
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will no more be validly associated with it. Hence, the ﬁrst intuitive measure for preventing this
association is to wait until a context appears in multiple Anonymity Subsets before sending
the CI .
However, this measure is not sufﬁcient. Consider the case of two contexts cx and cy , both only
appearing in Anonymity Subsets A4 and A6. Suppose that we require that a context appears
in at least two Anonymity Subsets before it is sent. Then, bothCI (cx) andCI (cy ) will be sent
directly after item d6 (with Anonymity Subset A6) is sent. At this point, the server is sure
that one of cx and cy is the targetContext for A4 and the other for A6. All of the other ku −2
contexts that have appeared in A4 and A6 are no more possible candidates for being the actual
targetContext from the viewpoint of the server. Hence, Guarantee 1 for these two sharing
operations is weakened as the ku −2 contexts are now deterministically excluded from A4 and
A6.
The guarantee would be weakened further if there was a third item d8 that has been subse-
quently sent, with its context c8 appearing in A4 and A8. From the server’s viewpoint, A4
is no more a valid possibility for c8 due to the mapping deduced when cx and cy were sent.
Therefore, the server can deterministically associate A8 with c8, and the actual context for d8
is revealed.
The main weakness in this naive method is that it does not account for the fact the server
can link multiple sending instances and reduce the possibility of mapping to a single case.
Our strategy to counteract that and keep Guarantee 1 is to verify that crowdsourcing the next
context preserves the property that each sent context item is still validly associated with all
the Anonymity Subsets it has appeared in.
At this point we add another deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 2. We say that there is a validmapping from a list of contexts to a list of Anonymity
Subsets if each context in the former can be validly associated with a distinct Anonymity
Subset from the latter.
Suppose the client has just completed the sharing operation i , and is attempting to crowd-
source the contexts that have not been sent yet, which are kept in its Pending List (PL).
We also denote by SL the Sent List, containing all contexts that have been crowdsourced
previously5, and by G the group of all client’s Anonymity Subsets up to (and including) Ai .
Towards achieving Guarantee 1, a context cˆ ∈ PL can be crowdsourced only when the following
two conditions are true:
1. c appears in at least r Anonymity Subsets
2. For each A ∈G , there exists a valid mapping from the list SL′ = SL∪ {c} of contexts to
the list G \ A of Anonymity Subsets.
5We assume throughout that such lists of contexts contain distinct elements; i.e., each user sends one
(context,decision) tuple for each context.
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Figure 2.4 – Checking privacy conditions before crowdsourcing context c2
Going back to the previous example, after each of cx and cy has appeared in two Anonymity
Subsets, condition 1 is satisﬁed assuming r = 2. However, condition 2 is not satisﬁed since
excluding A4 will lead to G \ A4 = {A6}, and then we cannot map each context to a distinct
anonymity set.
Figure 2.4 illustrates with another example how the two conditions can be veriﬁed. For each
targetContext, the client maintains a list of the Anonymity Subsets it has appeared in. In
addition, itmaintains two lists: U1, containing the targetContexts that have not satisﬁed the
ﬁrst condition yet6, and S1U2, containing the list of items that have satisﬁed the ﬁrst condition
but not the second. The ﬁgure shows a valid mapping that exists for each Anonymity Subset
in G when c2 is considered for crowdsourcing. It is worth noting that PL =U1⋃S1U2. Also, as
discussed in Section 2.4.1, when the contexts of PL appear in more Anonymity Subsets, the
above privacy conditions will be satisﬁed faster; hence, they were used in the construction of
the QuerySet.
Theorem 1. Checking conditions 1 and 2 allows preserving Guarantee 1.
Proof. Consider any context cˆ that is about to be crowdsourced. Let Z be the list of all contexts
that appeared in the elements of G . In order to preserve Guarantee 1, all the contexts in Z
should remain validly associated with the Anonymity Subsets they have appeared in. We can
write Z as Z = (SL′)∪ (Z \SL′); i.e., it is the union of the contexts that should have been sent
after this operation and those that have not been sent yet.
Condition 2 above implies that after cˆ is sent, we can still claim that: for each A ∈G , there is a
possibility that the targetContext of A has not been sent yet. Hence, each context c ∈ SL′,
can still be validly associated with all the r subsets it appeared in.
It is evident that there is no new information being sent about the contexts in (Z \ SL′).
Therefore, all the contexts in Z can still be validly associated with the Anonymity Subsets
they appeared in. Accordingly, Guarantee 1 is preserved.
6regardless of whether the second condition is satisﬁed
26 CHAPTER 2. CONTEXT-AWARE, CROWDSOURCED CLOUD PRIVACY
2.4.2 On the Privacy Guarantee
The goal of C3P is to provide a light-weight, non-cryptographic mechanism for sensitivity
querying and for delivering crowdsourced information to the central server. So far, we have
shown that the provided privacy guarantee is that the server cannot determine —with cer-
tainty —that a certain context is associated with a speciﬁc sharing operation. The server has
ku contexts that can be associated with each sharing operation, where u is the size of the
unexposed part of the context.
To give more intuition on why this guarantee makes sense in our setting, we take an example
of a user sharing an image with the following context:
(file_type=image, scene=indoor, faces=wife, location=home,
taken_with=user_camera, camera_type=smartphone, time_captured=recent,
observer=family ).
Assume that the sharing policy consists of stripping the image metadata. Hence, the unexposed
features are:
{location, taken_with, camera_type, time_captured, observer },
and the features that are exposed when the server receives the image are:
{file_type, scene, faces}.
If the user wants to only participate in the querying phase and not in the crowdsourcing phase,
then the privacy guarantee could be:
Each targetContext, for which the user requests the sensitivity, is anonymized
among ku homonyms (u = 5 in this case).
If the user participates in the crowdsourcing phase, then the contexts that reach the server
in that phase need to be accurate. Hence, the server must receive the full context along with
the user’s sharing policy. Our scheme guarantees that the server will not deterministically
associate the crowdsourced context with this sharing operation.
Without this guarantee, the server will know that the current receiver of the image is a family
member, that this sender is sharing his indoor photos with that observer, that this particular
photo has been taken at the senders’ home, etc.
With our scheme, the user has the ability to repudiate. The server cannot deterministically
associate the current receiver with the observer feature, will not know whether this photo is
indeed an indoor photo, and will not be sure of the location where the photo was taken 7.
Discussion: We note that an alternative scheme for crowdsourcing that includes encrypting
the context before sharing it would not work. In C3P, the server is required to use a similarity
7We assume that the server does not have additional background information about the user.)
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function to match the context with other ones sent by people in order to compute the context
sensitivity. Even if we encrypt the context before we send it, the server will be able to know it
by computing its similarity with all the possible contexts in the vocabulary (as the latter are
not large enough to prevent being iterated over easily). Another place where encryption might
be applied is in the querying phase, where Private Information Retrieval (PIR) techniques with
constant communication complexity might replace the QuerySet technique. However, as
the complexity gain is absent, and the privacy guarantee obtained by the querying phase is
limited by the crowdsourcing phase, we do not resort to the encryption-based method, which
is more complex to implement.
2.4.3 Sensitivity and Risk Evaluation
When the server receives the Crowdsourcing Information, it seeks to determine the sensi-
tivity associated with this item based on same or similar items shared with different policies in
the past by different users. The client, upon receiving this sensitivity, locally computes the
privacy risk of sharing. In this chapter, for computing the sensitivity, we use Item Response
Theory (IRT), a well-known psychometric function, which we describe next.
Sensitivity Computation by the Server
Item Response Theory (IRT) is a modern test theory typically used for analyzing questionnaires
to relate the examinees’ probability of answering a question correctly (or in general a correct
response probability Pi j ) to two elements: (1) the difﬁculty of the question (or in general a
latent threshold parameter βi of item i ) and (2) the examinees’ abilities to answer questions
(or in general a latent parameter θ j for each person j ). In contrast to Classical Test Theory
(CTT), which measures a person’s ability based on averages and summations over the items,
IRT has two distinguishing features: (1) the group invariance of calculated item parameters
(i.e. a single item’s parameters do not only apply to the current user sample, assuming the
social norms will not vary signiﬁcantly) and (2) the item invariance of a person’s latent trait
(i.e. the trait is invariant with respect to the items used to determine it) [Bak01].
In this work, we apply IRT by mapping the item’s difﬁculty to the sensitivity, the user’s trait
to the privacy attitude (or willingness to expose the items), and the response probability to
the policy level of the item. Although this mapping has been done in the context of Facebook
proﬁle items [LT10, QCP+12], we are the ﬁrst to tailor it to multi-featured items based on
unstructured data.
We focus on the unidimensional IRT models, which make three main assumptions about the
data: (1) unidimensionality (i.e. there is a single underlying trait θ that determines the person’s
response), (2) local independence (i.e. for each underlying trait θ, there is no association
between responses to different items), and (3) model ﬁt (i.e. the estimated item and person
parameters can be used to reproduce the observed responses) [RF05]. An IRT model is termed
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as dichotomous if the responses to the questions are binary ones (correct/incorrect) and
polytomous if there are multiple levels of the response (e.g. a ﬁve-level Likert scale with
responses: strongly disagree/disagree/neutral/agree/strongly agree).
The Rasch model, one of the most common IRT models, assumes that the probability of
correct response is a function of θ and β only and that the items are equally discriminative
for testing the underlying trait. It is particularly advantageous with smaller sample sizes, due
to its simplicity and few parameters, and, as we show in Section 2.5.1, it also ﬁts well in the
scenario of cloud data sharing. The parameters of the dichotomous Rasch model for an item i
and a person with parameter θ are related by the following function, called the Item Response
Function (IRF): Pi = 1/(1+e−(θ−βi )).
With polytomous models, we will make the assumption that the policies chosen by the users
are on the same scale for all the items. It is similar to the case of Likert scale, where the
same set of categories are applied for each item in the test. Accordingly, the most suitable
model for us, and whose ﬁt to the cloud scenario will be demonstrated in Section 2.5.1, is the
Rasch Rating Scale Model. For estimating the parameters of the different models, we used
Marginal Maximum Likelihood estimation, which is an expectation-maximization algorithm.
The estimation technique relies on having enough responses for multiple items by different
people. For more details about item response theory models, the reader is referred to the
following works [Bak01, RF05, NO11].
Risk Computation by the Client
The sensitivity is an indication of the magnitude of privacy loss incurred when data is lost.
The client can combine this measure with another measure of the likelihood that this event
happens, using information that is kept locally, such as the level of trust for the current
observer, the level of protection (i.e. the policy as we show do in Section 2.6), etc. The privacy
risk is then a combination of the sensitivity and the likelihood.
2.5 Evaluation and Experiments
2.5.1 Experiments for Validating IRT
Since we shall be using Item Response Theory (IRT) to calculate the sensitivity of shared items,
the ﬁrst question that needs to be answered is this: Can IRT be meaningfully applied in the
cloud scenario in which people share data items in a variety of contexts? In order to investigate
this and to empirically ground our design and subsequent experiments, we validated IRT for
the cloud scenario using real people’s feedback on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Next, we explain
our methodology for this validation.
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Figure 2.5 – Bond-and-Fox Pathway Map on the mTurk data (a dot represents a context item)
Methodology
We created a realistic vocabulary for the personal cloud, and, based on it, we developed a
list of questions that we submitted as Human Intelligence Tasks (HITS) on Amazon mTurk8.
We created two separate HITs for the dichotomous and polytomous cases of IRT. For the
dichotomous case, we asked 96 questions to which we received answers from 81 people. For
the polytomous case (with 3 categories), we asked 16 questions to which we received answers
from 50 people9. Here each question represents a context item while the users’ responses
represent their policies for sharing in the given context.
We analyzed the results using the eRm Package in R [MH07]. For testing the model ﬁt, we
used the standardized (STD) and the mean square (MSQ) inﬁt statistics. An inﬁt statistic is a
weighted ﬁt statistic derived from the squared standardized residual between the observed
data and the one predicted by the model [DA09]. The STD inﬁt indicates whether the data
ﬁts the model perfectly and is also an approximate t-statistic. In Figure 2.5, we show the
STD inﬁt statistic in the two cases of dichotomous and polytomous items, along with the
sensitivity value of items (threshold values in the polytomous case) in each graph, also called
the Bond-and-Fox Pathway Map. We notice that all the values in the polytomous case and
all but one in the dichotomous case lie between -2 and 2, which are the typically acceptable
bounds [DA09]. We also derived the MSQ inﬁt which serves as an indication of whether the
data ﬁts the model usefully, i.e. if it is productive for measurement. We found that the MSQ
inﬁt was in the range [0.7,1.312] for dichotomous items and [0.683,1.287] for polytomous
items, which are both within the typically accepted [0.5,1.5] range [DA09].
Having shown the applicability of IRT to the cloud sharing scenario, we proceed to the evalua-
8The vocabulary and the survey are shown in Appendix A
9The numbers of respondents is generally considered a good number for testing IRT[Lin94]
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tion of C3P.
2.5.2 Synthetic Datasets
In this section we detail, our methodology for evaluating our framework with synthetic data,
followed by the experimental results and discussion.
Methodology
The context items in this dataset were generated by selecting a generic vocabulary with 5
features per context. Each feature of a context had 5 possible values for a total of 3125 possible
contexts. From these contexts, we selected 200 ones at random. There are 500 sharers (or
people) who share these items. In total, for each experiment, we allocated 30000 sharing
instances, each of which represents a data item (corresponding to the context item) shared by
a certain person with another person at a speciﬁc time. The item to share at each instance
is drawn according to a predetermined item distribution (zipf with exponent 2, or uniform,
depending on the experiment).
In our implementation, the distance (and hence similarity) between each pair of contexts is
based on considering the hamming distance over their features10. The people connections for
sending data were modeled using two types of graphs: (i) small world (using the Watts-Strogatz
model with a base degree of 2 and β= 0.5) and (ii) random (with an average degree of 4). Our
simulation is a discrete event based simulation, punctuated by sharing events.
The person who instantiates a sharing event is selected randomly from the graph, weighted by
her degree, so that people who have more neighbors share more items than those with less.
The data receiver is selected randomly from the list of neighbors of the sender. Each person
sends data at a time rate modeled by a Poisson process so that the time between her two
sharing instances is exponentially distributed with an average of 3,6, or 12 hours, depending
on the experiment.
At each sharing instance, the context item’s QuerySet is sent according to our scheme. The
server maintains clusters of contexts it receives, grouped according to a similarity parameter
(whose value of 1 implies that each cluster’s contexts differ by one feature from their cluster
center, etc.). When the server receives a new context, it either maps it to an existing cluster
or assigns it as the center of a new one. All the contexts of a certain cluster are assumed to
have the same sensitivity. The server replies with all the sensitivities it knows for the clusters
to which the contexts in the QuerySetwere mapped. If the reply contains the requested item,
this is considered as a Hit.
In the crowdsourcing phase, upon receiving new Crowdsourcing Information (CI ) from a
10System designers can use any similarity measure best suited for their needs, e.g., those dealing speciﬁcally
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(d) Effect of item distribution
Figure 2.6 – Synthetic dataset graphs
client, the server matches it to a cluster S and tries to compute the sensitivity for S if it is not yet
computed. To achieve an acceptable sample for IRT, we require that (1) S has a minimum of
15 contexts with their policies, (2) that there are 4 other clusters satisfying requirement 1, and
(3) that each of these 4 clusters has at least 8 CIs by people who have also sent CIs appearing
in S. The sensitivities are computed using the marginal maximum likelihood estimation
technique. In all the experiments, unless otherwise stated, the default setting is a small world
social network with zipf item distribution, six hours average sharing interval, and a similarity
parameter of 1. In addition, the value for parameter r is equal to k, which is 3 by default.
Hence, k is the anonymity parameter we use henceforth.
Results and Discussion
Figure 2.6a shows the Hit Rate of users queries over time, where Hit Rate is deﬁned as:
Hit Rate= # of queried items with available sensitivity
total # of queried items
(2.1)
The Hit Rate is calculated per day unless otherwise speciﬁed.
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Anonymity Overhead In Figure 2.6a we can see that the Hit Rate for anonymity parameter
3 is better than the Hit Rate for 4. As discussed earlier, anonymity parameter k implies
that a targetContext for sensitivity must have appeared in k different Anonymity Subsets
and that k different values for each feature in the targetContext must be present in the
QuerySet. The above conditions suggest that the lower the anonymity parameter value, the
more targetContexts would be sent to the server for crowdsourcing, and thus the more
quickly would IRT be able to respond with sensitivity values. The anonymity parameter 1
implies no anonymity at all. We plot this curve to see the “overhead” of our K-anonymity
scheme on top of the time required by IRT. Simply put, the curve for the anonymity parameter
1 represents the time it takes IRT to provide Hit Rates when there is no anonymity scheme in
place. Thus the difference between the curves for anonymity parameters 1 and 3 represents
the overhead of our anonymity scheme in terms of reduced Hit Rate. However, we see that
the curve for 3 converges to the same Hit Rate as 1 in ten days time. This suggests that our
anonymity scheme bootstraps quickly and does not pose signiﬁcant overhead11.
Sharing Interval Effect Figure 2.6b shows the Hit Rate with different sharing intervals in
hours. An interval of 3 means that all users query for the sensitivity of an item every 3 hours
on average. It can be seen from the graphs that initially, the longer the interval, the slower the
increase in the Hit Rate. This is most noticeable around the 5th day when the Hit Rate with an
interval 12 is still around 0.5 and lags signiﬁcantly behind. Eventually, as the server collects
more and more items, the Hit Rates of all sharing intervals converge to similar values.
Similarity Parameter Impact Figure 2.6c shows the Hit Rate with different similarity pa-
rameters. The similarity parameter has been deﬁned in Section 2.5.2. A similarity parameter
of 0 signiﬁes that there is no (zero) difference between two context items while calculating
sensitivity12. Precisely, what this means is that: to calculate the sensitivity of an item, IRT
would require that other contexts, which are exactly the same as this context, be shared with
different policies. A similarity parameter 1 implies that two items that differ by a distance of 1
would be considered the same while 2 implies that items differ by a distance of 2 would be
considered the same. This, in turn, implies that IRT would be able to more quickly calculate
the sensitivity of an item (as opposed to case 0) since there would be more items which are
considered the same. Thus we can see in Figure 2.6c that Hit Rate with similarity parameter 0
is the worst since IRT does not have enough items for calculation.
Item Distribution Effect In Figure 2.6d, we investigate the effects of the “item distribution”
on the Hit Rate. By “item distribution” we mean the distribution of the context items, i.e., the
different contexts in which users share data. This is an important feature because different
11This overhead can be further reduced through bootstrapping the system with initial data collected from
surveys, thus increasing the Hit Rate at the beginning.
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Figure 2.7 – Hit rate and sensitivity difference under various conditions
organizations and different systems would naturally have different item distributions. For
our experiments, we use two different item distributions. One is the zipf distribution, which
has been shown to be most common in social networks [LKG+08]. The other is the random
distribution in which all context items are randomly distributed. A look at the Figure 2.6d
reveals that a zipf distribution “bootstraps” faster than a random distribution. The Hit Rate
with random distribution lags behind zipf by a day, i.e., it reaches the same Hit Rate a day later,
till the ﬁfth day. We argue this is because, given a zipf distribution, users share more similar
items, and thus the crowdsourcing is more effective, and IRT is able to calculate the sensitivity
of items quickly. Given a random distribution, it takes more time for IRT to accumulate enough
similar items for the calculation of sensitivity. However, as the times goes by and more items
are accumulated, both random and zipf converge to around the same values.
Effect of Social Graph In Figure 2.7a we observe the effect of changing the underlying social
network. We use two graphs for the social network structure: small world and random. These
affect the sharing patterns of the users. We see that the effect of the underlying graphs on the
Hit Rate is not signiﬁcant and both lead to similar values, with the small world doing slightly
better than the random network.
Effect of Malicious Users on Sensitivity Figures 2.7b and 2.7c show the effect of malicious
users and changing similarity parameters on the sensitivity values. For this particular set of
experiments, we begin by assigning different sensitivity values to the items and also different
attitudes to the users. As the experiment runs, the policy of the users on sharing the items is
dictated by their attitude and the item sensitivity given at the beginning. The sensitivity of the
items is then calculated by our scheme. We then measure the absolute difference between
the actual sensitivity of the items and the calculated sensitivity. Ideally, there should be no
signiﬁcant difference between the actual sensitivity and the calculated sensitivity. However,
differences could arise under certain conditions. The ﬁrst condition is the presence of mali-
cious users. A malicious user sends random policies for items, i.e., she does not have a ﬁxed
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attitude but rather a random and unpredictable one13. Figure 2.7b shows the effect of such
malicious users on our scheme. The ﬁgure shows the box plots for each item’s normalized
sensitivity difference in terms of percentage. We observe that when there are no malicious
users, the difference is pretty low (in the range [2%,6%]), with most items’ calculated sensitivity
very near the actual sensitivity (the individual dots represent the outliers). This keeps getting
progressively worse as the proportion of malicious users increases. Finally, with a fraction of
0.75 malicious users, most of the items’ calculated sensitivity differs by as much as 30% from
the actual sensitivity.
Effect of Similarity Parameter on Sensitivity In Figure 2.7c, we see that the effect of dif-
ferent similarity parameters on the calculated sensitivity. We observe that, with similarity
parameters 0 and 1, the difference between actual and calculated sensitivity is very low. The
reader will recall that similarity parameter 0 means that two items would only be grouped
together if they are identical. Therefore, when IRT calculates sensitivity value of an item, it
does so on the basis of other identical items for which it has received policies from different
users. Thus the calculated sensitivity value would be in high agreement with actual sensitivity.
With increasing similarity parameter values, the system would group together items which
are not identical, therefore sacriﬁcing accuracy in sensitivity calculation. We observe that the
difference between actual and calculated sensitivity with similarity parameter 2 is greater than
0 and 1. However, as we discussed while explaining the results of Figure 2.6c, a higher value
for the similarity parameter signiﬁes a better Hit Ratio. Therefore, we discover that there is a
tradeoff between accuracy of calculated sensitivity and Hit Rate, as far as similarity parameter
is concerned.
Overall, the above results signify that our approach has a reasonable overhead, with varying
item distributions and social graphs, and is resistant to a considerable fraction of randomly
behaving users.
2.5.3 Enron Experiments
We want to evaluate our scheme in a realistic setting. However, as there is no dataset of users
sharing activities in the cloud that is publicly available, we use the Enron email dataset [Nui].
Sharing data of various types with certain entities in the cloud is analogous to sharing attach-
ments via emails. Speciﬁcally, what we get from this dataset, is a variety of items (hence the
variety of contexts in which real people share these items with others) and also the level of
trust that they have in each other. We explain these points as well as our data extraction and
analysis methodology below.
13We note that, strictly speaking, random choices do not always stem from having intentions to attack the system,
but we use the term “malicious” to signify inconsistencies in the users’ privacy attitudes.
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Methodology
The dataset was obtained in the form of 130 personal storage folders (pst)14. It was processed
using the PST File Format SDK15 and the MIME++ toolkit16. We only considered emails with
attachments, whose metadata was extracted using the GNU Libextractor library17. Precisely,
the main metadata we extracted from ﬁles is: (revision history, last saved by, resource type,
ﬁle type, author name, and creator). We then collected all the email addresses mentioned in
the dataset and grouped the ones corresponding to the same person, based on the patterns
of occurrence of email aliases. Next, the emails of each person were used to obtain the list
of companies she is afﬁliated with according to the email domain, ﬁltering out public email
services (e.g. AOL, Yahoo). We matched all the processed metadata with a speciﬁc vocabulary
we created for the Enron Dataset.
In total, the obtained dataset contained 2510 people sharing 184 distinct contexts over 19415
sharing instances. Moreover, for each ﬁle sender, we calculated a measure of the trust associ-
ated with each receiver based on the frequency of emails exchanged with her. The trust value
T (i , j )= F (i , j )/Max(i ), where F (i , j ) is the number of emails sent from user i to user j , and
Max(i ) is the maximum number of emails sent by user i to any receiver. In our experiments,
the policies we associate with each sending event are dictated by this degree of trust between
the sender and the receiver. We use a similar timing scale as the synthetic experiments, where
each person shares all his items in the sequence the emails were originally sent but with a rate
modeled as a Poisson process.
Results and Discussion
Anonymity Overhead Figure 2.8a shows the Hit Rate of users queries over time, where Hit
Rate is the same as deﬁned in Equation 2.1. The graph is over a period of 10 days. We can see
that with anonymity parameter 1, i.e. with no anonymity scheme in place, the Hit Rate jumps
very quickly. However, anonymity parameter 3 and 4 eventually catch up, and all the curves
show a Hit Rate of 1 by the third day. We argue that this improvement in Hit Rate over the case
of synthetic experiments (see Figure 2.6a) is because the sharing contexts in the Enron dataset
are not diverse and more similar items are collected faster, thus leading to an increase in the
Hit Rate.
Similarity Parameter Impact In Figure 2.8b we can see that with the similarity parameter
equal to 2, the Hit Rate remains at 0 consistently. Our investigation into this reveals to us the
reason behind this strange result. We discover that the context items shared in the Enron
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Figure 2.8 – Enron dataset graphs
are clustered together since most items in the Enron dataset differ from each other by at
most 2 features. As most items are clustered in very few clusters, this means that IRT is not
able to work since it does not ﬁnd enough different items for sensitivity calculation. The
number of different items that IRT requires for working differs on the implementation being
used. Our implementation requires that there must be at least 5 different items for IRT to
work. In the case of similarity 2, these clusters are not available. However, with similarity 1,
enough clusters are found and this, in turn, implies that IRT would be able to more quickly
calculate the sensitivity of an item (as opposed to case 0) since there would be more items
which are considered the same. Therefore, similarity 1 shows better Hit Rate than similarity 0.
These results suggest that using IRT in a scenario where most people share similar items, the
similarity parameter should be low. However, we note that the Enron dataset, being an email
dataset, does not have the same diversity as would be available in a cloud setting.
2.6 Implementation
We have developed a prototype backend system based on C3P, in addition to two clients, a
desktop app (called PrivyShare Desktop) and a web client (called PrivyShare Web), showcasing
its potential.
2.6.1 PrivyShare Desktop App
This app, whose main screen is shown in Figure 2.9 allows users to analyze the risk associated
with ﬁles before they are uploaded to any cloud service. It also gives the option to apply
ﬁne-grained policies instead of encryption only. This enables users to balance the privacy-
utility tradeoff and to still use certain services with their cloud ﬁles (e.g., via 3rd party cloud
applications). PrivyShare Desktop supports any cloud storage provider as long as the app for
that provider is already installed on the user’s operating system. We leverage the fact that each
cloud storage provider typically has an assigned folder on the user’s ﬁlesystem. Hence, when a
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Common Features Text-speciﬁc Image-speciﬁc
Recency (day, week, year, more) Topic Identiﬁer Small Faces Count
Creator (social group) Medium Faces Count
Recipient (social group) Large Faces Count
Device Type (phone, tablet, camera, desktop) Location available




Table 2.1 – Features extracted from ﬁles in PrivyShare Desktop app; some of the features are
extracted from both text ﬁles (e.g., word documents, presentations, worksheets, etc.) and
images ﬁles. Other features are speciﬁc to the ﬁletype.
ﬁle is to be uploaded to that service, our app transfers the ﬁle to the corresponding service
folder.
A typical ﬂow of actions for an upload goes as follows:
– A user drops the ﬁle into the icon of one of the existing cloud provider (see Figure 2.9).
The app extracts the features of the ﬁle at the client side and builds the QuerySet
according to the C3P protocol. These features are shown in Table 2.1. For feature
extraction, we used a combination of Apache Tika18, OpenCV19, and Mallet20, which
were tailored to our purposes. Then the client sends the QuerySet to the server and
receives the sensitivity result. If the sensitivity data is available, it is used to compute the
risk, which appears via the risk meter on the right side of the screen. The risk itself is
chosen to be a normalized product of the sensitivity and the policy level applied. The
policy level ranges from 0 when the ﬁle is encrypted to 1 when the ﬁle is sent in plain
text. In between, there is a range of predeﬁned ﬁne-grained policies (e.g., based on the
fraction of metadata removed or the auxiliary information uploaded with the ﬁle as we
describe below).
– The user has the option to see the most important metadata ﬁelds of the ﬁle, which are
visualized to make them more comprehensible (Figure 2.10). For example, the location
metadata shows the actual location of the photo on the map. In addition, the user can
hide each of the metadata ﬁelds (Figure 2.11), which is one type of the ﬁne-grained
policies provided. For metadata hiding we used a combination of Apache POI21 and
Apache Commons Imaging22.
– Another option provided is to encrypt the ﬁle on the client side before uploading (Fig-
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Figure 2.9 – Main screen of PrivyShare Desktop app.
Figure 2.10 – Page for viewing and editing the metadata in PrivyShare Desktop app; more
metadata ﬁelds are adjustable in a secondary menu.
Figure 2.11 – Ability to toggle metadata visibility by clicking on it.
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Figure 2.12 – Encryption options page in PrivyShare Desktop. Clicking on the key are will
toggle encryption. Clicking on the thumbnail area will toggle adding a thumbnail.
Figure 2.13 – Page for editing thumbnails. Faces can be detected and blurred automatically.
The resolution is low by default but can also be adjusted along with the blur strength.
an image thumbnail or searching through text ﬁles), we give the option to attach auxil-
iary info to the encrypted ﬁle. In the case of photos, the app can add a low-resolution
thumbnail, which allows the photos to be navigable on the cloud storage web apps,
without exposing the photo itself (Figure 2.13)23. Faces in the thumbnail are detected
automatically, and the user can also manually blur additional areas. In the case of textual
ﬁles, the thumbnail of the ﬁrst page/slide is also attachable. The app gives the option to
attach a textual summary to the uploaded ﬁle, which can be indexed on the server side.
– When the user conﬁrms the upload, the ﬁle is synchronized from its original folder to
the folder of the cloud storage service. For example, in Figure 2.14, we see the image
and its thumbnail in the original folder. In Figure 2.15, we see the thumbnail with the
23We note here that, in the current web interfaces of cloud storage services, these thumbnails appear as individual
ﬁles next to the original ﬁles when sorted by name. We have plans to add support for a web interface of PrivyShare
that connects to the various cloud providers” APIs and shows these ﬁles as one ﬁle with auxiliary information.
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Figure 2.14 – Original image which is intended to be synchronized to the cloud storage service,
along with the generated thumbnail.
Figure 2.15 – Dropbox folder, to which the image is encrypted and synchronized, along with a
low-resolution thumbnail.
blurred face and the full encrypted photo in the Dropbox folder of the user. Whenever
the original ﬁle changes, the policy is reapplied, and the ﬁle is synchronized again. For
synchronizing ﬁles, including encrypted ones, we utilized JFileSync324.
The goal behind PrivyShare Desktop was to show what is possible to achieve on the client side
before uploading ﬁles to cloud storage services. Users, however, are not expected to update
the ﬁne-grained policy for each ﬁle. Instead, they can set a predeﬁned risk threshold they
tolerate, and the ﬁne-grained policy is applied based on the sensitivity of the ﬁle and the risk
threshold. A natural extension of this app is to add the possibility of visualizing the risk across
and setting the policy across a larger number of ﬁles, which takes the app further towards the




2.6.2 PrivyShare Web App
One shortcoming of PrivyShare Desktop is that, despite the users having the option to set
ﬁne-grained policies, it is not apparent to them how this reﬂects on the services they can still
use with their ﬁles online. Moreover, with the emergence of web apps, users are less willing to
install additional apps on their machines. In order to cope with these issues, we developed a
web app, called PrivyShare Web, which is utilized by simply going to the app’s URL in their
browser.
The web app allows users to drop multiple ﬁles, whose features are extracted on the client-side
of the browser (see Figure 2.17). This includes metadata features (e.g., location) and content
(e.g., faces, topic). Then users can apply a policy level, which allows them to encrypt ﬁles,
depending on their determined sensitivity (via the C3P protocol). The policy level ranges
from “zero” (where all ﬁles are in plain text) to “high” (where all ﬁles are encrypted). For
client-side ﬁle encryption in the browser, we used SpiderOak Crypton25. The policy level can
be automatically set based on users’ preconﬁgured risk threshold, as discussed earlier. It is
worth noting that, compared to PrivyShare Desktop, the policy level is ﬁne-grained at the level
of all ﬁles and not per ﬁle (i.e., it adjusts which of the ﬁles are encrypted, rather than what
policy to apply to a speciﬁc ﬁle).
In order to educate the user about the privacy-utility tradeoff, our app requests access to the
users’ list of installed 3rd party apps (e.g., PDF converters or image editors that can import
ﬁles from cloud storage services). In the example, we show how this works with the user’s
preinstalled Google Drive apps26. The user can see the list of apps whose functionality might
be affected by the current upload (Figure 2.19). By clicking on a speciﬁc app, the user can
zoom into the actual ﬁles which are affected (Figure 2.20).
Both PrivyShare Desktop and PrivyShare Web serve as prototypes showing what is possible
with a sensitivity as a service and that ﬁne-grained control over ﬁles uploaded to cloud storage
is possible. We believe though that there is further need for conducting usability studies for
such implementations, to assess how they are perceived by real users, which we leave for
future works. Moreover, we note that, despite the various options we illustrated, we envision
the system to be highly automated, applying the policy level based on the estimated sensitivity.
The users’ effort is simply to approve or change the recommended settings before the ﬁnal
upload occurs.
25https://spideroak.com/solutions/crypton-framework
26PrivyShare Web gets access to the list of Google Drive through a separate authentication mechanism via OAuth
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Figure 2.16 – Upload area of PrivyShare Web app.
Figure 2.17 – File Analysis interface once the ﬁles are dropped into the upload area.
Figure 2.18 – Ability to set the policy level; ﬁles which are to be encrypted (based on their
sensitivity) automatically move to the right.
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Figure 2.19 – The part of PrivyShare web showing the subset of the user’s apps that can be
potentially affected by the current upload (i.e., based on the ﬁle types the apps have access to).
Figure 2.20 – Clicking on a speciﬁc app will show the speciﬁc ﬁles that will no more be usable,
due to client-side encryption.
2.7 Related Work
Context-based Privacy Modeling
The concept of contextual privacy has received attention recently. Nissenbaum’s work on
“contextual integrity” [Nis11, Nis04] was one of the notable contributions that called for articu-
lating context-based rules and expectations and for embedding some of them in law.
Context-aware systems have been applied in multiple scenarios, ranging from social networks
to ubiquitous computing. Schaub et al., showcased a model that abstracts context information
about the user, the privacy-sensitive items, and the entities involved in the environment.
They took into account information privacy aspects as well as physical aspects, which is of
particular importance in the ubiquitous computing applications, such as ambient assisted
living. Schaub et al., later developed a system for ambient calendar displays that adapts to the
people present in a room and their privacy preferences [SKL+14].
Bilogrevic et al., introduced SPISM, a system for (semi-)automatically sharing information on
mobile social networks [BHA+13]. SPISM allows subscribers (e.g. services or other users) to
request contextual information (e.g., location) of other subscribers. Access to this information
is granted at multiple granularity levels.
C3P’s differentiating factor compared to these previous works is being the ﬁrst work to address
privacy modeling of unstructured data. The problem setting is also more challenging as the
system combining the context information is an honest-but-curious remote server. In the
other systems, the device determining data sensitivity is either the same as the device where
sensitive data resides or is trusted by the latter.
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Interest in context-aware data sharing continued to evolve afterward. The subsequent work
by Yuan et al., zoomed into the problem of privacy in photo sharing, with a similar ap-
proach [YTE17]. One of their main contributions is that they showed, via a user experiment
with actual photos, the efﬁcacy of machine learning in predicting the users’ policies based
on image semantics. In the ﬁeld of mobile permissions, there have been also later works on
automatically predicting the default app permissions [LAS+16] and on continuously managing
realtime permissions of Android apps [WBT+17, ODPSM+17].
Risk Estimation
One of the relevant attempts at privacy risk estimation was in the ﬁeld of social networks.
Liu and Terzi [LT10] used IRT in quantifying the privacy risk of exposing user proﬁle items
on Facebook (e.g. birthday, political afﬁliation, etc.). Quercia et al. [QCP+12] also modeled
the process of information disclosure in Facebook using IRT and found correlations between
disclosure scores and personality traits. In this chapter, we have shown that IRT applies in the
case of privacy aware sharing in the cloud. Our work is also distinct in that it utilizes context
extraction to work with any data ﬁle, rather than being limited to a predeﬁned set of proﬁle
items as on social networks.
Privacy in Cloud Storage
The concerns about the privacy of user data in the cloud were conﬁrmed by Ion et al. [ISKC11]
through surveys highlighting the users’ beliefs about the intrinsic insecurity of the cloud. They
discovered that users are less interested in issues like data deletion, country of storage, and
storage outsourcing. On the other hand, they tend to trust their local storage for sensitive data
rather than the cloud. Users were also found to hold false assumptions, such as that the service
provider is liable in case of data loss or that it does not have the right to access or modify their
data. Users were still interested in better security options and are willing to pay for systems
providing more privacy. These ﬁndings provide a strong motivation for systems like C3P as it
can help reduce users’ concerns and expand the user base of cloud storage services.
Several systems have been proposed earlier for controlling the privacy of online information.
Könings et al., developed PrivacyJudge, a system for giving the users control on who has access
to their information and how long it is kept online [KPSW11]. They combine cryptographic
approaches for enforcing access control with privacy labels to convey how the data should
be treated. A client-centric system was also developed by Ion et al. [IBC+13], enabling users
to share text and image ﬁles on web-based platforms while keeping the data encrypted and
hiding the fact that conﬁdential data has been exchanged from a casual observer.
From one angle, our work is complementary to theirs as we design C3P to help users decide
on what data to keep conﬁdential. From another perspective, our work is distinct as we allow
multiple levels of protection that can be controlled by the user.
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Crowdsourcing Privacy
The work by Garg et al. [GPKC13] highlights the peer produced privacy paradigm, which treats
privacy as a community good and considers individuals who share the risk of information
sharing. The authors argue that such an approach can result in more socially optimal privacy
decisions. Agarwal and Hall [AH13] have used crowdsourcing in their work on the Protect-
MyPrivacy project to recommend adequate permissions on iOS. One of their interesting
ﬁndings is that as few as 1% of the users, classiﬁed as experts, make enough decisions that
can support the crowdsourced privacy recommendation system. Our work shares similar
motivations to these, among which are the suboptimal privacy decisions taken by average
users and the inability of users to keep track of the changing contextual factors affecting
privacy.
2.8 Summary
In this chapter, we have depicted C3P, a new framework for preserving the privacy of data
shared to the cloud. The core premise of C3P is that, by providing the users ﬁne-grained
estimations of their ﬁles’ sensitivity, we open the door for automatically applying ﬁne-grained
privacy protection mechanisms. We strived to do that with a system that continuously learns
from its users, with minimal extra data required. A natural extension of this work is investi-
gating the best way to handle these automated policy recommendations mechanisms and to
balance the privacy provided with the services intended by the user.

Part IICommunicating the Risk
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3 A Primer on Cloud Apps Privacy
3.1 Overview
The popularity of consumer cloud storage providers (CSPs) over the previous decade has
been steadily rising. Dropbox, Google Drive, and One Drive have each amassed hundreds
of millions of users [Oom17]. In order to further appeal to their users, the CSPs have been
transitioning from being pure service providers to becoming app ecosystems. Hence, they now
offer APIs for developers to import and process users’ ﬁles stored in the cloud.
Consider, for example, a web app called PandaDoc1, which allows creating, editing, and
signing documents online. When a user uses PandaDoc from her laptop browser, she can
import ﬁles stored in her Google Drive instead of her hard drive. Such a pattern is increasingly
more prevalent with the growing number of 3rd Party Cloud apps (or 3PC apps) that are tightly
integrated with cloud storage services. Dropbox alone claims that hundreds of thousands of
apps 2 have been integrated with its platform.
Moreover, we are witnessing the rise of cloud-ﬁrst devices, such as Chromebooks. With 2
million devices sold in Q1 of 2016, Chromebooks have already outsold Apple’s range of Macs
for the ﬁrst time in the US market3. In cloud-ﬁrst devices, users install 3rd party apps from a
web store. Such apps are hence designed to easily integrate with cloud storage services.
Even in the enterprise setting, 3rd party cloud apps are increasingly popular. This is ﬁrst
because companies are ofﬁcially adopting the likes of Dropbox Business, OneDrive for Business,
and Google Drive for Work. Second, it is due to employees utilizing their personal cloud
accounts to share company’s ﬁles (resulting in the rise of Shadow IT). Various reports from
cloud application security providers state that organizations use from 10 to 20 times more
cloud apps than their IT department thinks [Sky16, Ela16].
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privacy issues. The reader will ﬁnd this common ground useful for the upcoming two chapters,
where will we dive more into our efforts at mitigating the risk communication gap.
3.2 Privacy Issues in Third Party Cloud Apps
3.2.1 The Threat
While the CSPs themselves are few in number, and, at least, have clearly deﬁned privacy
policies, users are now faced with a new kind of privacy adversary: the 3rd party app ven-
dors. With every app authorization decision that users make, they are trusting a new vendor
with their data and increasing the potential attack surface. Elastica, the cloud application
security provider, estimates that the average ﬁnancial impact on a company as a result of a
cloud-storage data breach is $13.85M, including remediation costs [Ela15]. In 2015, the data
breach at Anthem, a US insurance company, has reportedly cost more than $100M, with 80M
unencrypted health records leaked. This was a result of an exﬁltration exploit leveraging a
popular public cloud storage application [Ela16]. Even on the personal level, the risk extends
from breaches exposing ﬁnancial information and health records to unnoticeable, continuous
proﬁling based on stored ﬁles.
3.2.2 Over-privileged and Full-access Apps
As observed in other 3rd party apps ecosystems, users often end up exposing more data than is
needed to unaccountable apps. For instance, a user’s favorite PDF converter is highly likely to
get access to hermusic library and discover her taste inMozart or obtain her geo-tagged photos
and know where she went on the weekend. Throughout this thesis, we refer to such apps
as over-privileged apps. Giving such over-privileged apps superﬂuous access can potentially
result in users’ data being abused. This has recently been the case in the health apps market
where the top 20 most visited apps were found to be sharing users’ data with 70 analytics and
advertising companies [SD13]. It is also the case that a considerable percentage of 3PC apps
request full access to users’ cloud ﬁles. Even if these apps are not over-privileged, they still
place the users’ data in the hands of more and more parties, thus increasing the likelihood
of data leaks. In this thesis, we will be providing usable privacy solutions to curtail the users’
adoption of over-privileged apps (Chapter 4) and to hamper the unnecessary spread of users’
data to more parties (Chapter 5).
3.2.3 Unique Properties of the Cloud Ecosystem
Given that these problems have been also manifested in other ecosystems, such as mobile or
social networking apps, one would deﬁnitely ask whether the cloud apps ecosystem has some
unique features that warrant a particular study like ours. This is indeed the case.
Unlike studies on mobile app ecosystems, where the permissions concern the user’s list of
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contacts, current location, or photos, the cloud permissions allow the 3rd party apps to get
access to any ﬁle the user has stored in the cloud. Thus, instead of proﬁling the current user
context, such apps can get far-reaching insights inferred from her documents, concerning her
ﬁnancial, legal, or health-related outlook for example.
This can also be done without the user noticing. While data processing on smartphones can
be detected from excessive battery usage for example, 3PC apps can perform the analysis
completely on the server side once they get access to the users’ cloud ﬁles, without consuming
resources from the users’ devices. Put simply, the scale and the quality of data that can be
collected is both a privacy nightmare for unaware users and a goldmine for advertisers.
Finally, collecting the permissions of cloud apps at scale is challenging. Unlike other ecosys-
tems where app permissions of thousands of apps can be easily mined via traditional web
crawling, each 3rd party cloud app has a unique interface that links to the service providers.
Hence, this limits the corpus of apps that one can study. Still, while our contributions are
shown in this context of 3PC apps, our various techniques, especially on the level of risk
communication, can be easily transplanted to other ecosystems.
3.3 Third-party Cloud Apps Ecosystem
3.3.1 System Model
There are four main entities that interact in the third-party cloud app system:
1. a user u who uses that app for achieving a certain service
2. a cloud storage provider (CSP) hosting the user’s data
3. a data subject to whom the ﬁles belong and whose privacy is being considered. We further
deﬁne two levels of data subject granularity:
– individual-level granularity: i.e., the user herself is interested in guarding her own data
privacy,
– team-level granularity: i.e., a group of users are interested in guarding the privacy of
team-owned data (e.g., using an enterprise version of cloud storage services)
4. a vendor v that is responsible for programming and managing a 3PC app. These vendors
register their apps with the CSPs. The apps themselves are hosted on any website the
vendors choose (i. e., not hosted by the CSP itself).
Each user has access to a set Fu of ﬁles stored at the CSP. A subset of these ﬁles is owned
exclusively by the data subject while the other subset is composed of ﬁles that are each shared
with at least one other collaborator. We denote the set of all collaborators of user u byC (u). For
simplicity reasons, we will assume throughout this thesis that the ﬁles of all data subjects, as




C (u) Collaborators of u
Fu set of ﬁles of u
Fu,v set of ﬁles of u accessible by vendor v
Table 3.1 – Summary of notations used
well as the collaborators for each ﬁle, are all ﬁxed from a reference step t = 0. Using the CSP’s
API, the vendor v can get access, at step t ∈N, to the subject’s data upon user authorization,
which consists of u accepting a list of permissions. We will alternatively refer to this as app
installation, and we will assume that exactly one app is installed in each step t . Permissions
are named differently across various providers, but, in general, we can categorize them into
three categories:
– per-ﬁle access: where the user has to authorize the vendor for each ﬁle access individually.
This is typically done via a ﬁle picker provided by the CSP itself.
– full-access: where the vendor gets access to all users’ data. In the interface, this is worded,
for instance, as “View the ﬁles in your Google Drive” or “access to the ﬁles and folders in
your Dropbox”.
– per-type access: where the vendor gets access to all ﬁles of a speciﬁc type. For example,
Dropbox words it as “access to images in your Dropbox”. Some platforms, like Google Drive,
do not provide app developers with such ﬁne-grained options.
The authorization can also give v access to ﬁles shared with the collaborators of u. Similarly,
collaborators of u can install apps that expose ﬁles shared with u to new vendors. We denote
the set of ﬁles of u accessible by vendor v at step t as Fu,v (t ). Table 3.1 contains a summary of
the used notations.
3.3.2 The Case of Google Drive
In the two upcoming chapters, we will be taking Google Drive as a case study, and we anato-
mize this ecosystem in detail. Nevertheless, the solutions we develop are applicable to other
cloud platforms as well. This is because all these platforms have similar interfaces to authorize
3rd party apps and have comparable permissions schemes.
In Google Drive, any developer can register an app that accesses Google Drive API at Google
Developers Console for free. She then receives a Client ID and Client Secret that need to be
included in the app code to access Google APIs. The developer can then specify in her code a
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Get files from your Google account. 
We play nice. You just need to login.
Connect to Google Drive
We will open a new page to connect your Google Drive account.
Upload a file from Google Drive
My templates Public templates Upload 
Figure 3.1 – Example of how Pandadoc permissions’ request looks like. Notice that this window
only appears after the user decides to upload a new document and chooses the Google Drive
icon on the bottom. This interface is app-dependent.
set of Google permissions (a.k.a. scopes) she wants to obtain. The app itself can be hosted on
any website the developer chooses; i.e., it is not hosted by Google itself. The developer can
also submit a request for featuring the app on Google Chrome Web Store, which has a section
for apps that work with Google Drive. In the store, apps are presented along with screenshots
and descriptions of their functionality (provided by the developer). The store also allows users
to rate and review apps. Apps can be also submitted to other web stores hosted by Google,
such as the Add-ons Stores for Google Docs, Google Sheets, or Google Slides and the Google
Apps Marketplace for enterprises. However, there are a lot of apps that exist outside these
stores too. Unlike the mobile ecosystems where users ﬁnd it cumbersome and technically
difﬁcult to install apps from outside the ofﬁcial stores, the 3PC apps stores’ act as a simple
aggregator website that facilitates discoverability.
An app can request permission to access Google Drive data at any time of its operation, and
not necessarily at the beginning. For example, the user can be presented with a button in
a side menu that reads “Upload a ﬁle from Google Drive” (cf. Figure 3.1 for an example).
Clicking on that button redirects to a Google-hosted page that presents the set of permissions
requested by the app, as shown in Figure 3.2. The user has to accept all these permissions to
connect the app to her Google Drive. She cannot select a subset of them at installation time or
later. However, she may revoke the app authorization completely from her Google account
settings. As we see later, the absence of a standard location and interface for hosting apps and
triggering the permissions request is one of the reasons that makes the automated, large-scale
privacy analysis of apps infeasible.
The main permissions pertinent to Google Drive are presented in Table 3.2, along with the
Google-provided description for each. This short description is also presented to the user, and
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AllowDeny
PandaDoc would like to:
View the files in your Google Drive
By clicking Allow, you allow this app and Google to use your information in
accordance with their respective terms of service and privacy policies. You can
change this and other Account Permissions at any time.


























?????????? ???????? ???? ???? ???????????? ???? ?
???? ????? ????? ??? ??
Figure 3.3 – Google Drive ﬁle picker interface
a longer explanation is available via clicking the info button i next to each permission.
As far as ﬁles’ data is concerned, an app can request full access (DRIVE and DRIVE_READONLY
permissions) or on a per-ﬁle basis (DRIVE_FILE). In the case of full access, an app can access
any ﬁle directly via Google Drive API without the need for user intervention. For example, this
type of access enables an app to obtain all the user’s ﬁles and download them to its server.
When developers request DRIVE_FILE only, the explicit approval for each new ﬁle(s) is mediated
by an interface provided by Google. For example, the developer presents the user with a
Google-hosted ﬁle picker popup (Figure 3.3) so that she can select (and thus approve access
to) the ﬁle. Alternatively, the ﬁle can be opened from Google Drive’s interface via the “Open
with” option in the context menu of the ﬁle (cf. Figure 3.4).
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Permission Short Name
View and manage the ﬁles in your Google Drive. DRIVE
View the ﬁles in your Google Drive. DRIVE_READONLY
View metadata for ﬁles in your Google Drive. DRIVE_METADATA_READONLY
View and manage Google Drive ﬁles that you have
opened or created with this app. DRIVE_FILE
Add itself to Google Drive. ADD_DRIVE
View and manage its own conﬁguration data in your
Google Drive. DRIVE_APPDATA
View your Google Drive apps. DRIVE_APPS_READONLY
Table 3.2 – Requested permissions with the short reference name
Figure 3.4 – Example of the interface where the app is allowed to access a single ﬁle on the
Google Drive website itself. The permission requested by apps to appear in this menu is the
ADD_DRIVE permission. For accessing the ﬁles via this interface, the apps need per-ﬁle access
(i.e., DRIVE_FILE permission).
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The developer can alternatively request access to ﬁle metadata only via DRIVE_METADATA or
DRIVE_METADATA_READONLY (allows accessing ﬁlenames, editing dates, photos’ Exif infor-
mation, etc.). Additionally, the developer can request access to the list of apps the user has
authorized before via DRIVE_APPS_READONLY. It is worth noting that the permission list is not
limited to Google Drive API and that it typically includes permissions from other Google APIs,
such as access to user’s proﬁle information, email address, contacts list, etc.
3.4 Summary
Given this overview of the ecosystem of 3rd party cloud apps and the special case of Google
Drive, we will delve in the upcoming two chapters into two problems, both revolving around
better risk communication: (1) how to deter users from installing over-privileged apps and





Based on the previous chapter, it has become clear that users sacriﬁce some of their privacy to
get functionalities that third party cloud apps (or 3PC apps) provide. Moreover, it is apparent
that such apps might acquire more data than is needed for them to function.
In this chapter, we scrutinize such apps by taking Google Drive’s app ecosystem as a case study.
Our goal behind this is twofold:
1. First, we aim to explore this platform from a privacy angle, a task that has not been done
systematically before. More speciﬁcally, we study the ecosystem from the standpoint
of all relevant parties, namely, the users, app developers and cloud providers. We seek
to characterize (a) the spread of over-privileged apps in the ecosystem, (b) conditions
determining developers misbehavior, and (c) the steps cloud providers can take to
mitigate users’ privacy risks.
2. Second, we leverage app permissions as a medium for experimenting with various
models of risk communication. We present three different permission models namely:
(a) Delta Permissions, (b) Immediate Insights, and (c) Far-reaching Insights. The ﬁrst
model, i.e., Delta Permissions, informs users about the unneeded permissions that over-
privileged apps are using. The second model, Immediate Insights presents randomly
selected examples from the user’s data such as portions of text or image ﬁles, photo
locations, etc., that over-privileged apps can get access to. The third model, Far-reaching
Insights, has been motivated by the novel concept of Inverse Privacy [GHW15]. Inverse
privacy refers to the situationwhen a user is not aware of the information that an external
entity has about the user. Based on this deﬁnition, Far-reaching Insights communicate
to users the inferences which can be made by the apps with superﬂuous permissions
using advanced text and image analysis techniques. These include but are not limited
to user collaboration and activity patterns; the top faces, locations, and concepts that
appear in users’ photos, etc.
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Overall, we make the following speciﬁc contributions in this chapter:
i. Far-reaching Insights sensitize users with intimate details, and promote privacy-aware
behavior: Through extensive user experiments, we discover that our ﬁrst simple model, Delta
Permissions fails to deter users from installing over-privileged apps. Put bluntly, telling users
that their privacy is being infringed does not help. The second model, Immediate Insights, does
twice as well in discouraging users from installing over-privileged apps. However, the clear
winner is our novel model, Far-reaching Insights, which can be twice as effective in deterring
users from installing over-privileged apps as Immediate Insights. Overall, our analysis reveals
various factors that can deter users from installing over-privileged apps. For instance, we
discover that within Far-reaching Insights, Relational Insights (that reveal users’ relations with
other people) reduce by half the installation of over-privileged apps, as compared to Personal
Insights (that reveal information about the users themselves) (Section 4.4).
ii. PrivySeal helps us proﬁle developer behavior and helps users safeguard their data: In
an effort to promote privacy-awareness in the general public, and to help users safeguard their
privacy, we present PrivySeal, a privacy-focused app store that uses Far-reaching Insights
to warn users about over-privileged apps. This store is available for public use and has been
used by over 1440 registered by until November 2015. A considerable fraction of these users
has prior experience of using Google Drive 3rd party apps. By automatically getting their
previously installed apps’ metadata, we anatomize current developers’ behavior, point towards
potential avenues of misbehavior, and present suggestions to deter misbehavior (Sections 4.6
and 4.7).
iii. Shared wisdom: Finally, based on our analysis we present several easy to implement
practical suggestions that can be adopted by cloud providers and by those others working in
the domain of privacy to safeguard users privacy in the cloud (Section 4.7).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we describe in detail our
app permissions review process and results. In Section 4.3, we present our three permission
models, before evaluating them in Section 4.4. Based on the privacy-focused store we have
developed (Section 4.5), we analyze app developer behavior in Section 4.6. Finally, we give our
recommendations for the community in Section 4.7.
4.2 Privacy Risk of 3rd Party Google Drive Apps
The question that comes next is: “what is the extent of risk that actual users are exposed
to?” To answer this, we examined a sample of 3rd party Google Drive apps to determine the
percentage of apps that request extra permissions1. We proceeded to Google Chrome Web
Store, which has a section for apps that work with Google Drive. The store features apps on
its main page, that change with time. At the time of this study, there were around 420 apps
on the store that are labeled as “Works with Google Drive”. We selected 100 featured apps at
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random from the main page (during May 2015), and we manually reviewed them one by one.
Hence, our sample represents around one-fourth of the whole set of apps in the store, which
is one of the main avenues for ﬁnding Google Drive apps. As we discuss later in Section 4.6.1,
we discovered that, in our real word sample of 1440 users, around one-fourth of the installed
apps are from the Google Chrome Store.
Figure 4.1a shows the distribution of the installation counts of apps in our dataset on a log scale,
where it is clear that the apps follow closely a normal distribution (this has been individually
conﬁrmed using q-q plots). The average number of installations was 194,600 and the median
was 29,350. Figure 4.1b shows that the number of ratings follows a similar distribution, with a
mean of 736 and a median of 181. The ratings value distribution is shown in Figure 4.1c, with
a mean of 3.66 and a median of 3.72. Overall, this shows the diversity of the apps in our APRs
dataset and that it represents a wide range of apps.
4.2.1 Permissions Review Process
We now explain the App Permissions Review (APR) methodology we followed, and we refer the
reader to Figure 4.2 for the corresponding ﬂowchart. Our methodology is inspired by Google
Drive’s guide for choosing authentication scopes2.
Each APR aims to get: (a) set P of requested permissions, (b) set S of sufﬁcient permissions
for the app functionality. We start each APR by going to the app’s website, linked from the
store, and testing the app manually. For each app, we ﬁrst ﬁnd the step where the app can
be connected to Google Drive (if this is not upon the initial sign up). Then, we record the
set P of requested permissions and authorize the app to access a test Google Drive account
created for this purpose, and we record the permissions requested. If DRIVE_FILE (i.e. minimal
per-ﬁle access) is the only Google Drive permission requested, the app review is complete
(S = {DRIVE_FILE}). Otherwise, we continue to check the app’s interface for all ﬁle pickers
2https://developers.google.com/drive/v3/web/about-auth







































Figure 4.2 – Flowchart of the APR process, inspired by Google
Drive guide for choosing authentication scopes
that allow importing ﬁles from Google Drive (in almost all the cases, there is at most one ﬁle
picker).
In the ﬁrst case where the app solely uses Google’s ofﬁcial ﬁle picker of Figure 3.3 (e.g., an
app that allows users to convert speciﬁc ﬁles to PDF format), we set S = {DRIVE_FILE}. In the
second case where we ﬁnd that there are no ﬁle pickers in the interface and that the app
functionality does not require access to any ﬁle, the app is labeled as not requiring any ﬁle
permissions (S = {}). In the case where the app includes a custom ﬁle picker, we decide that (a)














Figure 4.3 – Permissions’ usage in APRs
app with custom photos browser) or (b) S = {DRIVE_METADATA} if the functionality does not
need the content (e.g., an app that visualizes who has access to a selected folder). Similarly,
if the app has no ﬁle picker, we decide that (a) S = {DRIVE} if the app’s declared functionality
necessitates ﬁle content (e.g., malware scanning apps for Google Drive that do not need a
ﬁle picker) or (b) S = {DRIVE_METADATA} if the functionality necessitates ﬁle metadata (e.g.,
an app that visualizes all collaborators with access to user’s ﬁles). Finally, we label an app
as over-privileged if either (a) the set S is empty, and P is not or (b) if the set P contains at
least one permission that is more demanding than all permissions in S (the permissions in
Figure 4.3 are listed from the most demanding on the left to the least demanding on the right).
We also determine the set of unneeded permissionsU , composed of each permission in P
that is more demanding than all permissions in S. The set of needed permissions is given by
N = P \U .
4.2.2 Review Results
Analyzing the APRs, we found that 64 out of 100 apps request unneeded permissions. In
other words, the developers could have requested less invasive permissions with the current
API provided by Google. In total, 76 out of the 100 apps requested full access to all the ﬁles
in the user’s Google Drive. Moreover, the 64 over-privileged apps have all requested full
access. Accordingly, in our sample, around 84% (64/76) of apps requesting full access are
over-privileged.
As shown in Figure 4.3, the top permission that is needlessly requested is the full read and write
access to Google Drive (in 55 apps), followed by the full read access permission (in 17 apps).
This further increases the magnitude of data that can be exploited with the extra permissions.
On the other hand, the per-ﬁle access permission is the top permission that is actually needed
when requested. This happens in 41 of the apps. However, in 16 of these 41 apps, we have
found that the developer also requested full access to the user’s data. Accordingly, developers
are sometimes mixing full-access with partial access (which is a subset of the former). We note
that such mixing of permissions can either be the result of developer incompetence or aimed
at deceiving the user. Regardless, such apps pose a risk which can be potentially exploited.
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Another outcome of the APR was that DRIVE_FILE was the top alternative permission (in 48
apps) that could replace the unnecessary permissions requested. DRIVE_METADATA_READONLY
was the alternative for one app only. This indicates that, simply, the correct usage of the current
Google Drive API (which does provide per-ﬁle access), can eliminate the major part of the
privacy risk. Nevertheless, it is evident that developers are generally not following concept of
least-privilege (see the later work of Fischer et al., [FBX+17] on some of the possible causes for
this issue).
4.2.3 Automating the APR Process
Being an external party, we do not have access to the full list of Google Drive apps with their
permissions. Hence, the ﬁrst task we had to do was to ﬁnd the position in each app where
Google Drive permissions are requested. This is not always on the main page of the app, and
sometimes ﬁnding it requires navigating multiple menus and/or pages (cf. Figure 3.1 for an
example). Automating this task involves building an advanced web crawler that can retrieve
the permissions from a large number of such apps by smartly searching for the sign-in button.
The second task was checking the functionality of the app to see if it matches the requested
permissions. Automating the process of over-privilege detection or real-time private data leak-
age detection has been tackled in the mobile apps scenario (e.g. in [FCH+11] and [EGC+10]).
However, in the mobile scenario (or any similar architecture), the user’s device hosts the
data, the 3rd party apps, and the detection/monitoring solution. Cloud apps present a rad-
ically different scenario as the data is hosted by the CSP, the 3rd party app is served at a
developer-speciﬁed location, and any detection/monitoring app would operate from outside.
The only part of the code that the 3rd party app exposes is the client side code. Hence, all
techniques that check the app’s code (e.g., via static/dynamic analysis) or its inputs/outputs
cannot be transplanted to the cloud app case as they would evidently underestimate what
APIs/permissions the app might need3.
One automated way we perceive for over-privilege detection is to cluster apps of similar
functionality and identify the ones which request more permissions than others in the same
cluster. Even then, the data collected manually would be used as the ground truth to evaluate
the automated method. Detecting actual data leakage is much more challenging in the cloud
apps scenario as the app can send users’ data to other parties from the server side (which is
impossible to monitor via external solutions).
Faced with these limitations, manual expert reviews are the closest we can get to assessing
the apps’ needed permissions. Still, we do not claim that this method is perfectly accurate
as a developer might be working, for example, on a non-advertised feature that requires new
permissions. However, we conjecture that APRs are accurate with the vast majority of the




Finally, as our main purpose in this work is to characterize the ecosystem and suggest alterna-
tive permissionmodels, automating both the apppermissions collection and the over-privilege
detection tasks falls out of the scope of this work. We note though that we are concurrently
working on the speciﬁc research problem of designing automated APRs.
4.3 New Permission Models
In the light of the risk that over-privileged apps pose, we propose in this section three alter-
natives to the existing permission model in Google Drive before evaluating their efﬁcacy in
mitigating the risk in the next section.
4.3.1 Delta Permissions
Our ﬁrst model is based on the following hypothesis: “When users are informed about the
unneeded permissions being requested by apps, they are less likely to authorize such apps.”
Hence, this model replaces the current permissions interface displayed in Figure 4.4 with a
new interface, presented in Figure 4.5. We call this permission model Delta Permissions (DP),
and it reveals to the user the distinction between permissions that are needed for the app
functionality and those others (the delta) that are unnecessarily requested.
4.3.2 Immediate Insights
The second model is based on the following hypothesis: “When users are shown samples of the
data that can be extracted from the unneeded permissions granted to apps, they are less likely to
authorize these apps.” Accordingly, we show users randomly selected data examples, directly
extracted from their Google Drive, such as excerpts of text or image ﬁles, photo locations, or
people she collaborated with. An instance of this model, which we call Immediate Insights (IM),
is given in Figure 4.6. On the left, we have the sameprevious DP interface. On the right, we have
the Insights Area, where we show a question that says: “What do the unneeded permissions
say about you?”, followed by an answer in the form of a visual with short explanatory text. In
this ﬁgure, the Insights Area visualizes the location where a randomly chosen user photo was
taken. In the following, we describe the design of the IM Insights:
Image: We show an image selected at random from the set of user’s image ﬁles.
Location: We randomly choose a photo from the set of user’s image ﬁles, such that it includes
a GPS location in its Exif data. Then we show that photo on a map centered at that location (as
4From our experience over one year, rarely did apps introduce new features that required new permissions.
Moreover, in Section 4.5, we discuss how to further alleviate the repercussions of inaccuracies in a real-world
deployment by allowing developers to submit rebuttals.









Figure 4.4 – Example of the current permissions interface of Google Drive
in Figure 4.6).
Text: We show the user an excerpt from the beginning of a randomly chosen textual ﬁle.
Collaborator: We show the proﬁle picture and the name of a randomly chosen collaborator.
4.3.3 Far-reaching Insights
The third model is based on the following hypothesis: “When the users are shown the far-
reaching information that can be inferred from the unneeded permissions granted to apps, they
are less likely to authorize these apps.” These are insights that go beyond examples and include
what can be inferred by runningmore involved algorithms, such as sentiments towards entities,
objects identiﬁed in photos, faces detected, etc. Hence, we denote this model by Far-reaching
Insights (or shortly FR Insights). The interface layout is the same as that of Figure 4.6, but
with the Insights Area containing an FR insight instead of an immediate insight. In this work,
we have designed six types of FR insights that can be extracted from users’ data. Below, we
will provide the details for generating each of these insights. Towards that goal, we highlight
two ﬁle categories of interest: (1) textual ﬁles, such as PDF documents, word-processing
documents, spreadsheets, presentations, text ﬁles, etc., and (2) image ﬁles, such as JPEG, PNG,
TIFF, etc. We represent the set of textual ﬁles as TF = TF1,TF2, ..,TFK and the set of image
ﬁles as IF1, IF2, ..., IFL .
Entities, Concepts, and Topics (ECT): The ﬁrst type of insights we form is based on applying
various NLP techniques to extract named Entities (E), Concepts (C), and Topics (T) from users’
textual ﬁles.
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Figure 4.5 – Example of Delta Permissions interface
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Figure 4.6 – Example of Immediate Insights interface; the same layout is used for Far-reaching
Insights, with the insights area content changing accordingly
i. Entities: We get the top named entities (e.g., people, places, companies, etc.) present in the
user’s textual ﬁles. Such entities are recognized using Named Entity Recognition (NER), which
is a traditional problem in natural language processing that involves locating and classifying
elements in text into predeﬁned categories [DBE07]. For this task, we perform text extraction
on each ﬁle, and we then pass the text to a AlchemyAPI’s service. Given the text of ﬁle TFj ,
this service returns a set of entities, along with the frequency of occurrence fi , j of each entity
ei in TFj . We normalize this frequency for each entity by dividing it by f_maxj , which is the
frequency of the most recurrent entity in TFj :
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They tell the app that these People, Places,









(a) Named Entities insight
NSAObama
You're positive about: You're negative about:









They tell the app that these People
 are your top collaborators.
?
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They tell the app that, with the above people, 
you share documents on these topics:
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(f) FacesOnMap insight
Figure 4.7 – Visualizations for the various Far-reaching Insights





f_normi , j (4.2)
As shown in Figure 4.7a, we visualize the entities with the highest scores as a set of circles, each
of a diameter proportional to the score of the corresponding entity. Different types of entities
(e.g., people, places, etc.) have different circle color.
ii. Concepts: We also extract concept tags from users’ documents. These concepts are high-
level abstractions, not necessarily mentioned in the text. For example, the sentence “My
favorite brands are BMW, Ferrari, and Porsche”, would be tagged by the concept “Automotive
Industry”. AlchemyAPI was again used for this task, returning, for each ﬁle TFj , a set of
concepts, each denoted as ci along with a relevance score ri , j ∈ [0,1]. We used the following




ri , j (4.3)
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Similar to the case of entities, we represent concepts by circles, each of a diameter proportional
to the score of the concept.
iii. Topics: Topics are higher level abstractions, used to classify documents into general
categories, such as technology, art, business, etc. We used AlchemyAPI, which returns a
maximum of 3 topics per ﬁle TFj (each denoted as ti ), along with a relevance score ri , j ∈ [0,1]
for each of them. A topic comes in the form of “a1/a2/ . . ./an”, representing a hierarchy among
the labels (e.g., “/hobbies and interests/astrology” or “/ﬁnance/investing/venture capital”).





ri , j (4.4)
We represent topics by circles, similar to the case of entities, where the diameter of a circle is
proportional to the score of the topic. Topics sharing the top level label are colored similarly.
We combine these three together due to their similar goal of proﬁling users’ interests. When
we use the ECT insight, one of E , T or C is randomly displayed to the user in the Insights Area.
Sentiments: For each entity that occurs in TF , it is possible also to estimate whether the text
relays a positive, neutral, or negative sentiment about that entity. Towards that end, we use
the sentiment analysis service of AlchemyAPI. For each TFi , we select the entities labeled with
positive or negative sentiments (each such entity also has a sentiment score si , j ∈ [−1,1] with
1 corresponding to the most positive sentiment and -1 to the most negative one.). We then




si , j (4.5)
The sentiments with the highest positive and negative scores are then shown to the user, as
presented in Figure 4.7b.
Top Collaborators: The next insight we added displays the top collaborators a user has, based
on the analyzed ﬁles (Figure 4.7c). We deﬁne collaborators as people who share ﬁles with the
user, regardless of who initiates the sharing operation. These typically include close work col-
leagues, intimate friends, or people the user goes out with and shares pictures with afterward.
In the interface, this insight is visualized as a horizontal bar chart of the top collaborators with
the bar lengths representing the relative frequency of the user’s collaboration with each of
them.
Shared Interests: In this insight, we try to represent the user’s mutual topics of interests with
a group of people. Towards that end, we perform the following steps:
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– We determine the top topics as we have done in the ECT insight.
– Then we select from these topics a subset St that only includes the ones which appeared
in shared ﬁles.
– Via Google Drive API, we extract, for each topic ti , a listU (ti ) of collaborators (based on
ﬁles it appeared in).
– We select from eachU (ti ) the most frequent collaborators (i.e., those appearing in most
documents with this topic).
Users then get a visualization similar to Figure 4.7d, where we show the three top topics from
St along with the top collaborators for these topics.
Faces with Context: We now come to the insights that are based on features inside the user’s
images. The ﬁrst insight of this type shows a group of faces, representing the most frequent
people appearing in the user’s images, alongside the concepts that appear in the same images
(see Figure 4.7e). One can imagine that such information might be valuable, for example, to
advertisers that aim to extract the user’s interests in certain people, products, or services.
To construct this insight, we performed two steps:
i. Face clustering: It is evident that showing the user random faces detected in her photos will
not create the same effect as when these faces are actually people she cares about. Our plan to
achieve the latter case involves three steps:
– We use a face clustering algorithm in order to group together photos of the same person.
As a result, we get a list of groups G , where each group Gi ∈G is comprised of the faces
that belong to a person identiﬁed as pi . The algorithm used is by Zhu et al., [ZWS11]
implemented by the OpenBR framework. [KKK+13]
– From each group Gi , we exclude the faces with width (height) less than
1
15 of the total
image width (height).
– We exclude groups with less than 3 faces in total.
– We sort the groups by the number of faces in each of them.
ii. Image concept recognition: In order to identify the concepts inside each photo, we used a
classiﬁer from the Caffe library [JSD+14]. The classiﬁer uses a pre-built deep learning network,
that is based on the architecture used by Krizhevsky et al., [KSH12] that won the Imagenet
2012 contest.
Based on the above, we show the user the top groups (i.e. with most faces) along with the most




















Figure 4.8 – Component diagram mapping the used analysis techniques to the generated
insights
Faces on Map: In addition to the image content itself, image metadata can also be sensitive,
especially the geographical location where the image is captured. Hence, this insight, shown
in Figure 4.7f, consists of showing the faces of people overlaid on a map, centered at the
geographical area where these faces appeared. Below the map is a list of the top concepts
that appeared in the photos taken in that area. In our actual implementation, the visual is
animated, moving between different areas to show the user the places that different photos
were taken at. To construct this visualization, we had to cluster the images into different
geographical areas. For that, we used the OPTICS algorithm (Ordering Points to Identify the
Clustering Structure) by Ankerst et al., [ABKS99]. OPTICS allows ﬁnding density-based clusters
in spatial data and is tailored for detecting meaningful clusters with data of varying density.
After getting the cluster results, the zoom level on the map is animated to show one cluster to
the user at a time.
The component diagram of Figure 4.8 summarizes the techniques used for generating each of
the FR insights.
Further Notes:
We note that the reasoning behind designing lightweight models such as DP and IM was that
we wanted to examine whether designing heavyweight insights such as FR Insights is worth
the effort for the potential adopters of our approach. If users respond equally favorably (or
badly) to both the heavy and the lightweight approaches, the FR insights need not be adopted.
We also note that, for an app that does not request unneeded permissions (even if it requests
full access), the Insights Area will simply show a text saying that the app does not require any
extra permissions. We also note that we follow Google Drive’s approach of requesting per-
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missions “At Setup” [SBDC15] (i.e., at the ﬁrst time of app authorization). This is unlike other
ecosystems (e.g., iOS or Android M), which require a “Just in Time” approach (i.e., permissions
are requested only when the actual functionality is needed). This is because, in Google Drive,
many apps are supposed to work with the user’s data even when she is ofﬂine. Hence, granting
access in an interactive manner for individual permissions is not always feasible.
4.4 Evaluating the Models
4.4.1 Experimental Setup
We designed an experiment with actual users to test the hypothesis of whether the new models
can better deter the users from installing over-privileged apps as compared to the existing one
and to discover factors that inﬂuence users’ decisions.
User Recruitment:
To recruit users, we primarily used our university’s mailing list. The users were briefed about
an app that is related to protecting the privacy of their data against 3rd party apps on Google
Drive. The news about the app was also reported on the university’s website and was picked
up by several technology websites. The website described itself as an app for Google Drive
that aims at exposing what 3rd party web apps can needlessly get about users.
Via our website, the users can sign in to their Google account and then grant full Google Drive
access to our app. Next to the “sign in” button, we linked to our privacy policy, explaining what
data the app gets and what it keeps. Only those users who had at least 10 ﬁles containing text
or 20 images were allowed to continue. This is to ensure that they possess at least a minimal
level of experience with Google Drive. Figure 4.9 shows the density plot of the percentages of
users’ analyzed ﬁles that are textual. Although there is a signiﬁcant fraction of users with no
image ﬁles, there are many users with a balanced fraction of textual and image ﬁles. Next, users
who agreed to participate in our experiment were randomly assigned to one of the groups
described below. As a motivation to complete the experiments, the users were enrolled in a
lucky draw, where they could win one of ﬁve gift cards to a mobile app store of their choice.
Methodology:
The ﬁrst goal of the experiment is to investigate the efﬁcacy of the three new permission
models by comparing them to the existing Google Drive permission model as well as to each
other. The second goal is to perform micro-comparisons among the different types of IM and
FR insights. Accordingly, we went for a mixed between-subject and within-subject design.
The reason for not going for a complete between-subject design was the large number of
participants needed for statistically signiﬁcant results with 12 independent groups (for all
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Figure 4.9 – Density plot of the percentage of textual ﬁles for our experiment’s users
avoid any participants’ bias that can result from showing the existing interface they are used to
and the new interface we developed in the same experiment. Accordingly, we had four groups
in our experiment. A user is assigned to one single group, and the only permission interface
she sees during the experiment is that of its group. The groups were:
1. Baseline group (BL group): Users in this group were presented with a clone of the
original interface that Google shows upon installing the app (shown in Figure 4.4). This
group serves as the control group, and we brieﬂy refer to it as BL
2. Delta Permissions group (DP group): Users in this group were presented with the
modiﬁed interface, previously shown in Figure 4.5.
3. Immediate Insights Group (IM group): Users in this group were presented with the
modiﬁed interface of Figure 4.6, with the Insights area containing one of the IM insights
of Section 4.3.2.
4. Far-reaching Insights Group (FR group): Users in this group were presented with the
modiﬁed interface, of Figure 4.6, with the Insights Area containing one the FR insights
described in Section 4.3.3.
A user experiment was divided into multiple tasks. In each task, the user was requested to
select an app with a speciﬁed goal. For example, the goal would read “Select the app which
allows you to extract the ZIP ﬁles on your Google Drive”, and the corresponding app would
be “ZIP Extractor”. The user would then choose this app among other apps that are listed in
the interface. We show this interface in Figure 4.10, and we note that it is similar to the actual
Google Chrome Web Store.
Moreover, only one app of those listed satisﬁes the given goal, and it is highlighted in the
interface. This part of the setup only serves a gamiﬁcation purpose to keep the user interested.
Once the user selects the app, she is presented with a permission interface that corresponds
to its group (i.e. that of Figure 4.4 for the BL group, Figure 4.5 for the DP group, and Figure 4.6
with a randomly selected visual for the IM or FR Insights groups). The user is then presented
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Figure 4.10 – Task interface presented for the users in the experiment, where they had to select
the app satisfying the given purpose (already highlighted for them)
with a question that says: “Based on permissions below, would you be likely to install this
app?”. She can choose between “Permissions are too invasive” (accept) and “I’m OK with these
permissions” (reject). Figures 4.11 and 4.12 show screenshots of the interface for the FR and
IM experimental groups. We worded the question so that we avoid all users rejecting the
installations of all apps. We rather aimed that users would reject apps whose permissions
they consider as too invasive, thus allowing us to make within-subject comparisons. After
answering the question, the user is directed to the next task with another app, until she
completes the whole set of tasks.
The apps used in the experiment were obtained from the Google Drive section of the Chrome
Web Store. For experimental purposes, we modiﬁed the permissions requested by these apps
to be able to test various conditions. Unlike in the store, we removed elements such as ratings,
user reviews, and screenshots and kept a minimal interface, allowing the users to focus solely
on the app permissions. We also avoided using apps from popular vendors to avoid the bias
resulting from users being inﬂuenced by famous brands. These steps were taken to study
the effect that the permission model has on the user’s decisions, without the inﬂuence of
extraneous factors5.
Moreover, the apps were presented to the users in randomized order to compensate for the
effects of learning and fatigue. For reference, the permissions that each app requested are
presented in Table 4.1. A user assigned to the BL or DP groups had to install 5 apps in 5 tasks.
5Incidentally, the user might confront a scenario exactly as in the experiments if she does not ﬁnd the app from
the store, but lands on a certain site that has the option of authenticating with Google Drive.
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Figure 4.11 – Example of the interface shown to users of the IM group, with the decision dialog
on top
Figure 4.12 – Example of the interface shown to users of the FR group, with the decision dialog
on top
For the IM Insights and FR groups, we added additional apps. This is because we wanted to
compare the effects of the different kinds of insights. The permissions of the additional apps
were ﬁxed to those of (ZIP Extractor), but the insights displayed were changing. For each user,
the insights were assigned at random to each of those added apps. In total, users assigned to
the IM Insights and FR Insights groups had to complete 8 and 10 tasks respectively.
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App DRIVE DRIVE_ METADATA DRIVE_ FILE Experimental Group
ZIP Extractor R,U R,N 1,2,3,4
Xodo PDF Viewer & Editor R,U R,N 1,2,3,4
WhoHasAccess R,U R,N 1,2,3,4
Video Converter R,U 1,2,3,4
Cloud Convert R,U NR,N 1,2,3,4
HelloFax R,U R,N 3,4
Heap Note R,U R,N 3,4
Photo to Cartoon R,U R,N 3,4
PDFUnlock R,U R,N 4
HelloSign R,U R,N 4
Table 4.1 – Permissions of apps in the experiment. R: Requested, N : Needed, U : Unneeded,
NR: Not Requested
At the end of the experiments, users were presented with a survey, which consisted of a set of
multiple choice survey questions, in addition to a free form to provide feedback.
Data Protection and Ethics:
Respecting the user privacy when working with cloud data is of fundamental importance. Our
experiments were done according to a code of ethics protecting this privacy. In particular,
after generating the insights from a user’s ﬁles, these ﬁles are deleted immediately from our
apps’ servers. As per our displayed privacy policy, only the insights’ data presented to the user
is kept in the app database. Moreover, the user is given the option to delete her insights data
at any time with a single click in the app’s menu. The database dump we ran our analysis
on was isolated from the one to which the deployed web server connects. Also, we use the
https protocol so that users can securely connect to our system. Before data analysis, we
anonymized any occurrence of names and emails in the database by applying a one-way
MD5 hash on them. At all times, we refrained from manually checking the database for users’
insights. All the images used in this chapter are in the public domain, and the insights shown
do not belong to real users. For further transparency, all the libraries and frameworks used for
building the tool and data analysis were listed and linked to from the main page of the website.
Although an IRB review was not performed beforehand, this work was subsequently reviewed
by our university’s IRB, which did not object to publishing the results.
4.4.2 Results
We got 210 users in total who successfully completed this part of the experiment. Out of them,
55 were in the BL Group, 50 in the DP Group, 54 in the IM Insights group, and 51 in the FR
group. We start by interpreting the results of our user experiment and comparing the efﬁcacy
of the various permission models. The metric we used in our evaluation is the Acceptance
75
Likelihood AL, deﬁned as:
AL = #(Accepts)
#(Accepts)+#(Rejects) , (4.6)
where Accepts denotes the cases where users were ﬁne with the permissions, and Rejects
denotes the cases where they found them too invasive. Accepts and Rejects are aggregated
across users and tasks for the permission model under consideration. The lower the AL, the
better the performance in deterring users from installing over-privileged apps.
In order to compare the effect of different interfaces, we plotted in Figure 4.13 the Acceptance
Likelihood for the BL and DP groups and also for each particular insight of the IM and FR
Insights groups. To evaluate the signiﬁcance of the AL differences among the interface types,
we ﬁt a generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) with the user’s decision (Accepting/Reject-
ing the app installation) as the binary response variable and the interface type as the ﬁxed
effect. Participants’ IDs and apps’ names were ﬁtted as random effects to control for the
potential between-participants and between-apps variabilities. The model was ﬁt assuming a
binomial distribution and a logit link function, using the glmer function in the lme4 package
in R [BMBW15]. Visual inspection of residual plots did not reveal any obvious deviations
from homoscedasticity or normality. The signiﬁcance of differences among AL values was
determined using Tukey Honest Signiﬁcant Difference test with the glht function of the mult-
comp package [HBW08]. The difference between the AL of any two interfaces in Figure 4.13 is
signiﬁcant if the corresponding row and column intersect at a p-value≤ 0.05 in Figure 4.14.
Inefﬁcacy of Baseline and Delta Permissions: We ﬁrst found that the Delta Permissions and
Baseline approaches performed closely (AL of 0.42 and 0.39 respectively) without a statistically
signiﬁcant difference (p-values= 0.77). Hence, we found no evidence of any advantage that
the DP can introduce, which means that telling our experiment’s participants explicitly about
unneeded permissions did not help deter them from installing over-privileged apps. We also
observe that both these interfaces had a signiﬁcantly higher AL (i.e. p-values≤ 0.05) than
all the insights, except for the Collaborator insight. This highlights the fact that showing
well-selected insights will result in deterring more users compared to the case of not showing
any insights.
The Power of Relational Insights: The next interesting outcome is that there is a category of
insights (Category 1) composed of {Image, Text, ECT, and Sentiments} that are all associated
with a signiﬁcantly higher acceptance likelihood than the category composed of {FacesWith-
Context, TopCollaborators, and SharedInterests} (Category 2)6. Since this is a very interesting
result, we investigate further to analyze the deﬁning characteristics of these two naturally
clustered categories. The main feature of Category 1, which includes both IM and FR insights,
is that insights in this category are restricted to characterizing the user herself, such as showing
text excerpts from her documents, topics appearing in them, or images she has in her ﬁles.
6The number of users who had location-tagged photos was low; hence, we could not obtain highly signiﬁcant
results in the case of Location and FacesOnMap insights.







































Figure 4.13 – AL for the different types of interfaces;
numbers next to each bar are the error values at 95%
conﬁdence interval
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Figure 4.14 – p-values of pairwise tests; if p-value≤ 0.05,
we consider the visuals on the corresponding row and
column as different; the difference direction is obtained
from Figure 4.13
Hence, we denote this category as Personal Insights. On the other hand, the deﬁning feature
of Category 2 insights, which are all Far-reaching, is that they extend to characterizing the
relationships of the user with other people. For instance, FacesWithContext shows the most
prominent faces in user’s photos along with the items appearing with them. SharedInterests
shows the people who collaborate with the user and the type of topics they share. Also, Top-
Collaborators identiﬁes the most frequent people the user interacts with. We denote these
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as Relational Insights. From our results, we can conclude that Relational Insights promote
greater privacy awareness in users, as such insights are more likely to dissuade them from
installing over-privileged apps.
Impact of Face Recognition: Delving deeper into more results brought forth by the compari-
son of different insights, one can notice that showing examples of user’s images (AL = 0.21) is
signiﬁcantly less deterring than showing the important faces and listing the concepts in the
image (AL = 0.08) with pairwise comparison p-value< 0.01. This highlights the fact that users
are sensitive towards the output of face detection and object recognition in photos. Given
that services such as Google Photos, OneDrive, and Flickr already apply such techniques to
facilitate search, the above result highlights that they can also be used by these companies
to easily implement solutions such as ours for raising users’ privacy awareness when sharing
data.
Inﬂuence of High-Level Textual Insights: Contrary to the case of images, in the case of textual
documents, showing the high-level entities or concepts extracted from the text does not seem
to have a signiﬁcant difference as compared to simply showing direct excerpts from the text
(p-value= 0.94). Only when the relationship factor is introduced does the AL signiﬁcantly
decrease (as in the case of SharedInterests).
Superiority of Far-reaching Insights: By aggregating the results over all the experiments with
FR Insights, we obtained a lower AL value compared to IM Insights (AL = 0.161 and 0.226
respectively). To check the statistical signiﬁcance of this difference, we followed the previous
methodology and ﬁt a GLMM model, but with the ﬁxed effect being the experimental group
instead of the speciﬁc interface. We conﬁrmed that the AL difference is signiﬁcant with a
pairwise comparison p-value= 0.004). We also noticed from Figure 4.14 that the best Far-
reaching insight, FacesWithContext (AL = 0.081), performed more than twice better than the
best Immediate Insight, Text insight (AL = 0.206) (ignoring the insights where the difference is
not statistically signiﬁcant). Overall, these results demonstrate the superiority of our novel
approach of FR Insights. Nevertheless, IM Insights are still signiﬁcantly better than the BL and
DP models. This goes in line with the ﬁndings of [HHWS14], which showed the goodness of
an approach similar to Immediate Insights in the case of Android permissions, even though
they did not have Delta Permissions as a building block.
4.4.3 Survey
In the following, we discuss the most important results based on users’ answers. Figure 4.15a
shows that although the majority of users understand what the text of the different Google
permissions means, at least one-fourth of users expressed that they do not fully understand
these permissions. Figure 4.15b allowed us to verify whether the experimental permission
interfaceswere intuitive to the users. More than 90%of users answered afﬁrmatively, indicating
that our experiments’ interface was user-friendly. Figure 4.15c showed that the users in the
FR group were the ones that expressed the most surprise at what the apps can know about















































(c) Q: I was surprised that apps know more about















(d)Q: I would be interested in such a Store before
installing real apps.
them, which is justiﬁed given the low Acceptance Likelihood in this group. Finally, more than
90% of users (and 100% of the FR group) expressed interest in using a similar interface to the
one they saw in the experiment (Figure 4.15d). Overall, the survey results were in line with
the experimental ﬁndings. Furthermore, surveyed users expressed the interest in “adding
recommendations for whether one should install 3rd party apps”, in “implementing similar
functionalities in the Google Play Store and iOS App Store”, and in “highlighting apps that
actually misbehave rather than only the over-privileged ones”. These ideas can potentially be
realized in future works.
4.4.4 Limitations
First, our design of the experiment abstracted several other factors that users take into account
when installing apps. The interplay between ratings, app’s brand, and permissions has been
studied before ([KCS13] and [HHWS14]), and it might be worth revisiting in a future work in
the context of our new permission models. Second, our experiment’s advertisement included
a mention of privacy as we wanted participants to focus on the app permissions. Evidently,
this might have made participants more alert towards this issue. Both these points can
imply that the real values of the AL might be different in reality, where privacy might not
be the main factor. Nevertheless, even if the absolute values of AL have been impacted, the
relative advantages of new permission models still hold. Moreover, we also note that the
users in the FR and IM groups had to do more tasks than the BL and DP groups, which
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might have resulted in more user fatigue and habituation in the FR and IM groups. This
was counteracted ﬁrst via task randomization at design time and second by the very nature
of insights that change at every step. For further validation, we computed the AL values
of Figure 4.13, considering only the ﬁrst 5 tasks each user performed. We did not see any
major deviation from the results with all tasks included. Finally, our user recruitment strategy
was primarily targeted towards our university’s network, and our study was only for English
speakers. It would be interesting to see how the results compare in a more general sample
(linguistically, demographically and geographically).
4.5 PrivySeal: A Privacy-Focused App Store
Driven by the magnitude of the risk posed by over-privileged apps in Google Drive, we were
motivated to bring the advantages of the Far-reaching Insights interface to the user community
of this platform. One approach towards achieving that would be for Google itself to implement
a scheme similar to ours and to integrate it within the app authorization process. However, we
decided not to wait and chose an alternative approach, which is independent of the company’s
plans and is ready for user utilization immediately. We built PrivySeal, a privacy-focused
store for Google Drive apps, which is readily available at https://privyseal.epﬂ.ch.
PrivySeal allows users to navigate a list of apps, click on those of interest, and check whether
they are over-privileged via our FR Insights interface. Users can also search by keyword for
apps, specifying criteria such as the app being least-privileged. The component diagram
for PrivySeal is shown in Figure 4.16. Similar to the APRs we conducted, we have included
a “Review Wizard” inside PrivySeal for indicating the requested, needed and unneeded
permissions along with the alternative permissions the developer could have used. This
responsibility is currently given to a small set of expert developers and is moderated by the
store administrators. Developers who would like to object to existing APRs of their apps can
submit rebuttals.
Currently, PrivySeal has more than 100 apps and 1440 registered users, with a geometric
mean of around 50 new users per month (whose vast majority is signing up out of interest in
the app after reading article(s) about it). We ﬁnally note that PrivySeal gets access, as is the
case with other apps, to users’ data to generate insights. Hence, users are assumed to trust the
provider of such a “Privacy-as-a-Service” solution. However, this assumption of trust will hold
if a solution such as PrivySeal is hosted by the CSP itself (which already possesses the data),
or an enterprise protecting its documents from 3rd party apps. The assumption of trust is also
valid if the users choose to trust a single entity (such as PrivySeal) to protect themselves from
multiple other unaccountable over-privileged entities that they would otherwise be forced to
trust.
























Figure 4.16 – Component diagram of PrivySeal (components labeled by S are server-side
and by C are client-side)
4.6 Anatomizing Developers’ Behavior
After studying the users’ privacy decisions, we now move to investigate the developers’ land-
scape, building on the apps data that our store’s users have installed. In total, we obtained
data from 1440 registered users of our privacy store.
4.6.1 Current Developer Behavior
The “DRIVE_APPS_READONLY” permission requested by our app allowed us to get the list of
apps previously installed by users, along with the information that Google Drive API gives
about the apps7. We found 662 unique apps installed by users in our dataset. For each app, we
obtained the following:
i. Access Level: which indicates whether the app had Partial Access or Full Access to the user’s
drive on authorization time. Since an app can change the permissions it requests from future
users, our dataset had instances of the same app installed with different access levels by
different users. We denote such apps as having an access level of Both.
ii. App Location: which indicates whether the app is (1) on Google Chrome Web Store, (2) on
Google’s Other Web Stores (namely the Add-ons Stores and the Google Apps Marketplace for
enterprises), or (3) Outside Web Stores of Google. This categorization is inferred by following
the productUrl ﬁeld present in the app information, which either leads to one of the stores or
is absent.
Figure 4.17 shows how the apps in our dataset were distributed over the different locations and























Figure 4.17 – Change of access level with app location
the number of apps requesting the different access levels. From this ﬁgure, one can observe
the following:
Developers Changing Behavior: The ﬁrst surprising outcome from this dataset is that around
40% of apps on Chrome Web Store (63 apps) had Both as access level, signifying that many
developers have changed the requested permissions at least once. To check the current
access levels of these apps, we reviewed them one-by-one. We discovered that 59 of these
apps (i.e., 94%) have changed from requesting Partial Access in the past, to requesting Full
Access currently. Hence, we can deduce that when developers change the access level, there
is a high probability that it is associated with getting more data instead of the other way
round. Highlighting this change of access level on installation time can further serve for more
informed user decisions.
Developer Deterrence through Ofﬁcial Stores: Apps outside the Web Stores requested Full
Access almost twice as much as they requested Partial Access (281 full vs. 155 partial). This
was not the case in the Chrome Web Store, where we observe only a slightly higher number of
apps with Full Access (81 full vs. 76 partial - counting apps that fall under the Both access level
but which currently request Full Access). So we can see that developers with apps outside the
Web Stores are more prone to asking for Full Access. This can be explained by the conjecture
that the store acts as a medium where the apps receive more exposure. Hence, developers
there are likely to be under the pressure of being evaluated through reviews and ratings, and
thus tend to avoid abusing the permissions, while developers outside Web Stores are under no
such pressure. Although Full Access does not necessarily mean that apps are over-privileged,
our APRs have shown that 84% of apps that request Full Access are over-privileged apps. In
the case of the Other Web Stores, the number of apps that requested Partial Access is around
thrice the number that requested Full Access (16 full vs. 47 partial). This is mainly because that
these Add-ons apps are generally expected to provide functionality for Google Docs (or other
native Google ﬁle types), so deviating from this and requesting permissions for all Google
Drive ﬁles will be easily detected by the community. Similarly, the community of enterprises,
which is highly sensitive towards privacy will deter developers from requesting Full Access in
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the Google Apps Marketplace.
Deterring Developers in the Wild: The majority of apps in our sample do not come from
any Google Web Store (24% from Google Chrome Store, 10% from the Other Web Stores, and
66% from outside the Web Stores). This is also the case for 75% of the apps requesting full
data access. These can be apps on other platforms, such as mobile platforms, for example,
where there are other types of application stores. These apps can also be ones that are not
present in any store but still have Google Drive integration. Hence, we can infer that improving
the Chrome Web Store privacy indicators might not be a sufﬁcient solution for deterring
the majority of developers. There is a need for alternative solutions, focused on Google Drive
permissions in speciﬁc, and independent of the various stores.
4.6.2 Potential Developer Misbehavior
Although it is clear that full access to users’ data can expose various far-reaching insights
about the user, it is not completely apparent what seemingly benign permissions, such as
metadata-only access can reveal about the user. In the previous section, we have shown that
the TopCollaborators insight, which can be extracted just from the metadata, has resulted in
an Acceptance Likelihood of 0.13, which is around three times lower than what the current
Google permission scheme (Baseline) attains. Hence, users are remarkably deterred by seeing
what they expose when they give access to their ﬁle metadata. Therefore, it is worthwhile to
explore the potential of information leakage through metadata-only access. In this section,
we show that metadata-only access on its own can allow developers to gather deeper insights
about the user’s topics and concepts of interest. This calls for extending the FR Insights with
such information to better inform the user about the potential risk of giving unneeded access
to metadata. Towards that, we analyze and compare insights inferred from users’ ﬁle metadata
to what can be inferred from ﬁle contents (the data).
Upon user u signing up to our app, the following operations are executed as part of the data
analysis:
i For each analyzed ﬁle, the ﬁlename is processed by removing its extension and replacing
punctuation marks by spaces.
ii The names of all the analyzed ﬁles are grouped into a comma-separated list LFN (u)
iii Topic and concept analysis are applied to LFN (u). The service used for text analysis
allowed us to extract topics in the form “a1/a2/ . . ./an”, representing a hierarchy among
the labels (e.g., “/law, government and politics/espionage and intelligence/surveil-
lance” or “/ﬁnance/investing/venture capital”). In this section, we differentiate between
General Topics where we only consider a1, and Speciﬁc Topics, where we consider an .
Accordingly, General Topics would indicate user’s interest in law, government and pol-
itics or ﬁnance for example while Speciﬁc Topics could indicate the user’s interest in
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surveillance or venture capital. At the end of this step, we ﬁlter the results to restrict our
analysis of metadata to a maximum of 3 General Topics, 3 Speciﬁc Topics, and 5 Concepts
for each user’s list LFN (u).
iv. From the user’s ﬁles’ contents, we extract the top 5 General Topics, top 10 Speciﬁc
Topics, and top 20 Concepts. These choices are motivated by the general observation
that one’s Concepts of interest are usually more in number than the Speciﬁc abstract
topics one cares about, which are in turn more than the General Topics of interest.
For each user u, we compared the list D(u) of labels (i.e., concepts/topics) extracted from
the ﬁles’ contents with the list M(u) of labels extracted from the list LFN (u) of ﬁlenames. We
selected precision as the evaluation metric as we are mainly interested in determining whether
labels extracted from metadata serve as a good approximation of labels extracted from the data.
Inspired by the multi-label classiﬁcation literature [TKV10], we computed precision using the
micro-averaging method, i.e., directly across all labels. A label occurrence is considered as
true positive if it belongs to M(u)∩D(u) and a false positive if it belongs to M(u) \D(u). tp(l )
is the number of true positives for a label l , and f p(l ) is that of false positives, both across all
users. Let LT also be the set of all labels found across user’s data and metadata. The overall




l∈LT (tp(l )+ f p(l ))
(4.7)
We used this method instead of macro-averaging (i.e., computing the precision per label and
then taking the average) because we are interested in estimating the users’ interests more
than the ability to predict each and every label. For this experiment, we only considered who
signed in to our app and had at least 10 textual ﬁles with associated concepts/topics. Hence,
our sample contained 200 users. Interestingly, the results for General Topics indicate that 0.78
of the metadata labels across users match with their top 5 topics of interest. In the case of
Speciﬁc Topics, on average, nearly two of the three extracted metadata labels also appear in
the top 10 Speciﬁc Topics extracted from data (Pmicro = 0.61). Finally, the fraction of metadata
Concepts that also appear in the data is around one-third (Pmicro = 0.31). However, this does
not necessarily imply that the other two-thirds of concepts appearing in the metadata are not
relevant to the user. In fact, we have noticed that a lot of these metadata labels are semantically
similar to those in the data.
In sum, we have observed that metadata on its own can be considerably accurate in revealing
part of users’ interests. It can be easily abused by sophisticated adversaries who conceal their
misbehavior through only requesting seemingly benign permissions (for metadata access).
Therefore, this calls for extending the FR insights in the case of metadata-only access to match
the developer’s potential. For instance, SharedInterests, which was shown earlier to convey
inferences from content, can also be used as an insight based on the collaborators and the
potential mutual topics inferred exclusively from the ﬁles’ metadata.
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4.7 Recommended Best Practices
In addition to PrivySeal, there are several steps that can serve to mitigate the potential of
misbehavior in Google Drive and similar services. These solutions serve to help the user both
before and after installing the apps.
Fine-Grained APIs: The availability of ﬁner grained permissions (such as access to a speciﬁc
ﬁle type) evidently reduces the amount of data in the hands of the developer and is in line with
the principle of least privilege. One disadvantage of such detailed permissions is that they
become more difﬁcult for users to comprehend in a short amount of time. However, providing
developers with the means to request such ﬁne-grained controls should not necessarily result
in a more complicated interface. This can be achieved via multi-layered interfaces [SBDC15].
For example, instead of the app indicating that it needs to “View the ﬁles in your Google Drive”,
it can indicate that it needs to “View ﬁles of speciﬁc types in your Google Drive”. Users that are
interested in knowing these ﬁle types can then click on an additional button (such as the info
button i in the current interface of Figure 4.4).
Transparency Dashboard: A post-installation technique which can potentially deter devel-
opers from actually abusing the users’ data is for the cloud platform to provide what we call
“Transparency Dashboards”. These dashboards allow the user to see which ﬁles have been
downloaded by each 3rd party app and when such operations took place. Such a monitoring
solution for all apps can only be achieved by the platform itself.
Insights Based on Used Data: Unlike external solutions (e.g., ours) that can only determine
what data can be potentially accessed, the cloud platform can provide users with insights
based on the data that developers have previously downloaded. Such an interface will help
users better pinpoint adversarial apps that needlessly retrieve ﬁles outside the scope of their
functionality.
A Privacy Preserving API Layer: It is not uncommon nowadays to ﬁnd APIs that work as an
additional layer on top of one or more existing cloud APIs (e.g., Cloud Elements Documents
Hub). Hence, one solution to build a privacy-preserving API is to create it as a layer on top of
one or multiple existing platforms’ APIs. This new API can provide ﬁner-grained access control,
allow permissions reviews from the community, and implement transparency dashboards. By
building this layer on top of existing cloud APIs that already offer various services, one can
circumvent the problem of attracting developers who might otherwise loathe using a solution
that only serves to protect privacy.
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4.8 Related Work
4.8.1 Privacy in Other App Ecosystems
To our knowledge, this work was the ﬁrst that studied the problem of user privacy in the
context of 3rd party apps on top of cloud storage providers. In the case of other ecosystems,
there are related works that have studied the current state of privacy notices (e.g. [CYA12,
HMSW13, FGW11, PXY+13]).
Felt et al., [FGW11] performed a study on permissions in the Chrome Extensions and Android
ecosystems. They found that only 14 out of 1000 extensions request the most dangerous
permissions and that the average Android app asks for fewer than 4 of the 56 dangerous
permissions. Interestingly, they discovered that users are shown at least one dangerous
permission during installation of almost each extension and Android app. Moreover, 5 out of
50 extensions they inspected manually were over-privileged. In another work, Felt et al., built
Stowaway, an automated tool for over-privilege detection in compiled Android apps [FCH+11].
Stowaway works by comparing the API calls used to the permissions requested. One-third of
the 940 analyzed apps were shown to be over-privileged. One of the justiﬁcations proposed
was the insufﬁcient documentation available for developers, which leads them to request a
few extra permissions. In this dataset we studied in this work, we have seen that 3rd party
Google Drive apps are, on average, almost twice as likely to be over-privileged. Moreover, the
implications of the extra permissions are mostly full-access to the users’ ﬁles, which makes
the problem highly signiﬁcant.
Chia et al., conducted a large-scale analysis of Facebook apps, Chrome extensions, and An-
droid apps to study the effectiveness of user-consent permissions systems [CYA12]. They
observed that the community ratings are not reliable indicators of app privacy in these ecosys-
tems and showed evidence of attempts at misleading users into granting permissions via
free apps or apps with mature content. Huber et al., developed AppInspect, a framework for
automating the detection of malpractices in 3rd party apps within Facebook’s ecosystem and
used network trafﬁc analysis to spot web trackers and identify leaks of sensitive information
to other third parties [HMSW13].
On a higher level, the case of 3rd party apps in Google Drive differs from these platforms in
that it is not possible to perform large-scale analysis, ﬁrstly due to the absence of a standard
application format and secondly due to the difﬁculty of automatically ﬁnding the triggering
button for permission requests in different apps. Aside from the above, client-side trafﬁc
analysis is not sufﬁcient to detect all cloud data leaks as the apps can send data to third parties
after it arrives at the server side, to which outsiders do not have access.
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4.8.2 Nudging Privacy
Our work on improving the privacy notices can be classiﬁed under the general umbrella of
privacy nudges. In their book [TS08], Thaler and Sunstein use the term nudge to signify “any
aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without
forbidding any options or signiﬁcantly changing their economic incentive”. In that sense, they
deﬁned nudges as interventions that are cheap to avoid, rather than being mandates that force
the user to take a speciﬁc action. Acquisti later proposed to transplant this approach of soft
paternalism from behavioral economics to the context of privacy, and termed it as privacy
nudges [Acq09].
Although there has been a signiﬁcant division around the approach of nudging in general
([SW11, Sun12]), debating its relation to freedom of choice and human anxiety, Acquisti et al.,
argue in their recent survey on privacy and security nudges that every design choice made is
itself a nudge [AAB+17]. Success stories in A/B testing tell us that minor changes in a certain
button or a photo on a website can result in a signiﬁcant modiﬁcation in user engagement.
Hence, they state that the question is not about the ethics of nudging in the ﬁrst place, but
whether the inevitable nudges are themselves ethical. Another argument they make is that
notices should strike a balance between greater transparency and overwhelming information.
In our approach of Far-reaching Insights, we tried to achieve that balance in two ways. First,
the insights themselves are aggregated to reveal high-level abstractions from users’ data.
Second, we do not pack all the relevant information for a speciﬁc insight in the interface at
the same time. For example, each time, we display a subset of the most important people
and photos in the corresponding insights. We believe that this also serves for reduced user
habituation.
There have also been several previous works that also fall under the category of privacy nudges.
Particularly relevant is the investigation of improvements to the existing permissions schemes.
In the case of the Android ecosystem, Kelley et al., argued that the privacy information should
be a part of the app decision-making process and should not be left till after the user makes her
decision [KCS13]. Hence, they appended a list of “Privacy Facts” to the app description screen,
textually indicating that the app, for example, collects contacts, location, photos, credit card
details, etc., and found that it assisted users in choosing apps that request fewer permissions.
Harbach et al., proposed to integrate personal examples from the user’s data in the permissions
request screen to expose the data apps can get access to [HHWS14]. This involved showing
random pictures, call logs, location, and contacts from user’s data that correspond to each
permission. They showed that this created more awareness among their study’s participants
and instilled a negative effect, making them more alert when installing apps.
Another work of interest was that by Tan et al., who investigated the effect of explanations
given by developers when requesting permissions on iOS [TNT+14]. They found that the mere
presence of the explanation lead to a higher approval rate of the permission and that the
content of the explanation did not make a noticeable difference. In the context of Facebook,
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Wang et al. [WLS+13] introduced privacy nudges to aid users while posting statuses to Face-
book through showing random proﬁle pictures of friends who can see the post, introducing
a time interval before the actual post is sent, or showing the post sentiment. Personalizing
warning notices has been studied before in the context of LED signs [WRKS94] and was shown
to signiﬁcantly increase compliance when compared to impersonal signs.
In this work, we go further, and we show that well-crafted visuals showing far-reaching insights
extracted from users’ data can be more effective than randomly selected data. We also show
through pairwise comparisons among the insights themselves that the choice of the displayed
insight highly affects the interface’s effectiveness, which was not proven in the case of textual
explanations for example ([TNT+14]). It is also worth mentioning that, in our experiments,
the number of users who were involved with their personal accounts in the experiment was
more than ﬁve times the number of users in [HHWS14] and [KCS13]. Furthermore, we also
provide a readily available solution for the public in the form of a privacy-focused app store.
Moreover, our work is in line with the best practices recommended by the recent work of
Schaub et al., who developed a design space for privacy notices to assist researchers in increas-
ing the impact of their schemes [SBDC15]. For instance, we implemented the multi-layered
notice concept by showing data of textual and visual modalities. We also developed various
visuals to ensure that the permissions dialog is polymorphic, which was also shown recently
to have an effect on reducing the habituation effect in the user’s brain [AKJ+15]. We further
hypothesize that our interfaces go beyond reducing habituation to making the user curious
about the content of the Far-reaching insights as these are not readily imagined by the users
as is the case of random examples (e.g., [HHWS14]).
4.9 Summary
In this chapter, we characterized the various factors that have an impact on user privacy in the
ecosystem of 3rd party apps for the cloud. We considered Google Drive as an example case
study and comprehensively anatomized the ecosystem from the viewpoint of users, developers,
and the cloud provider. For users, we carefully devised a set of experiments and tested existing
and novel risk communication models to analyze the factors that inﬂuence users’ decisions
in app installation. Our results provide interesting insights into how user privacy can be
improved and how CSPs can develop better risk indicators. We also presented a privacy-aware
store for cloud apps, which already has over 1440 registered users. From our store users and
people who took part in our experiments, we had the unique and unprecedented opportunity
to ﬁrst-hand study real users cloud data. Based on this data, we were able to characterize
the current behavior of 3rd party app developers and also point out avenues for developer
misbehavior. Finally, based on our analysis, we provided several suggestions for CSPs that
can help in safeguarding users’ privacy and protecting their data from needless leakage and
exploitation.

5 A Usability Approach
to Interdependent Privacy
5.1 Overview
In the previous chapter, we have shown our approach for better risk communication in the
context of over-privileged third party apps. However, users’ privacy is not solely determined by
these apps. For instance, the mere fact that users are granting more apps full access to their
cloud accounts is itself increasing the shareholding parties of their ﬁles, and subsequently the
likelihood of data exposure to unintended parties.
An additional intricacy is that when users grant access to a 3rd party cloud app, they are not
only sharing their personal data but also others’ data. This is because cloud storage providers
are inherently collaborative platforms where users share and cooperate on shared ﬁles. Hence,
protecting these ﬁles is not solely in the hands of the user.
Skyhigh Networks, a Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB), reports that 37.2% of documents
(across 23 million users) are shared with at least one other user. In organizations, documents
are shared, on average, with accounts from 849 external domains [Sky15]. Moreover, around
23% of cloud documents were found by Elastica (another CASB) to be “broadly shared”, which
means that they are shared (a) among all employees, (b) with external partners and clients,
or (c) with the public [Ela16]. Interestingly, 12% of those documents contained compliance-
related or conﬁdential data.
This further highlights what has been termed as the interdependent privacy problem [BC13],
where the decisions of friends can affect the user’s privacy and vice-versa. This concept was
initially proposed in the context of third-party social networking apps, such as Facebook.
However, while 1.92% of Facebook apps request friends’ personal information, this is much
more pronounced in 3rd party cloud apps, where all apps accessing one’s ﬁles get access to the
part which is shared too. Moreover, unlike Facebook apps, due to the collaborative nature of
cloud apps, the CSPs do not provide an option for users to control whether their collaborators’
apps can get access to data they own.
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Research Questions
In this chapter, we aim to lead the users to reduce the total exposure of their data to third
party shareholders (i.e., apps’ vendors) by better communicating to them the existence of
those shareholders. We go beyond over-privileged apps, and we tackle this issue in all apps
that are granted blanket access to users’ ﬁles (i.e., excluding the per-ﬁle access apps where
the user gives consent for each sharing operation). We are driven by the rationale that users
will inevitably continue to install apps to achieve various services. Hence, instead of stopping
them, we aim to lead them to select apps from vendors in a way that minimizes their privacy
risk.
We achieve this by leading users to take what we term as History-based decisions. Such
decisions account for the vendors who previously obtained access to the user’s data, whether
directly (with her consent) or via her collaborators. Our strategy consists of introducing
privacy indicators to the current permissions interfaces that help users minimize the number
of vendors with access to their data. Our “usable privacy” approach is guided via a data-driven
study and is evaluated via a data-driven simulation.
In essence, we tackle the following research questions:
– From a practical perspective, are the collaborators’ decisions signiﬁcant enough to be
accounted for in users’ app adoption decisions?
– Do users already account for entities with access to their data? If not, to what extent can the
usage of privacy indicators lead to users taking History-based decisions?
– How signiﬁcant is the effect of adopting these privacy indicators in the case of large networks
of users and teams?
Contributions
Towards addressing these questions, we continue to take Google Drive as our case study. We
make the following contributions:
– In Section 5.3, we analyze a real-world dataset of Google Drive users, and we show that the
median privacy loss that collaborators cause by installing apps can be much higher than
that inﬂicted by the user’s own app adoption decisions (39% higher with 5% of shared ﬁles
and 523% higher with 60% of shared ﬁles). To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst usage of a
real-world dataset to give a concrete evaluation of interdependent privacy in any ecosystem.
– Driven by the signiﬁcant impact of collaborators, we design new privacy indicators for
helping users mitigate the privacy risk via History-based decisions (cf. Section 5.4). We
assess these indicators via a web experiment with 141 users. We show that they signiﬁcantly
increase the likelihood that users choose the option with minimal privacy loss, even if not
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all of these users are motivated by privacy per se. To the best of our knowledge, this is
also the ﬁrst work to investigate a usable-privacy approach to mitigating the problem of
interdependent privacy. The few studies on this issue have mainly approached it from a
theoretical perspective, such as developing game-theoretic or economic models [BC13,
PG14] or from a behavioral perspective, such as studying the factors affecting real users’
monetary valuation of others’ privacy [PG15, PG16].
– We explore the potential of History-based decisions by performing a simulation on two
large user networks. We show that the network-effects of our approach result in curtailing
the growth privacy loss by 70% in a synthetic Google Drive-based collaboration network and
by 40% in a real author collaboration network. We also simulate the effect of such decisions
in a teams’ network. We demonstrate that teams can reduce the privacy loss by up to 45%
by solely accounting for team members’ decisions (cf. Section 5.5).
5.2 Models and Preliminaries
In Chapter 3, we gave an overview of the various interacting parties in the ecosystem of third
party cloud apps: the user, the cloud storage provider (CSP), the data subject whose privacy is
being considered (i.e., the individual or the team), and the third party cloud app vendor. In
this section, we further add the speciﬁc details related to the problem we tackle in this chapter.
5.2.1 User Model
A user is further assumed to be self-interested, i. e., only caring about optimizing the privacy of
the data subject (a.k.a., privacy egoist), and non-cooperative, i. e., does not coordinate her deci-
sions with others. We do not assume that the risks of installing each app are known to the users
or calculated a priori. In fact, unlike other 3rd party app ecosystems, the risk of each cloud
app cannot be automatically estimated based on techniques such as taint tracking [EGC+10]
or code analysis [FCH+11] because the main app’s functionality is typically implemented on
the server side (which cannot be accessed by external entities). Such assumptions constitute
the worst case in the scenarios we consider, and further privacy optimizations can be obtained
by relaxing them.
We also assume that the mental model for privacy-concerned users matches the possible
permission granularities they are given. Accordingly, privacy-concerned users can have one of
the following privacy-goal granularities1:
– per-type privacy goal: where users aim to optimize the data subject’s privacy independently
for different ﬁle types. For example, in an ecosystem like Dropbox, where per-type access
1We list here the mental models that match the status of app permissions nowadays. It is possible to add other
variants, such as caring for the privacy of a certain set of ﬁles for example, but this is not achievable with the
existing models. We also note that per-ﬁle access already achieves the least privilege possible; hence we do not
consider a corresponding privacy mental model.
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is an option, users might follow the separation-of-concerns principle. Hence, they might
install photo-related apps from a set of vendors that is different from the set authorized for
document processing.
– all-ﬁles privacy goal: where users aim to reduce the privacy risk for their entire set of ﬁles.
This can be in the case of ecosystems which do not have the option of per-type access, like
Google Drive. It can also be the case that a user of Dropbox has this goal in mind despite
being presented with ﬁner-grained app permissions.
5.2.2 Threat Model
Weconsider the 3rd party app vendors as the adversary (andnot theCSP). The privacy indicator
we introduce is best implemented by the CSP, which already has access to the users’ and
collaborators’ data. Alternatively, this can be a feature within Cloud Access Security Brokers
(e.g., SkyHigh Networks, Netskope, etc.), which are already trusted by thousands of enterprises
to protect their cloud data against other 3rd parties. Moreover, we consider the protection
against over-privileged apps as an orthogonal problem, whichwe have considered in Chapter 4.
We rather focus on the interdependent privacy problem, which covers all vendors with full
access and is an issue in least-privileged apps too.
Furthermore, in this chapter, we will focus on content-related permissions. In the case of
Google Drive, there are two such two access levels: (1) full access, which can be achieved
with the DRIVE_READONLY or DRIVE permissions and (2) per-ﬁle access via the DRIVE_FILE
permission. Google Drive does not offer the per-type permissions option.
5.2.3 Privacy Loss Metrics
In order to quantify the privacy loss that a user incurs with time, we introduce now the Vendors
File Coverage (VFC) metric2. Consider a user u and a set V of vendors at a certain time step.
For notation simplicity, we will omit the time step henceforth. VFCu(V ) is computed as the







Intuitively, VFCu(V ) increases as vendors in V get access to more ﬁles of u. It has the range
[0, |V |]. 3
If we consider the set Vu of vendors explicitly authorized by user u, we can deﬁne the Self-
2Table 5.1 summarizes the notation employed in this chapter
3We do not normalize VFCu (V ) by |V |. Our rationale is that multiple vendors with access to all the user’s ﬁles





C (u) Collaborators of u
Vu set of vendors authorized by u
Vc(u) set of vendors authorized by collaborators of u
VFCu (V ) ﬁle coverage due to the vendors in set V
Fu set of ﬁles of u
Fu,v set of ﬁles of u accessible by vendor v
Table 5.1 – Summary of the notations used
Vendors File Coverage as:
Self-VFCu =VFCu(Vu) (5.2)
Similarly, if we consider the set VC (u) of vendors authorized by the collaborators C (u) of u, we
can deﬁne the Collaborators-Vendors File Coverage as:
Collaborators-VFCu =VFCu(VC (u)) (5.3)
Finally, the Aggregate VFCu for a user u is that due to all vendors authorized by u or its
collaborators:
Aggregate-VFCu =VFCu(Vu ∪VC (u)) (5.4)
Throughout this work, we will use the terms privacy loss and VFC interchangeably. As will
become evident in Section 5.4, this metric choice allows relaying a message that is simple
enough for users to grasp, yet powerful enough to capture a signiﬁcant part of the privacy loss.
Obviously, one can resort to a deeper inspection of content or metadata sensitivity (as we did
in Chapter 2) had the purpose been ﬁnding the best privacy model in general. However, our
rationale to not do so is the following: for instigating a behavioral change, telling users that a
company has 30% of their ﬁles is more concrete than a black-box description informing them
that the calculated loss is 30% and constitutes less information-overload than presenting them
with detailed loss metrics.
5.3 Collaborators’ Impact
At this point, we are in a position to handle the ﬁrst research question on the extent of
collaborators’ contribution to a user’s privacy loss. Hence, we want to test the following
hypothesis:
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H1: The collaborators’ app adoption decisions have a signiﬁcant impact on the user’s privacy
loss.
If this hypothesis is valid in practice, it provides a strong motivation for designing privacy
notices that aid users in accounting for their collaborators’ decisions, which is what we will
study in Section 5.4. Towards that, we will be dissecting the privacy loss, quantiﬁed by VFC,
that users incur in a realistic 3rd party cloud apps dataset.
5.3.1 Dataset
One of the main challenges when studying the privacy loss in 3rd party cloud apps is the
absence of public datasets with realistic ﬁle distributions, collaborator distributions, sharing
patterns, 3rd party app installations, etc. We beneﬁt in this section from an anonymized
dataset that we have constructed via the PrivySeal4 service in Chapter 4. We build our
analysis on it to evaluate the VFC of users in a realistic context.
Out of the database of registered users in PrivySeal, we selected those which had a mini-
mum of Nf i les_min = 10 ﬁles in total, at least Pmin_shared = 5% of ﬁles that are shared, and a
minimum of Napps_min = 1 third party app installed. The dataset, henceforth referred to as
the PrivySeal Dataset, was anonymized and contained metadata-only information. It con-
sisted of a subset of the ﬁles’ metadata of 183 PrivySeal users in addition to the Google Drive
apps installed by those users prior to authorizing PrivySeal’s app (the DRIVE_APPS_READONLY
permission was requested by PrivySeal). The dataset speciﬁcally contained:
– list of user IDs (anonymized via a one-way hash function);
– IDs of ﬁles in each user’s Google Drive,
– list of anonymized collaborators’ IDs for each ﬁle ID;
– list of apps with full access installed by each user;
– the vendor of each app.
In total, the number of users in addition to collaborators was 3422. Overall, these users had
installed 131 distinct Google Drive apps from 99 distinct vendors. Figure 5.1 characterizes the
PrivySeal Dataset. Particularly, it displays 4 distributions in this dataset, which realistically
model the system under study:
– number of ﬁles per user, which follows a skewed distribution with a median of 67 ﬁles
– sharing pattern: percentage of shared ﬁles out of all user ﬁles, which also follows a skewed
distribution with a median around 18%
4https://privyseal.epﬂ.ch
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– number of collaborators across all user ﬁles (a.k.a., the degree of the user node in the
collaboration network): where 75% of the users had less than 23 collaborators
– number of vendors authorized per user: also follows a skewed distribution with a median of
1 vendor per user
5.3.2 Results
We computed the Self-VFC, the Collaborators-VFC, and the Aggregate-VFC (as deﬁned in
Section 5.2.3) for users in the PrivySeal Dataset5. As we did not have the actual number of
apps for each collaborator of users in the dataset, we assigned to these collaborators a set of
apps from a random user of the dataset. We show in Figure 5.2 how these metrics evolve as we
gradually consider populations that collaborate more frequently. With Pmin_shared = 5%, we
had a median of 1.39 for Collaborators-VFC, which was 39% higher than a median of 1.00 for
Self-VFC. The signiﬁcance of the median difference is evidenced by the non-overlapping box-
plot notches. This difference became much larger when we considered users that share more
ﬁles. We had a 100% median difference at Pmin_shared = 10% and 523% median difference at
Pmin_shared = 60%. Such results indicate that:
– The collaborators’ app adoption decisions contribute a core component to the user’s privacy
loss, thus conﬁrming our hypothesis H1.
– The higher the number of collaborators is, the higher the magnitude of loss these collabora-
tors can potentially inﬂict.
Both conclusions motivate the need for taking collaborators’ decisions into account when
designing privacy indicators for cloud apps, which is what we will embark on next.
5To avoid double counting, we considered the vendors authorized by both the user and her collaborators in
computing Self-VFC but not in computing Collaborators-VFC.
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Figure 5.1 – Density plots for vari-
ous parameters, computed per user
(Pshared_min = 5). Median line is shown,
and the light orange area represents the
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Figure 5.2 – Evolution of metrics with popu-
lations that share more ﬁles (Nf i les_min = 10,
Napps_min = 1). The numeric labels denote the
corresponding number of users in the dataset.
5.4 User Study
Up till now, we have conﬁrmed that, if users want to minimize their privacy loss, they are
better off not ignoring the app installation decisions of collaborators. In this section, we tackle
the next research question, where we investigate the potential of privacy indicators in leading
users to minimize their exposure to 3PC app vendors. We show ﬁrst our design methodology
for the privacy indicators, and we follow that by a web experiment that investigates the efﬁcacy
of these indicators in realistic scenarios.
5.4.1 History-based Privacy Indicators
We call our proposed privacy indicators “History-based Insights” (HB Insights) as they allow
users to account for the previous decisions taken by them or by their collaborators. We
continue to consider Google Drive as a case study, and we show this indicator in the context of
Google Drive apps’ permissions in Figure 5.3b. Compared to the current interface provided
by Google (Figure 5.3a), we added a new part to highlight the percentage of user ﬁles readily
accessible by the vendor (computed based on VFCu({v}) for each vendor v).
As we prove in the next section, selecting the vendor that already has the largest percentage
of user ﬁles is the optimal strategy to minimize the privacy loss in our context. We denote
this strategy as “History-based decisions”. Following the best practices in privacy indicators’
design [SBDC15], our indicator was multilayered, with both textual and visual components.
The wording of the main textual part was brief and general enough to hold for both the data
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percentage exposed by friends and that exposed by the user. We used a percentage value
rather than a qualitative measure to facilitate making comparisons among apps based on
this value. The visual part showed the percentage as a progress bar with a neutral violet color.
The bottom textual part was added in a smaller font to provide further explanation for those
interested. We used the term “company” in our interface instead of “vendor” as it is more
commonly understood by the general audience.
5.4.2 Proof of Optimal User Strategy
Before proceeding to our user study, we provide in this section a proof of the optimal user
strategy for minimizing the privacy risk, given our assumptions. We follow the notation
summarized in Table 5.1. Let us consider that each 3PC app vendor has probability p of
exposing users’ data. As we do not assume that users are provided with a per-vendor risk
estimation utility, we set this probability to be the same for all vendors. In general, at a time
t , a user u would have exposed her data to a set V of vendors, such that each vendor v has
access to a fraction fu,v (t) = |Fu,v (t )||Fu | of the ﬁles. Without loss of generality, we will consider
henceforth that the user has an all-ﬁles privacy goal (cf. Section 5.2.1). However, the same
reasoning applies in the case of a per-type privacy goal. In that case, we simply replace “ﬁles”
by “ﬁles of a speciﬁc type” (e.g. photos, documents). We will also be assuming that the users
themselves are the data subjects (i. e., we consider individual-level subjects).
For a vendor v , we quantify the user’s privacy risk magnitude as p ∗ fu,v (t ), i. e., the fraction of
user ﬁles possessed by the vendor multiplied by the probability that the vendor exposes the
user’s ﬁles. This vendor could have obtained access due to app installations by the user herself
or by her collaborators. A user’s privacy risk magnitude at time t can thus be deﬁned as the
sum of the risk magnitude across vendors in V : Risk(t )=∑v∈V p ∗ fu,v (t ).
When a user installs an app from a vendor vˆ at time t +1, the vendor gets access to the whole
set of user’s ﬁles. Hence, the risk magnitude is increased by p ∗ (1− fu,vˆ (t)). Given that p is
constant, the risk magnitude can be minimized by choosing vˆ , such that vˆ = argmaxv fu,v (t )
(which can also be written as vˆ = argmaxv VFCu({v}, t )). Hence, the optimal, greedy strategy
to minimize the risk is to select the vendor that already has the largest fraction of user ﬁles,
thus minimizing p ∗ (1− fu,vˆ (t )). We call this strategy: “History-based decisions”.
5.4.3 Methodology
To evaluate the new permissions interface, we performed an online web experiment (rather
than a lab study) as we were mainly motivated by obtaining a large sample of users that is also
geographically and culturally diverse. The hypothesis we wanted to test is:
H2: Introducing the new privacy indicator signiﬁcantly increases the probability that users take
History-based decisions.









(a) Current permissions interface of Google Drive
(b) Proposed “History-based insights” interface, with the
buttons from the user study in the bottom
Figure 5.3 – Comparison ﬁgures showing the original permissions interface
of Google Drive and the “History-based insights” interface
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Figure 5.4 – Example app displayed in the list of apps
In addition, the study allowed us to build a realistic user decision model based on the choices
taken by participants in different conditions. We will utilize this model in Section 5.5 to
simulate the app choices in a large user network and to study the effect on the overall VFC in
the network. We structured our study to have (1) an Introductory Survey, (2) a series of App
Installation Tasks, and (3) a Concluding Survey.
User Recruitment: We recruited users via CrowdFlower’s crowdsourcing platform. In our
study, we restricted participation, via the platform’s ﬁltering system, to the highest quality
contributors (Performance Level 3). We also geographically targeted countries where English
is a main language as our interface was only in English. To further guarantee quality responses,
each user was rewarded a small amount of $0.5 for merely completing the study and an
additional amount of $1.25 that was manually bonused for those who did not enter irrelevant
text in the free-text ﬁelds.
Instructions: Participants were ﬁrst presented with introductory instructions that explained
the context of the study (i. e., cloud storage services and 3rd party apps that can be connected
to them). They were asked to only continue if they had good familiarity with cloud storage
services (e. g., Google Drive, Dropbox, etc.). We did not explicitly require that participants
have experience with 3rd party cloud apps. However, we educated them about such apps
throughout the instructions, particularly showing them two examples of 3rd party apps in
action (PandaDoc for signing documents and iLoveIMG for cropping photos). These apps were
displayed via animated GIFs that play automatically and do not rely on the user clicking. We
used limited deception by neither mentioning the focus of the study on participants’ privacy
nor giving hints about selecting apps based on the installation history. The advertised purpose
was to “check how people make decisions when they install 3rd party apps.”
Introductory Survey: After checking the instructions, users were presented with an introduc-
tory survey, where they ﬁrst entered general demographic information. This survey was also
front-loaded with questions about cloud storage services (several of which required free-text
input) to discourage users who had not used these services from continuing to the actual
study.
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5.4.4 Study Overview
Next, users could proceed to the study page. We used a split-plot design in the study. Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to one of two groups:
1. Baseline Group (BL): where the permissions interface used is that currently provided by
Google Drive (Figure 5.3a).
2. History-based Group (HB): where the History-based Insights permissions interface (Fig-
ure 5.3b) is used.
In each group, the study consisted of 3 modules, which cover the main conditions that can
occur when users desire to install a cloud app. On a high level, the modules investigate the
following questions:
1. Module 1: are users likely to select apps from the same vendor they installed from
before?
2. Module 2: are users likely to select apps from vendors that her collaborators have used
before?
3. Module 3: do users consider the differences in access levels obtained by vendors that
collaborators installed?
In all modules, whenever the user was asked to choose an app, she was presented with a list of
12 apps (Figure 5.4 shows an example app). Only two of these apps were relevant to the task
purpose, and they were placed on top of the list (randomly positioned as ﬁrst or second). With
this setup, we wanted to mimic the realistic setup of app browsing while not squandering the
user’s effort on ﬁnding apps. All apps had the same full access permissions too (namely DRIVE
permission). Unlike in Chrome Store, we removed elements such as ratings, user reviews,
and screenshots and kept a minimal interface. This is all in order to reduce the distractions
from factors outside the study. We refer the reader to the work of Kelley et al., [KCS13] who
investigated the effects of those elements on users’ decisions for Android apps.
To account for fatigue and learning effects, modules 1, 2, and 3 were presented in a random
order for users. We piloted our experimental setup in two stages: with colleagues and with
online users from the CrowdFlower community itself. For reviewing the online pilot testers
work, we embedded a Javascript code for session recording in our study’s web page, which
allowed us to view the user’s mouse and keyboard actions on our side.
Demographics
We had 157 users who completed the study. Based on manually reviewing the users’ inputs,
we removed 16 users who were inputting irrelevant free-text in the survey in the study. We
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Age 18-62 (median 31 years)
Gender 35.5% Female
64.5% Male






IT Experience 41.8% Have worked or studied in IT
Degree 19.1% High school
7.1% Trade/tech./vocational training
51.1% Associate or Bachelor’s degree






7.4% AUS+IRL+ NLD + PAK
Table 5.2 – Demographics in our user study; N = 141
thus report the results of 141 users, 72 of which were in the BL group and 69 in the HB group.
In Table 5.2, we describe the participants’ demographics based on the introductory survey. Of
these participants, 66.4% were males and 33.6% were females. They were between 18 and 62
years old, with a median of 31. Moreover, 42.3% of the participants had worked or studied in
IT before. Participants were mostly from India (37%), USA (35%), Britain (7%), Germany (7%),
and Canada (7%).
CrowdFlower presents the users with an optional satisfaction survey after completing the
study, and 49 users took this survey. On average, the study received 4.2/5 for instructions
clarity, 3.8/5 for questions’ fairness, 3.8/5 for ease of job, 3.6/5 for pay sufﬁciency (before the
bonus was rewarded). This ensures that participants’ behavior has not been affected by either
a lack of time to complete the task or the task design in general.
5.4.5 Study Details and Results
We now move to the detailed description of the modules and the results obtained. These
modules are summarized in Figure 5.5, to which we refer henceforth. We also show sample
screenshots from the online study in Figure 5.6. For a more elaborate documentation of the
study steps, we refer the reader to Appendix B. The results are also presented in Table 5.3.
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a second app by thetimetube.com
between
an app by a new vendorpurpose: scanning 
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another app by a new vendor purpose: converting all 













John            having access to 
more data than Lisa 
Vendor Familiarity
PDF Files Merger by 
smartsfile.comJohn
installedc Vendor Familiarity






PDF Files Mergerpurpose: merge PDF documents 
into a single PDF file
d
app name: Video to GIF Converter
app name: Malware Scanner
app name: NitroSafe
app: Enjoy Music Player, vendor: musico.com
app name: Mediamania Converter
vendor name: driveplayer.com
app name: Photo Editor
app: Online Audio Converter, 
vendor: online-audio-converter.com
Figure 5.5 – Summary of the experiment modules; a sample of the questions corresponding to
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(a) Instructions presented to users at the beginning of a module
As explained, we now start from scratch. Consider that this is the ?rst app you will install. Please install any
application from the company: thetimetube.com. (Only one such app exists, and you can click
on the app to view its info.)
(b) Module 1; Task a : Vendor Familiarity
You now need an app that allows scanning your Google Drive ?les for viruses. 
Two such apps exist below. Check them both by clicking on them. Then choose the one that you prefer to
install.  
Be prepared to give a reason for that choice.
(c) Module 1; Task b: App Selection
Google Drive allows you to share ?les with friends. You decided to share all your photos on
Google Drive with your friend John . Up till now, who is the friend who has access to your data?
 John 
 Lisa 
(d) Module 2; Task a: Collaborator Awareness
Task:  
Your friend John  has installed an application called Photo Editor and has given its company
access to all his ?les (including shared ?les). Write below the name of the company that owns this application. 
(You can click on the app to view its info.)
(e) Module 2; Task b: Vendor Familiarity
Assume that you have shared all your photos with John . Additionally, you have shared with Lisa
 some of your photos. Who has more ?les from you in their Google Drive?
 John 
 Lisa 
(f) Module 3; Task a: Collaborator Awareness
Figure 5.6 – Screenshots from the user study
104 CHAPTER 5. A USABILITY APPROACH TO INTERDEPENDENT PRIVACY
Module 1 (Self-History Scenario)
This module tests whether the user is more likely to select an app from the same vendor she
has just installed from before. In step (a), the user is made aware the she installed an app from
a speciﬁc vendor v (Figure 5.6b). In step (b), she is asked to install6 an app that satisﬁes the
given purpose (Figure 5.6c) among a list of apps. Two of the listed apps were relevant, and one
of them was from vendor v itself.
Despite the participants being informed one step earlier that they installed an app from
“thetimetube.com”, that did not make a difference in the BL case: half of the users still chose
the app from the new vendor “nitrosafe.org” (cf. Table 5.3. In the absence of traditional signals
that users follow for deciding on apps (reviews, ratings, permissions), participants apparently
made decisions that canceled out, making the two apps equally favored across participants.
The vast majority of users were not approaching the installation from the angle of keeping
their data with fewer shareholders. Based on their provided justiﬁcations, they rather looked
for other cues, such as selecting the app that, in their opinion, has a more comprehensive
description, a more professional logo, a better sounding name, or a more trustable URL.
Still, 12 users have explicitly mentioned in their text input that they chose an app because it
is from the same vendor they have dealt with earlier. Even then, neither of them has alluded
to a privacy motivation behind the choice. These 12 participants mainly provided cross-app
compatibility, interface familiarity, and satisfaction with the previous vendor as justiﬁcations.
For example, one participant wrote: “I favored Malware Scanner due to the fact that the name
‘thetimetube.com’ was in the last app installed, and I tend to install apps from the same company
due to cross-app compatibility usually found in apps by the same company.”
Interestingly, twousers justiﬁed their installation of the app from the new vendor (nitrosafe.org)
by writing that they had just installed an app from the same company before. This indicates
that even when users try to account for previous decisions, they might ﬁnd it difﬁcult to
remember the previous app vendors. Given that our study had a short time span separating
the current from the previous installation, we expect that such mistakes would be even more
common in real scenarios when app installation instances are separated by longer time spans.
The HB group witnessed a much larger proportion of users who favored the option with less
privacy loss. 72.2% of the participants selected the app from the “thetimetube.com” (the
vendor which already has access). The difference of 22.8% compared to the BL group is
statistically signiﬁcant (Fisher’s exact test, p-value = 0.005). Many of the participants who
chose the app from “thetimetube.com” reported that they were motivated by the 100% access
that the app already has. We counted around 40 such users (i. e., 57% of the HB group). Some
of them went further and explicitly mentioned that their selection was motivated by giving
data to fewer data owners (i. e., more privacy). For example, one user wrote: “This company
has access to all my ﬁles, so I would choose them as I don’t want to have 2 companies with full
6Users were informed that this is a role-playing study, and no apps were actually installed.
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Scenario
BL HB group Δ p-value
VwA NV VwA NV
Self History 50.0% 50.0% 75.4% 24.6% 25.4% 0.003
Collaborator’s app 52.8% 47.2% 88.4% 11.6% 35.6% < 0.001
Collaborator’s vendor 58.3% 41.7% 82.6% 17.4% 24.3% 0.002
Multiple collaborators 44.4% 55.6% 82.6% 17.4% 38.2% <0.001
Table 5.3 – App selection statistics in the study; VwA: vendor with access; NV : new vendor.
The comparisons in each experimental group were planned contrasts, and the p-values of
difference between the percentages of users who selected each app type were computed using
Fisher’s exact test
access to my ﬁles”.
In a nutshell, we were able to verify our hypothesis in this scenario: the new privacy indicator
leads users to more frequently choose the app from a vendor they already authorized. Fur-
thermore, we have discovered that the HB Insights interface has indirectly made users think
about various positive effects brought by using apps from the same vendor. This eventually
lead them to make more privacy-preserving decisions.
Module 2.1 (Collaborator’s App Scenario)
This module tests the likelihood that the participant selects the same app that her collaborator
had used. In step (a), the participant is made aware that she had shared all her photos with
a friend f (Figure 5.6d). For more familiarity, we also added a picture for each of the two
ﬁctitious friends throughout the study. In step (b), the user is made aware that her friend
f has installed an app a0 (Figure 5.6e) from vendor v . She is asked to type the name of the
app’s vendor (“paste” option was disabled in the input ﬁeld to further ensure the participant
is aware of the vendor). In step (c), the user is asked to install an app with a certain purpose
(similar to Figure 5.6c). One of the two matching apps is app a0.
Similar to the previous module, the BL group witnessed an almost even split between “Online
Player”, installed previously by the friend, and “Enjoy Music Player”, from a new vendor
(cf. Table 5.3. We also noticed that 20 participants in this group justiﬁed their decision by
mentioning that their friend has used the app. Still, neither of them alluded at privacy reasons
in their justiﬁcations. Instead, the two most prevalent motivations were (1) considering the
friend’s use of the app as a recommendation or (2) achieving compatibility with their friends’
app, which facilitates data sharing within the app itself. Quoting one user: “This is the same
app my friend is using so it should be quite compatible for us to both share.”
In addition to having a signiﬁcant 35.6% difference in the case of the HB group, we noticed that
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32 users mentioned the existing data access as a reason for choosing the app “Online Player”.
Also, 26 users referred to the fact that the friend has installed this app before (including those
who mentioned both of the previous reasons). Unlike the BL group’s justiﬁcations though,
where the friend’s recommendation and the app’s compatibility prevailed, the privacy issue
was explicitly brought up by at least 10 users. One participant put it as follows: “Thanks to
John, they have already access to 70% of my data. Sharing the last 30% isn’t as bad as sharing
100% of my data with driveplayer.com.”
Module 2.2 (Collaborator’s Vendor Scenario)
Weproceed in steps (d) and (e) as in the previous scenario’s steps (b) and (c), with the difference
that a new app from v is included among the options in step (e) instead of the exact same
app a0. One interesting insight from this scenario is that the line between the company and
the app is blurred in the minds of several users who used the two entities interchangeably.
In fact, 3 users in the BL group and 7 participants in the HB group justiﬁed their choices
by mentioning that their friend installed the same app before, which was not the case. For
example, one user wrote: “this app already has access to my ﬁles, and I don’t want to install any
new app.”
Module 3 (Multiple Collaborators Scenario)
Given collaborators fmore and fless , where the user shares much more data with fmore , this
scenario checks the likelihood of the participant authorizing an app that fmore has installed.
In step (a), the participant is made aware that fmore has access to more data than fless (Fig-
ure 5.6f). In steps (b) and (c), the participant is made familiar with the apps each of the friends
installed (similar to Figure 5.6e). In step (d), the user is asked to select an app with a speciﬁc
purpose. The two friends’ apps are the only ones matching, and the choice is to be made
between them (similar to Figure 5.6c).
In the BL group, we had 44.4% of the participants choosing the app installed by fmore . Still, this
percentage is relatively close to an equal split between the two apps. Out of this percentage,
13 users justiﬁed their choice by mentioning that they were encouraged to follow the choice of
friend fmore . Even though they did not mention privacy, the larger number of ﬁles shared with
fmore was often used as a justiﬁcation. For example, one participant wrote: “This is the app
that John already uses, and he has access to all of my ﬁles. The PDF Mergy app is used by Lisa,
but she only has access to part of my ﬁles.”
In the HB group, around 82.6% chose the app previously installed by the friend fmore , which is
signiﬁcantly more than those in the BL case (Fisher’s exact test, p-value< 0.001). Looking at
the justiﬁcations, around 37 users explicitly mentioned the higher access level that this app
already possesses as a reason for their choice. Privacy was additionally mentioned by 8 of
these users. Quoting one of them: “PDF Mergy already has access to 70% of my ﬁles. Using
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PDF Files Merger would unnecessarily increase third party app access to my ﬁles.” However, we
still had 2 users who went for the app with less existing access, with one of them saying he
favors the app that only “had accessed 30% of ﬁles before installation”. What was interesting
though is that almost all users who mentioned friends were making a comparison between
the two friends’ existing access level, regardless of their ﬁnal choice.
5.4.6 Concluding Survey
At the end of the user study, users were presented with a ﬁnal set of questions. We asked them
whether they would like to be notiﬁed when a friend installs an app that gets access to their
shared ﬁles. Around 92% of users in the BL group and 90% of users in the HB group agreed.
We further asked the participants whether they are ﬁne with a collaborator being notiﬁed
when they install applications that access ﬁles shared with that collaborator. The percentage
of people who agreed dropped to 75% in the BL and 78% in the HB group. The relatively small
difference between the answers to these two questions highlights that only a minority of
users is not willing to make the trade-off of contributing to the overall system. Such users
can be given the option to not use privacy indicators based on their friends’ decisions.
Next, users were asked the following question “Assume you have installed an application called
YouMusic from a company called Musicana and gave it access to all your ﬁles on Google Drive.
Now you are considering installing an application called YouVideo from the same company.
How do you think that this application will affect your privacy:”. Only 11% of each group
replied by “negatively”. The vast majority in both groups either perceived the avoidance of a
new vendor as a positive outcome or considered that the privacy loss will remain the same.
Interestingly, the users in the BL showed a similar reasoning in justifying their choices as the
HB group although the latter were primed about these aspects via the privacy indicators. This
indicates that the privacy indicators match the ﬁrst intuition for a large fraction of users.
5.4.7 Discussion and Limitations
Overall, we found out that, in the threemodules, participants in theHB groupwere signiﬁcantly
more likely to install the app with less privacy loss (i. e., the app from the vendor with the
largest share of the user’s ﬁles) than those in the BL group. Despite showing the efﬁcacy of
History-based Insights, our study still has its limitations. To get a large, diverse sample size,
we resorted to a web experiment based on role-playing with hypothetical data. It would be
interesting to see how such results extrapolate to the case where users’ own data is in question
and the users are in immediate need of installing an app. On the one hand, the users might be
more alerted towards their own data privacy. On the other hand, users are typically seeking
an app to satisfy an immediate need. A longitudinal study with actual users’ data is also
well-suited to study the effect of our new privacy indicators over time.
Moreover, in our design, we have abstracted several factors (e.g., ratings and reviews), which
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have been previously studied in similar ecosystems [KCS13], in order to focus on one factor.
These factors might have diluted the effect of the privacy indicator. Still, we conjecture that,
although the absolute values of our ﬁndings might not strictly apply, the differences between
the two groups will still be practically signiﬁcant.
Additionally, in this chapter, we have investigated only one type of history-based privacy
indicators. Evidently, such indicators can be integrated at different stages of the app installa-
tion process. For example, they can be part of the recommendation strategy for suggesting
alternative apps. They can also be included in the apps’ search interface. Apps can also be
labeled as “privacy preserving” in the web store based on this metric. It is also possible that
the privacy indicator is only shown when the vendor has existing access to the user’s data. This
might serve to reduce the habituation effect and the information overload. The best choice
among these deployment scenarios needs further investigation.
Furthermore, it is important to note that, although our experimental interface mentions the
collaborators’ name in the explanation under the progress bar, this does not have to be the
case in actual deployments. We hypothesize that removing the name will not have a signiﬁcant
impact on the results as it was not highlighted in the interface. This allows the CSP to relay
such information to the users without exposing sensitive data about particular collaborators.
The CSP can resort to more sophisticated anonymization methodologies, such as showing a
non-exact percentage that can be mapped to multiple collaborators. Exploring the impact of
these techniques is left for future work. Moreover, we note that this anonymization might not
be needed at all in the enterprise settings, where apps installed by teammembers are supposed
to be visible for the administrators. As we show in Section 5.5.3, a signiﬁcant reduction in
privacy loss can be achieved without even accounting for decisions by users external to the
team.
Finally, the privacy indicator in our study has addressed two granularity levels: full and per-ﬁle
access. However, the same indicator can be extrapolated to the case of per-type access. For
example, the interface can say: “The app’s company already has access to 70% of your photos”
(instead of ﬁles).
5.5 Large Networks’ Simulations
In the previous section, we showed the signiﬁcant change that our privacy indicator can
effect through encouraging users to make History-based decisions. We will tackle the next
research question, where we investigate the impact of adopting such privacy indicators on
the privacy risk in realistic scenarios with large user networks. As we are not in the position
of the CSP to study an actual implementation of the HB Insights interface over time, we will
perform a simulation of potential users’ installation behavior. We will base this on both the





For the purposes of this simulation, we constructed the following three networks. The ﬁrst
network is an inﬂated version of the PrivySeal Dataset. The second is a large collaboration
network with a more realistic degree distribution. The third network allows us to study the
case of collaboration within teams.
– Inﬂated Google Drive Network: We used the standard degree-driven approach for net-
work topology generation to construct a larger Google Drive network based on the one
in the PrivySeal Dataset of Section 5.3.1 [MV02]. Based on an input user degrees’ distri-
bution from that dataset, we particularly used the Conﬁguration Model as described by
Newman [New03] and implemented by the library NetworkX [SS08] for inﬂating the graph.
This model generates a random pseudograph (a graph with parallel edges and self-loops) by
randomly assigning edges to match an input degree sequence. We removed the self-loops
and parallel edges a posteriori from the generated graph. In the end, we had a collaboration
graph with 18,000 users and 138,440 edges. This graph is, by construction, a connected
graph, with an average node degree of 15.
– Paper Collaboration Network: In an effort to have a realistic, large collaboration network
without resorting to graph inﬂation, we relied on the Microsoft Academic Graph, which
consists of records of scientiﬁc papers along with the authors and their afﬁliations [SSS+15].
We used a snapshot of 50,000 papers, and we constructed the collaboration graph based
on it. We ended up with 41,000 collaborators and 199,980 edges. The graph itself is not a
connected graph but is rather constructed of around 1700 connected components. The
average node degree is 4. Our rationale is that this graph captures a realistic scenario of
users collaborating on authoring documents, which is, in fact, an activity achieved via cloud
services nowadays. Hence, it is ﬁt for showing the efﬁcacy of our privacy indicators.
– Team Collaboration Network: We used the same academic graph to construct a network
of teams. A team is deﬁned as a frequently collaborating group of people. Motivated by
research around community detection [MV13], we use Strongly Connected Components
(SCCs) to label teams in our graph. We ended up with 16,400 users split over 1700 teams.
Unlike the previous two networks where users themselves are the data subjects (whose
privacy is to be optimized), members of each team in this network consider their team as
the data subject.
Sharing and Installation Patterns
In order to closely model the user characteristics in Google Drive, we assigned to each user in
the collaboration networks a ﬁle sharing distribution and a number of apps corresponding to
a user with a matching degree in the PrivySeal Dataset.
110 CHAPTER 5. A USABILITY APPROACH TO INTERDEPENDENT PRIVACY
Apps
As we wanted to perform the simulation with a much larger number of users than we had in
the dataset described in Section 5.3.1, we also needed a larger collection of apps. Given that
Google Chrome Store has only around 500 apps that are tagged by the “Works with Google
Drive” tag, we decided to also include all Google Chrome Apps in the dataset (i. e., even those
that do not have this tag). As far as the simulation is concerned, this step is justiﬁed since the
only realistic information that we will rely on is the distribution of vendors per app. It is fair
then to assume that this distribution does not differ signiﬁcantly between the general category
and the Google Drive category. Hence, we augmented the PrivySeal Dataset via apps from the
Google Chrome Store to arrive at 1000 apps. In addition to the app’s installation count and
vendor name, we also collected the set of “Related Apps” that the store displays for each app.
This is because, in our simulation, we will assume that users have the choice to choose the
app itself or one of its related apps. Again, this is a fair assumption as these related apps are
mostly the apps which deliver a close functionality to the app itself, and we will only rely on
them to model the alternatives at each simulation step.
User Decision Models
For the purpose of this simulation, we deﬁne 3 user decision models:
– Fully Aware Model (FA): the user always makes the decision that minimizes the privacy
loss of the data subject, taking into account all previous installation decisions by her and by
her collaborators.
– Experimental History-based Model (EHB): the user takes decisions similar to what a ran-
dom user of the HB experimental group does. In speciﬁc, we model those users as taking a
history-based decision with probability q and making a random app choice with probability
1− q . We set q based on the number of users who mentioned the app’ existing access
in writing as a reason for their choice in each module of Section 5.4. Based on Module
1’s users’ responses, we set q = 0.57 when the user encounters a vendor she previously
authorized. Based on Module 2, we set q = 0.70 whenever the user is presented with one
vendor previously authorized by a single collaborator. Based on Module 3, we set q = 0.67
for the cases where the user is presented with multiple vendors previously authorized by her
collaborators. In all of these cases, the user will select the vendor with the minimal resulting
Aggregate VFCu with probability q .
– Experimental Baseline Model (EBL): the user takes decisions similar to what a random
user of the BL experimental group does. As users in practice are rarely informed of what their
friends have installed before, we do not integrate this knowledge into the model. Hence, we
only account for the case of Module 1, where the user’s previous decisions are concerned.
Based on the fraction of users who mentioned the app’s existing access as a motivation
for their choice, we set the probability of taking history-based decision in this model as
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Algorithm 1 Simulation Steps
1: Initialize VFCu value to 0 for each user
2: for t ← 0 to N do  N is total number of steps
3: select a random user u0 based on user’s app installation frequency
4: select a random new app a0 based on app’s installation count
5: Arel := {a0}∪ (set of related apps of a0)
6: Vrel := set of vendors of apps in Arel
7: r := a random rational number in the range [0,1]
8: if user had installed apps by vendors in V ′ ⊂Vrel then
9: if (r < q(group,‘same vendor’)) then  q is a function of the user decision model; group is the
experimental group
10: select a random vendor vˆ ∈V ′
11: install the app aˆ in Arel from vendor vˆ
12: else
13: install app a0
14: end if
15: else if ∃ (c ∈C (u0) who installed apps by vendors in V ′ ⊂Vrel ) then
16: compute VFCu0 ({v}) for each vendor v in V
′ at this time step
17: select the vendor vˆ ∈V ′ with highest VFCu0 ({v}) at this time step
18: if (r < q(group,‘collaborator vendor’)) then
19: install the app aˆ in Arel from vendor vˆ
20: else
21: install app a0
22: end if
23: else
24: install app a0
25: end if
26: for all u ∈ {u0}∪C (u0) do
27: update Aggregate VFCu for u  recompute it via Equation 5.2.3
28: end for
29: update the average Aggregate VFC over all users
30: end for
q = 0.18.
In the special case of the team collaboration network, users who take history-based decisions
account for their own decisions and the decisions of their team members only. We do not con-
sider that users account for decisions taken by members of other teams. This is to demonstrate
the potential of the privacy indicators under strict conditions.
5.5.2 Simulation Details
We now move to the description of the simulation itself, which is detailed in Algorithm 1. We
had three simulation groups, named after the three decision models: FA group, EHB group,
and the EBL group. The simulation was run until the average number of apps installed across
by users reached 30 apps7. On a high level, at each simulation step, the following actions are
performed:
7Comparatively, mobile users have accessed 26.7 smartphone apps on average per month in the fourth quarter
of 2014 [The15].
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– A user is selected from the collaboration network via a weighted random sampling based
on the assigned app installation frequencies (line 3). This accounts for the diversity of
users’ installation frequencies. An app a0 is selected from the simulation apps’ dataset
via a weighted random sampling based on the actual app installations count in Google
Chrome Store (line 4). That way, popular apps are installed more frequently (as is the case
in practice).
– A user decision is simulated. The user is assumed to be choosing the app a0 or one of its
related apps. This choice is made depending on the user’s decision model, as explained
previously.
– Finally, the average Aggregate VFC is computed based on all users’ Aggregate VFCu .
5.5.3 Simulation Results
To demonstrate the simulation results, we show three types of ﬁgures per collaboration net-
work. On a high level, in Figures 5.7a, 5.8a, and 5.9a, we show how the privacy loss (quantiﬁed
using the average Aggregate-VFC) in each group evolves as users install more apps. In Fig-
ures 5.7b, 5.8b, and 5.9b, we show ratios of the privacy loss in the two experimental groups
EHB and FA with respect to the baseline EBL group. Finally, Figures 5.7c and 5.8c, and 5.9c
show the actual events contributing to the privacy loss growth, where we can speciﬁcally
check the fraction of apps coming from new vendors, those coming from vendors previously
authorized by the user, and those from vendors previously authorized by collaborators.
Results for Individuals’ Networks
Based on these metrics we start by analyzing the results for the individuals’ networks, where
we observe the following:
Curtailed growth of privacy loss: From Figures 5.7a and 5.8a, we notice that the growth of the
privacy loss is visibly curtailed in the cases of EHB and FA groups compared to the baseline
EBL group. This signiﬁcant divergence demonstrates the efﬁcacy of our HB privacy indicators.
Impact of the network effect: Looking into the ratios in Figures 5.7b and 5.8b, we see that
the privacy loss in the EHB group has dropped by 41% in the inﬂated network and by 28%
in the authors-based network (both with respect to the baseline). In the FA group, where
users always optimize their privacy, the privacy loss has dropped by 70% in the inﬂated
network and by 40% in the authors-based network. This higher impact in the case of the
inﬂated network is because it is a connected graph, unlike the authors-based network, which
is composed of smaller connected components. Nevertheless, we can state that, although our
privacy indicators have a larger effect on highly connected networks, they are still signiﬁcantly
effective in less connected networks, like the authors-based dataset.
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Figure 5.9 – Simulation results in the teams’ network
to the observed privacy loss patterns, we look into Figures 5.7c and 5.8c. First, we observe
that users in the EBL group are mainly installing new apps from vendors that had no previous
access to their data. This is reﬂected in the almost linear increase of privacy loss in Figures 5.7a
and 5.8a. Second, we observe that, in the case of the inﬂated network, users have frequently
been installing apps from vendors with existing access through their collaborators. In fact,
as apparent in Figure 5.7c, this event outnumbers the event of installing from a new vendor.
Third, the number of installations from collaborators’ vendors is also signiﬁcant in the case of
the authors-based dataset. While it does not outnumber the installations from new vendors
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(due to the low-graph connectivity), this is still enough to lead to 28% and 40% decrease in
the privacy loss in the EHB and the FA groups respectively. Finally, we note that, although the
users are more frequently encountering vendors authorized by their collaborators than by
themselves, the latter event is still signiﬁcantly impacting the results. This is because users still
incur an incremental privacy loss with vendors authorized by their collaborators while this loss
is zero with vendors they have previously authorized. Accordingly, the obtained optimizations
are a result of users’ accounting for their own and for others’ decisions.
Results for the Teams’ Network
We now discuss the results for the case of the collaboration network where users work in
teams and aim to protect the privacy of the team’s data. We observe the following, based on
Figure 5.9:
Inherent usage of similar apps: From Figure 5.9c, it is clear that the dominant event is that of
users installing apps which have been authorized by other team members before. This is even
in the case of the baseline group (EBL), which was not the case in the individuals’ networks.
We justify that by the fact that we selected apps at each simulation step to match their realistic
installation frequencies. In practice, apps’ installation counts follow a long-tail distribution,
and users tend to mostly install a limited set of apps. That is why team members will naturally
tend to install a set of similar apps.
Curtailed growth of privacy loss: Still, we observe that the trend of slower growth of privacy
loss also applies in the case of teams (Figure 5.9a). As we also observe in Figure 5.9b, the
privacy loss has decreased by 23% for the EHB group and by 45% for the FA group, both with
respect to the baseline group. This implies that there is ample room for privacy optimization
in teams too.
Effect due to internal collaborators: We ﬁnally observe that the privacy loss decrease was
achieved via decisions taken by each team’s members independently, without relying on other
teams’ decisions. This highlights the fact that HB privacy indicators can still be effective even
when users do not account for others’ decisions. Obviously, taking the external members’
decisions into account can lead to further optimizations.
In sum, our simulations provide further evidence of the efﬁcacy of using History-based privacy
indicators in a large network of collaborators. It is worth noting too that, although users in
our study were following the EHB decision model, we believe that, in an actual deployment of
such indicators, the model will move closer to the FA model. This is because users are more
protective when their personal data is at risk than when they are put in a role playing scenario
about ﬁctitious data. Moreover, users in our study were exposed to this indicator for the ﬁrst





The problem of interdependent privacy has been tackled before in the context of social apps.
The main approaches were high-level game-theoretic or economic modeling.
Biczók and Chia ﬁrst introduced the concept of interdependent privacy and studied its pres-
ence in Facebook 3rd party apps’ ecosystem [BC13]. They also modeled its impact via a game
theoretic, (2-player, 1-app) model and showed how positive externalities (improved user expe-
rience due to users installing the same app) and the negative externalities (privacy loss) could
affect the users’ app usage behavior. One of the problems they hint at is the absence of risk
signaling, which is what this chapter has tackled.
Pu and Grossklags [PG14] later presented a more elaborate economic model that additionally
accounts for larger groups of users and the interplay among various social network parameters.
They also consider the users’ “other-regarding preferences”, i.e., how much they care about
privacy harms they inﬂict on their peers. They showed that app rankings do not accurately
reﬂect the level of interdependent privacy harm the app can cause (a phenomenon that
does not extrapolate to our case of cloud apps, where all apps have the potential to inﬂict
interdependent privacy harm). They additionally conclude that even rational users who
consider their friends’ well-being might adopt apps with invasive privacy practices at a certain
stage. One commonality with our work is that they also perform a simulation to study the effect
of app adoption decision at scale. However, our simulations are based on graphs that mimic
the real-world collaboration networks (rather than scale-free networks). We also consider
the worst case of selﬁsh users, and we model users’ decisions based on the user study that
we performed. In that sense, the insights derived here can be seen as complementary to the
insights derived in that paper.
In a subsequent work, Pu and Grossklags [PG15] used a conjoint study approach to quantify
the monetary value which individuals associate with their friends’ personal data. They found
that individuals place a signiﬁcantly higher value on their own personal information than
their friends’ personal information. This further supports our assumption of self-interested
users in this work. The same authors also built on a user survey in [PG16] to assess the factors
affecting users’ own privacy concerns as well as friends’ privacy concerns in the context of
social app adoption. In particular, they found evidence of negative association between past
privacy invasion experiences and the trust in 3rd party apps handling of their own data. They
also found partial support for a positive effect of privacy knowledge on concerns for users’
own privacy and their friends’ privacy.
Other works have also investigated the issue of interdependent privacy in the context of
location privacy [OHS+16] and genomic privacy [HAHT17]. In this work, we are focused on
quantifying the interdependence of privacy in the context of cloud apps before addressing it
from a usable-privacy perspective, thus bridging the gap between the theoretical studies and
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the end-user needs.
5.6.2 Privacy Nudges
This chapter can be categorized under the line of work on privacy nudges, which we have
discussed in the previous chapter (Section 4.8. In that chapter, we presented the ﬁrst study
the privacy of 3rd party cloud apps and we exposed that almost two-thirds of those apps
are over-privileged. We also introduced a novel privacy indicator for deterring users from
installing over-privileged apps by showing them Far-reaching insights that apps can needlessly
infer from their data (e. g., top topics, faces, or locations of interest). This work, however,
helps users improve their privacy by reducing the vendors with access to their data, even if
the functionality delivered by the vendor abides by the least-privilege principle. Hence, it
complements these approaches and can be deployed alongside any of them.
In addition to the related works on privacy nudges that we discussed in Section 4.8, we also
note the relevant work by Almuhimedi et al., who showed the effectiveness of regularly alerting
users about sensitive data collected by their apps, in encouraging users to review and adjust
the permissions [ASS+15]. Applying such an approach in the context of 3rd party cloud apps
can also be effective in increasing transparency towards the apps’ practices (see our discussion
on transparency dashboards in Section 4.7).
Highlighting the app’s vendor name in the interface, a step which ﬁts naturally into the HB in-
sights interface has been previously shown by Bravo-Lillo et al., to be effective in nudging users
to pay attention to potential malicious vendors appearing in security warnings [BLKC+13].
They also demonstrated that interacting with the vendor’s ﬁeld was even more effective. In
our user study, the vendor’s name appeared multiple times as a justiﬁcation for installing/not
installing the app. However, the problem we tackle here is orthogonal to the problem of
inferring (mis)trust from the vendor’s name; it is rather about the ability of users to remember
vendors across multiple, typically far-apart, installations.
5.7 Summary
The ﬁndings in this work are the ﬁrst to concretely delineate the various aspects of interde-
pendent privacy in 3PC apps. One of the major outcomes is that a user’s collaborators can be
much more detrimental to her privacy than her own decisions. Consequently, accounting for
collaborators’ decisions should be a key component of future privacy indicators in 3rd party
cloud apps. We have shown the impact of History-based Insights as a privacy-enhancing tech-
nology in this context, especially that, based on our user study, users are less likely to account
for previous decisions on their own. Our privacy indicators would optimally be implemented
by the CSPs themselves as they control the authorization interface and the application stores.
The indicators can also be realized by third party privacy providers with access to users’ data.
Our approach can also be easily mapped to other ecosystems. In the mobile apps’ scenario, it
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can enable users to reduce the number of vendors with access to her contacts. It can also be
extended to the case where the goal is protection against 4th parties (e.g., ad providers and
data brokers). There, the user can account for data previously held by a 4th party with which
the app vendor cooperates.

Part IIIHandling Language Complexity
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6 PriBot: Automated QA
for Privacy Policies
6.1 Overview
The previous two parts of this thesis were contributions towards two main problems: how to
protect the data before it leaves the user’s device in the ﬁrst place and how to protect the data
before it is transferred from the cloud storage provider to a third party app. In this ﬁnal part,
we consider the complementary problem: how to better understand what privacy and security
guarantees the apps promise. We tackle this from the angle of privacy policies, which are at
the core of the online notice and choice paradigm for virtually all apps and websites (i.e., not
only restricted to third party cloud apps).
Users, however, rarely read these policies when they sign up to new services. Multiple recent
events have shown that this is not due to indifference but rather to the difﬁculty of sifting
through all the information spread across multiple pages of text [Isa17, Bra17]. For example,
Unroll.me, a free service for removing unwanted subscriptions from users’ email, was recently
reported to be selling information mined from those emails to third parties (e.g., Uber) [Isa17].
After the media reports, a lot of user backlash occurred. However, the reported practices
were already covered by the company’s privacy policies that users had agreed too. Still, it was
never clear for the majority of users that the company’s business model hinged on selling their
emails’ contents to other parties while still advertising the company as a mailbox “clean-up”
service.
Given this inherent user interest in knowing the data practices of service providers on hand and
the difﬁculty in attaining that within the different user time, effort, and knowledge constraints,
on the other hand, we see an immediate need to address the shortcomings of privacy policies
with a new perspective. Our motivation is not only the user frustration with the current
status quo but also the emerging technologies, which are adding new kinds of user needs. In
particular, this is manifested through UI-limited devices and automated customer support.
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UI-limited Devices. As part of our daily routines, we interact with a large number of UI-
limited devices and services, such as voice-activated digital assistants (e.g., Amazon Alexa
and Google Assistant) and IoT devices (e.g., smart thermostats or door locks). Many of these
devices rely on voice commands as their primary input method. With such conversation-ﬁrst
devices, the existing techniques of linking to a privacy policy or reading it aloud are not usable;
they might require the user to access privacy information and controls on a different device,
which is not desirable in the long run [SBDC15]. The miniaturization trend has further led
to new classes of small screen devices, such as smartwatches and other wearables. Previous
efforts on standardizing privacy policy content into tables similar to nutrition-labels [KBCR09]
are difﬁcult to ﬁt on such devices. Even the machine learning techniques of analyzing privacy
policies, such as [ZB14], have so far followed a one-size-ﬁts-all approach by providing all users
with the same interface, regardless of their privacy interests.
Customer Support. Similar issues, related to the inadequacy of current methods for privacy
notice delivery, are emerging in another domain: customer support. As a new trend in the
industry, automated customer support allows companies to respond to customer inquiries
in real time and around the clock. Through chatbots and other automated interfaces (e.g.,
Twitter bots), companies interact with their customers on a variety of topics, including privacy.
We have sampled Twitter for companies’ tweets that mention the term “privacy policy" in
response to customer inquiries. We found that the number of such tweets has increased 20x
between 2008 and 2016. Existing approaches for presenting privacy policies to users cannot
apply in this context; they are incapable of providing concise answers to privacy-related
questions posed in natural language.
Our vision to address such users’ concerns is by treating the privacy policy as an unstructured
data source rather than a user interface. Our approach breaks the concept of privacy policy
into a three-layered framework. On the bottom is the Data Layer, where we have the textual
content of these policies. In the middle, is the Machine Learning layer, which involves the
data analysis algorithms that we built to classify the content of privacy policies and to answer
questions about them. On the top is the User Interface (UI) Layer, which leverage the results
of the automated analysis to relay the information to the user in novel ways.
In this chapter, we develop an instantiation of this framework via PriBot, the ﬁrst automated
Question-Answering (QA) system for privacy policies. The PriBot system takes a previously
unseen privacy policy and uses it to answer, in real time with high accuracy and relevance,
user questions that are posed in free form.
At the core of PriBot, we propose a novel, deep-learning-based algorithm for matching users’
questions with answers from the privacy policy. This algorithm accounts for the intricacies of
privacy policies that render traditional retrieval or QA systems suboptimal in this case. Speciﬁ-
cally, our approach can handle questions about high-level issues, such as services sharing user
information with third parties, and ﬁne-grained issues, such as whether companies release
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data to legal authorities. PriBot can provide the answers in two alternative forms: via excerpts
extracted from the privacy policy itself, and via high-level interpretations of these excerpts.
PriBot provides substantial beneﬁts for both users and service providers. It allows the user to
pose a question, in natural language, about the privacy practices of a certain provider. PriBot,
whether integrated as a chatbot, a voice assistant, or a social media bot, responds back with a
relevant and concise answer from the company’s privacy policy. Moreover, PriBot enables
providers to deliver privacy notices through theirUI-limited devices and services. Furthermore,
companies can use PriBot to add automated support for their privacy-related questions from
consumers without requiring a large knowledge-base of hard-coded rules. PriBot assists
companies by streamlining processes and training for customer service representatives to
handle privacy inquiries.
Contributions
In this chapter, we make the following key contributions:
– We propose a novel deep learning approach for ranking answers with respect to ques-
tions in theprivacy domain (Sections 6.3 and 6.4). Our approach consists of a hierarchy
of neural-network classiﬁers that accounts for both the high-level aspects and the spe-
ciﬁc pieces of information present in privacy policies. We evaluate its performance
against multiple traditional QA techniques that we transplanted into the privacy policies
context. We show that our best algorithm consistently surpasses the predictive accu-
racy of traditional QA retrieval techniques on standard metrics (Section 6.6). We also
demonstrate its high user-perceived utility via a user study, where it returned a satisfying
answer among the top-3 for 91% of the questions (Section 6.7).
– We create a new test dataset of user-posed, privacy-related questions from Twitter.
These questions represent real-world and unaltered user-company interactions about
privacy practices. They further have the advantage of avoiding subject bias, which is
likely to happen when eliciting privacy-related questions from individuals (Section 6.5).
– We implement PriBot as an online, real-time, text and voice-activated chatbot (Sec-
tion 6.9). The chatbot delivers answers segmented from the policy itself or answers
generated from high-level interpretations of the policy. Our chatbot is the ﬁrst practical
system for answering questions about privacy policies. It will be available to the public
via a web interface with the release of this thesis.
6.2 System and Data Overview
In this section, we describe the PriBot approach at a high level, along with the datasets we
utilize to build it.























Figure 6.1 – High-level system overview of PriBot.
6.2.1 System Overview
From a high-level perspective, PriBot takes as input the user’s questions along with a privacy
policy URL to retrieve suitable answers. Fig. 6.1 provides a high-level description of PriBot.
The operation of PriBot involves two main components, preprocessing the policy and the QA
ranking algorithm.
Policy Pre-processing. PriBot pre-processes the privacy policy through its segmenter com-
ponent. The segmenter ﬁrst extracts the policy content from the policy’s webpage and then
partitions it into a set of adequately-sized and semantically coherent fragments. These seg-
ments constitute a pool of candidate answers from which PriBot chooses the answer to the
user’s question. We elaborate further on the policy pre-processing in Section 6.3.
QA Ranking Component. At runtime, the main task of PriBot is to match the user’s ques-
tion to one or more segments of the privacy policy. PriBot involves a QA ranking component,
specialized for the privacy setting, to rank the policy segments according to their “closeness”
to the posed question. In this chapter, we contribute a new architecture of neural networks,
termed the Hierarchical model, that accounts for the multi-level complexity of privacy
policies (Section 6.4.3). We compare it against two other models that we build: the Retrieval
model, inspired by traditional information retrieval (Section 6.4.2) and the SemVecmodel that
takes a neural-network approach to retrieval (Section 6.4.3).
Friendly Summary Approach. We also propose an answer-generation algorithm that sum-
marizes the retrieved policy fragments into a short-form, more readable response. Employing
this approach, PriBot automatically labels the segments matching the user’s question accord-
ing to the type and purpose of privacy practice. It uses these labels to generate an answer via a
custom grammar; these answers are considerably shorter and more readable. We elaborate on






























































Figure 6.2 – The OPP-115 dataset hierarchy [WSD+16].
6.2.2 Data Overview
To answer the wide range of free-form questions from users, PriBot is data-driven by de-
sign. Prior to this work, there were no publicly available datasets for privacy-related question
answering that we can readily use to train PriBot’s neural networks. To address this chal-
lenge, we leverage the Online Privacy Policies (OPP-115) dataset, introduced by Wilson et
al. [WSD+16]. We re-purpose this classiﬁcation-oriented dataset as a building block for our
QA ranking approaches (SemVec and Hierarchical). We do not apply this dataset in the tra-
ditional classiﬁcation sense as it is inapplicable for the QA context. Instead, we use this dataset
to train a set of custom neural networks to extract feature vectors from the user questions and
policy segments, which we use later for answer ranking.
OPP-115 Dataset for QA Purposes
The OPP-115 dataset contains 115 privacy policies manually annotated by skilled annota-
tors (law students). In total, the dataset has 23K annotated data practices. The annotations
were at two levels. First, paragraph-sized segments were annotated according to one of
the 10 high-level categories in Fig. 6.2 (e.g., 1st Party Collection). Then, annotators select
parts of the segment and annotate them using attribute-value pairs, e.g., Information Type:
Location Information Type, Purpose: Advertising, etc. In Fig. 6.2, we only show the
mandatory attributes that should be present in all segments. There were also optional at-
tributes that can sometimes occur in each category. In total, there were 16 distinct mandatory
attributes and 94 distinct values across all attributes. For space constraints, we do not show all
the attribute values in Fig. 6.2. We use this dataset to train a set of neural networks to predict
the higher-level categories and the attribute-value pairs given a policy fragment as input.
Combined Policies Dataset
We have collected a corpus of 16,500 privacy policies of Android apps from Google Play
and augmented it with a diverse corpus of 1,000 privacy policies collected by Ramanath et
al. [RLSS14]. We combine these two policies datasets with the raw policies from the OPP-115
dataset, to form an unlabeled corpus of around 16,615 policies, to which we refer henceforth
as the Combined Policies Dataset. We utilize our Combined Policies Dataset to seed the
Retrievalmodel and to segment the policies into coherent answers.
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Further useful privacy and security related materials can be found through Google’s policies 
and principles pages, including:
? Information about our technologies and principles, which includes, among other things, 
more information on
• how Google uses cookies.
• technologies we use for advertising.
• how we recognize patterns like faces.
? A page that explains what data is shared with Google when you visit websites that use our 
advertising, analytics and social products.
? The Privacy Checkup tool, which makes it easy to review your key privacy settings.
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Figure 6.3 – List merging during the policy segmentation.
6.3 Policy Pre-processing
The policy preprocessing includes two steps: extraction and segmentation. Other than the
link to the privacy policy, the preprocessing requires no other information or prior knowledge.
Policy Extraction. Given the URL of the privacy policy (provided by the administrator of
PriBot for instance), the segmenter scrapes the web page containing the privacy policy using
a headless browser (we use PhantomJS in our implementation). Then, it removes all irrelevant
HTML elements including the scripts; header, footer, side and navigation menus; comments;
CCS and header texts (< h1> to < h6>).
Second, the segmenter handles the lists inside the policy. Recalling that segments constitute
the answers pool of PriBot, lists require a special treatment as counting an entire list as a
segment could result in overly long segments. On the other hand, treating each list item as an
independent segment is problematic as list elements are typically not self-contained. Fig. 6.3
shows a list from Google’s privacy policy1. Obviously, each of the inner list items (shaded)
cannot function as a standalone segment.
Our handling of the lists involves two techniques, one for small list items (the inner list of
Fig. 6.3) and another for longer list items (the outer list of Fig. 6.3). The segmenter traverses
every list in the policy (< ul > tags). If the largest list element is less than 20 words, then
the segmenter combines the elements with the introductory statement of the list, thereby
converting the list (<ul > element) into a paragraph (< p > element). This is highlighted by
the ﬁrst two steps of Fig. 6.3. For those lists with long items, the segmenter transforms the
list into a set of paragraphs. Each paragraph is a distinct list element prepended by the list’s
introductory statement as highlighted by the third step in Fig. 6.3. The resulting paragraphs
constitute better standalone answers compared to simply taking the list items out of their
context.
1https://www.google.com/policies/privacy, last modiﬁed on Aug. 29, 2016 and retrieved on Feb. 14, 2017
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Policy Segmentation. The segmenter performs initial and coarse-level segmentation by
breaking down the policy according to the HTML < div > and < p > tags. The < p > elements
include paragraphs in the original policy and the newly constructed ones from the lists. The
output of this step is the initial set of segments. Some of resulting segments might still be long;
the segmenter further breaks them down by passing each of them to an out-of-the-box text
segmenter.
Our choice for the text segmenter is GraphSeg [GNP16], a recently proposed unsupervised
algorithm that generates semantically coherent segments. GraphSeg is an attractive choice
since it makes no assumptions about the structure of the input text. It relies on word embed-
dings to generate segments as cliques of related (semantically similar) sentences. To employ
GraphSeg, our custom word embeddings are generated by training the fastText language
model [BGJM16] on the Combined Policies Dataset. Finally, the segmenter outputs a series of
ﬁne-grained segments.
6.4 Question-Answering Approaches
The primary challenge of PriBot is to develop QA ranking algorithms that match the user’s
question with relevant and accurate answers. The complexity of this task can be motivated by
the question: “To whom do you expose my content?.” While simple, this sentence embodies
four issues to be considered while developing the QA ranking algorithms. First, the terms in
the question might not occur at all in the privacy policy, despite being common in everyday
usage. Second, even if a term like “content” occurs in the policy, it does not indicate the general
topic (e.g., whether the context is about third-party sharing or ﬁrst party collection). Third,
words tend to be used differently in the question’s context than a policy’s context. Policies
typically use a pronoun like “you” to indicate choices the user has and “we” to indicate what it
does; users mention “you,” in contrast, to refer to the company. Finally, users typically pose
questions in general terms, without specifying their intent in exact words. The answers should
not exhibit the same level of generality as to not miss the information of interest to the user.
With these challenges in mind, we developed three QA ranking approaches. We start with our
unsupervised approach (called Retrieval), inspired by the state-of-the-art in term-matching
retrieval algorithms. Retrieval constitutes the baseline with which we compare the rest of
our QA approaches. We then describe SemVec, our approach that uses word embeddings
and neural networks, to bridge the semantic similarity gap between questions and the policy
segments. Finally, we present our further optimized approach, Hierarchical, that utilizes
a hierarchy of classiﬁers, accounting for the discrepancy between questions’ and answers’
structures.
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6.4.1 Problem Formulation
The input consists of a user question Q about a privacy policy P . PriBot ﬁrst generates a
pool of candidate answers {A1,A2, . . .AM } by segmenting the policy (cf. Section 6.3). Each
question comprises the terms {q1,q2, . . .qn}. Similarly, an answer is composed of the terms
{a1,a2, . . .an}. A subset G of the answer pool constitutes the ground-truth. We consider an
answer Ak as correct if Ak ∈ G . We consider Ak as incorrect if G is not empty and Ak ∉ G .
If G is empty, we denote the case as unanswerable. This can happen when the answer to
the question does not exist in the privacy policy. We formulate the problem as a one-shot
question-answering problem, in which PriBot returns the best answer without requesting
further question reﬁnements from the user. This formulation does not preclude conducting a
dialogwith our system, provided that users pose standalone questions. The ranking algorithms
introduced below, rank each potential answer (policy segment), A, by computing a proximity
score s(Q,A) between A and each question, Q. Before passing the question and candidate
answers to the ranking algorithms, PriBot processes them with traditional tokenization
techniques (Treebank tokenizer), converts their text into lower case and replaces the numbers
with words.
6.4.2 Baseline Retrieval Approach
To obtain a reasonable baseline to evaluate our QA algorithm against, we developed a ranking
mode that builds on the BM25 algorithm [Rob04], which represents the state-of-the-art in
ranking models based on term-matching. It has been employed successfully across a range of
collections and search tasks, such as the TREC evaluations [BGH+97]. Given both a question
Q (composed of terms qi ) and an answer A, we compute the score s(Q,A) as:
n∑
i=1
IDF(qi ) · f (qi ,A) · (k1+1)




where f (qi ,A) is the frequency of term qi in A, IDF(qi ) is the inverse document frequency
computed as log(N/df (qi )), N is the total number of answers, df (qi ) is the number of answers
containing qi , and avgal is the average answer length (in words). The default parameters were
taken as k1 = 1.6 and b = 0.75.
This algorithm is highly dependent on the presence of distinctive words in the question that
link it to the answer but has the advantage of being unsupervised. In other words, it does
not require training over a dataset of annotated privacy policies. We take a step to leverage
this by pre-computing the IDF value for each word using a large corpus of unlabeled data.
In particular, we segment the Combined Policies Corpus of Section 6.2.2 to automatically
generate answers. Then, we use those answers to compute the IDF, instead of solely relying on
one policy’s answers. With this, Retrieval provides an even stronger baseline against which























Figure 6.4 – CNN classiﬁer building block.
6.4.3 Neural Network-based QA
Our second class of approaches relies on supervised learning, which leverages the OPP-115
dataset, to address the challenges we described earlier (related to term matches and usage).
The idea consists of training a supervised model on a proxy task and then using this trained
model as the basis for a QA algorithm. We employ neural network models, which have been
shown to be effective in matching non-factoid questions with answers [FXG+15, TdSXZ16].
Our rationale behind using neural networks is bridging the semantic gap between users and
privacy policies. This can enable users to pose-free form questions, without requiring the ques-
tions to correspond to terminology used in the privacy policies. In what follows, we present
our two QA approaches that are based on neural networks: SemVec and Hierarchical.
Handling the Vocabulary Discrepancy
Traditional QA approaches assume that a representative set of questions and answers are both
available at training time. In our setting, the distribution of the vocabulary terms that people
use in their questions differs from that of the privacy policies’ vocabulary. To handle this
issue, we take advantage of the generalization power of word embeddings, which are vectors
representing the “embeddings” of English words in the di -dimensional and continuous vector
space. With these vectors, words of similar semantics, such as “delete” and “erase” are close
in the embeddings space. We use these vectors as inputs to the neural network. Note the
departure from the Term-Matching approach where the features are the terms themselves.
Speciﬁcally, we utilize the GloVe vectors [PSM14], which include 400,000 terms, pre-trained
on a large and general corpus, consisting of the whole English Wikipedia and the Gigaword
corpus. We made the decision to ﬁx the embeddings of the input words during the training
process. This is to account for words that do not occur in the speciﬁc vocabulary of the training
set (i.e., the privacy policies in our case). If the embeddings were set to be trainable, words
like “delete” and “erase” might no longer be close in the embeddings space if “erase” does not
occur enough in the privacy policies. Another advantage of the word embeddings is that they
indirectly mitigate the issue of discrepancy in pronouns usage in the questions vs. the policies.
Pronouns are typically close in the embeddings space. Hence, replacing the pronoun “you” in
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a sentence by another pronoun “I” will not shift the combined sentence representation.
Segment Classiﬁcation with CNNs
A building block of our two approaches is a multi-class classiﬁer that uses convolutional
neural networks (CNNs). This block is driven by the OPP-115 dataset, which is rich in class
information for each segment of the policy. We utilize the classiﬁcation network as a “proxy
task” that will help us obtain a rich representation of the segments in the policy. An alter-
native building block for our QA problem would have been a proxy task directly trained to
evaluate “phrase similarity.” In that case, the training data can be constructed by labeling
two phrases as “similar” if the skilled annotators gave them the same attribute-value label.
For example, the two phrases “better able to adapt our services and provide you with a bet-
ter experience” and “internal market research to help us better serve you” were both labeled
as {Purpose: Analytics-Research}. The phrase similarity task assumes, however, that
phrases are single-labeled. In practice, the phrases often contain a mixture of attribute-values,
such as mentioning both the type and purpose of information collection in one sentence.
The architecture we use for this building block is presented in Fig. 6.4. An input segment
is composed of terms, which are represented using their embeddings (this happens at the
embeddings layer). Next, the embeddings pass through a Convolutional layer. This layer
applies a nonlinear function (a rectiﬁed linear unit (ReLU) in our case) to each window of
k words in a phrase. Thus, it transforms each k-words into a dc-dimensional vector, which
accounts for the co-occurrences of words in this window. The max-pooling layer combines
these vectors by taking the maximum value observed in each of the dc channels over all the
windows (to detect the most important features). This vector passes through the ﬁrst dense
(i.e., fully connected) layer, which is again followed by a max-pooling operation and a ReLU
activation function. Finally, the vector arrives at the second dense layer. A softmax operation
is applied to the output of this layer to obtain probability distribution across the possible
output classes. This architecture is a simpliﬁed variant of the sentiment classiﬁcation network
introduced by Kim [Kim14]. We particularly reduced the network parameters to account for
the smaller dataset we have, thus improving the classiﬁer’s performance.
Semantic Vector QA Approach (SemVec)
Our deep-learning model builds on the previously introduced CNN classiﬁer introduced in
Section 6.4.3. We train that classiﬁer with the segments from the OPP-115 dataset, labeled
with attribute values. An example segment is “geographic location information or other
location-based information about you and your device” that was labeled as {Information
Type: Location}. We take all the attribute-values as a single pool and train the classiﬁer to
distinguish among them.
After training this model, we extract a “semantic vector”, which is a representation vector that
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Table 6.1 – SemVec parameters and aggregate metrics
Parameter Value
Embeddings size 200
Num. of ﬁlters 750
Filter size 3







accounts for the distribution of value labels in the input text. We extract this representation
as the vector at the output of the ReLU activation layer preceding the second dense layer (as
shown in Fig. 6.4). As we use a classiﬁcation task for training, phrases with similar classiﬁcation
distribution exhibit similar segment representations.
This representation further accounts for the co-occurrence of the same words in multiple
contexts, despite the fact that the dataset is not designed for multi-label classiﬁcation. The
semantic vector allows us to rank the similarity between a question (denoted by vector rQ )
and an answer (denoted by vector rA) in our QA system using the Euclidean similarity, deﬁned
as 1/(1+||rA − rQ ||2). This approach has been previously shown to be successful in the image
retrieval domain, where image representations learned from a large-scale image classiﬁcation
task were effective in visual search applications [RSCM14]. However, we are the ﬁrst to apply
it for analyzing legal text, such as privacy policies.
Model Tuning. In order to obtain the semantic vectors, we proceeded in training our model.
The training data for the CNN classiﬁer involves around 15,000 (segment,label) tuples, ex-
tracted from the annotated OPP-115 dataset. We reserve 9,000 tuples as a validation set. The
value-labels fall into 81 classes as we select classes with a minimum of 10 labels in each. We
tuned the parameters of the classiﬁcation network by running a grid-search and selecting the
best-performing model. The selected parameters along with the aggregate statistics are pre-
sented in Table 6.1. In Table 6.2, we present the results of value-level classiﬁcation performed
across 81 classes. For space constraints only the ﬁrst 50 classes are shown. We also show in
Figure 6.5 the confusion matrix between all the predicted and the true labels. We ran stratiﬁed
cross validation with ﬁve folds on the whole dataset to obtain the ﬁnal results. We obtain
a micro-average precision of 0.56 (i.e., the classiﬁer is on average predicting the right label
across the 81 classes in 56% of the cases – compared to 3.6% precision for a random classiﬁer).
Although we do not rely on the classiﬁcation outputs per se, this performance is crucial for the
adequacy of the segment representations we obtain.
Hierarchical Classiﬁcation Approach
One limitation of the SemVec approach discussed in Section 6.4.3 is that it is trained to detect
similarities between policy excerpts representing speciﬁc data practices, without accounting
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Figure 6.5 – Confusion matrix for the value-level classiﬁer among the 81 classes.
for high-level categories. For example, consider the following two privacy policy excerpts:
1. “third-party application providers may automatically collect real-time geographic location
information or other location-based information about you and your device . . .”
2. “we automatically collect and store certain information (. . . ) including: (. . . ) your mobile
device’s geographic location (speciﬁc geographic location if you’ve enabled collection of that
information . . . . ”
The annotators labeled the italicized parts of those excerpts as {Information Type: Location}.
However, thewhole segment that includes those excerptswas labeled as 3rd Party Collection
in the ﬁrst case and as 1st Party Collection in the second case. To tailor for these dif-
ferences, we propose Hierarchical, a new model that accounts for both the high-level
categories and the ﬁner-grained attribute values.
Hierarchical consists of building a hierarchy of classiﬁers that are individually trained on
handling speciﬁc parts of the problem, as shown in Fig. 6.6. Given a segment x and its la-
bels from the OPP-115 dataset, we ﬁrst train a classiﬁer that provides us with a probability
distribution across the high-level categories C (i.e., P (C |x)). This classiﬁer uses the same
model we presented in Fig. 6.4. Next, we have a set of classiﬁers that are trained on the value-
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Figure 6.6 – Overview of HierarchicalQA Approach.
ple, we have an Information Type classiﬁer that provides a probability distribution across
the values: financial, location, survey data, user profile, health, personal
identifiers, demographics, cookies, contact information, device IDs, online
activities, and computer information. More formally, we have the setV = {V 1, . . . ,V K }
of all possible subsets of values, and the classiﬁers will produce P (V j |x)∀V j ∈V , where V j is
the set of values under a given attribute.
As we train the two classiﬁers (category- and value-level) independently, we obtain the joint
probability distribution as P (C ,V |x) = P (C |x) ·P (V |x). This distribution accounts for both
the distribution across the value labels as well as for the high-level categories.2 The similarity
score between two segments is computed as the proximity between these distributions. For
this, we rely on the Hellinger distance, which quantiﬁes the similarity between two probability









l i )2. (6.2)
We compute the similarity between a question Q and an answer A as 1/(1+H (PA ,PQ )), where
with PA = P (C ,V |A) and PQ = P (C ,V |Q).
Model Tuning For training the value-level classiﬁers, we used similar parameters to those
of Table 6.1. For the high-level classiﬁer, we tune the parameters using grid-search. We
used a training set of 4,700 categories labels of segments from the OPP-115 dataset and a
tuning set of 1,170 labels. Similar to Wilson et al., OPP-115 dataset [WSD+16], we consider the
attributes of the Other category in Fig. 6.2 as separate classes. Compared to Table 6.1, the best
performing model had 2,000 ﬁlters and a dense layer of size 100. We report the classiﬁcation
results in Table 6.3. As we do not have access to the actual split between the training and
the testing sets in the OPP-115 paper [WSD+16], we report the results based on ﬁve folds
stratiﬁed cross-validation, and we obtain a micro-average precision of 0.75. By comparison,
2The product is only computed for attribute-value labels descending from each category.
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the best performing SVM model trained on word embeddings in the OPP-115 paper [WSD+16]
had a micro-average precision and recall of 0.66 .3 Therefore, our CNN-based classiﬁcation
approach signiﬁcantly improves performance over prior work.
Addressing the generality issue. As we described earlier, users’ questions can often be
generic. Matching such questionswith general answers is not desirable as these answers would
be from introductory or generic sentences, lacking the speciﬁc details. We address this issue on
the levels of category and value labels. First, we exclude clearly generic answers from consider-
ation. This is done by removing answers that are classiﬁed into the Introductory/Generic
category with a probability exceeding a threshold t (we choose t = 0.3 in our evaluation).
These answers typically do not contain relevant details to users’ questions and come at the
top or the end of the policy. Second, we beneﬁt from the generic labels at the value level in
the OPP-115 dataset. For example, (e.g., Generic Personal Information is the annotated
label when the particular information type is unspeciﬁed). Our strategy is to exclude such
classes at training time rather than prediction time. We found that this forces the question
and the answer to be classiﬁed under more precise labels, even when the question is generic.
That way, general questions are more likely to be matched with speciﬁc answers. This does not
affect the case when the question is already labeled with speciﬁc labels as these are already
matched together.
3Note that although the testing set was not available, we evaluated our model with different random sets of
similar sizes and the performance was consistently superior.
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Table 6.2 – Classiﬁcation results for the value-level classiﬁer across 81 classes (ﬁrst 50 are
shown)
Category Prec. Recall F1 Support
action-third-party-receive-shared-with 0.83 0.66 0.73 589
action-ﬁrst-party-collect-on-website 0.43 0.30 0.36 509
purpose-basic-service-feature 0.48 0.48 0.48 466
personal-information-type-contact 0.84 0.77 0.80 441
personal-information-type-generic-personal-information 0.70 0.59 0.64 414
purpose-advertising 0.80 0.62 0.70 407
purpose-additional-service-feature 0.41 0.24 0.30 395
purpose-marketing 0.63 0.68 0.65 367
personal-information-type-cookies-and-tracking-elements 0.56 0.73 0.64 365
purpose-analytics-research 0.66 0.57 0.61 358
personal-information-type-user-online-activities 0.61 0.57 0.59 301
purpose-service-operation-and-security 0.62 0.57 0.60 251
choice-type-opt-in 0.42 0.52 0.46 221
purpose-personalization-customization 0.67 0.72 0.69 203
choice-scope-collection 0.20 0.29 0.24 188
personal-information-type-ip-address-and-device-ids 0.46 0.61 0.52 174
choice-scope-ﬁrst-party-use 0.30 0.34 0.32 163
choice-type-dont-use-service-feature 0.27 0.29 0.28 157
personal-information-type-location 0.60 0.60 0.60 154
purpose-legal-requirement 0.75 0.81 0.78 142
personal-information-type-computer-information 0.67 0.71 0.69 142
personal-information-type-ﬁnancial 0.72 0.70 0.71 139
choice-type-opt-out-link 0.62 0.50 0.56 130
access-type-edit-information 0.75 0.66 0.70 120
choice-type-browser-device-privacy-controls 0.78 0.70 0.74 113
audience-type-children 0.89 0.79 0.84 112
security-measure-generic 0.64 0.82 0.72 110
personal-information-type-demographic 0.74 0.58 0.65 110
access-scope-user-account-data 0.29 0.17 0.21 101
choice-scope-use 0.19 0.25 0.22 97
action-third-party-collect-on-ﬁrst-party-website-app 0.15 0.24 0.19 79
personal-information-type-user-proﬁle 0.22 0.39 0.28 77
choice-type-opt-out-via-contacting-company 0.51 0.64 0.57 77
action-third-party-track-on-ﬁrst-party-website-app 0.16 0.34 0.22 77
choice-scope-ﬁrst-party-collection 0.15 0.13 0.14 69
choice-scope-third-party-sharing-collection 0.44 0.40 0.42 68
purpose-merger-acquisition 0.66 0.94 0.78 63
choice-type-third-party-privacy-controls 0.41 0.24 0.30 59
change-type-privacy-relevant-change 0.74 0.73 0.73 55
notiﬁcation-type-general-notice-in-privacy-policy 0.62 0.78 0.69 51
choice-scope-both 0.14 0.10 0.11 51
choice-type-ﬁrst-party-privacy-controls 0.19 0.42 0.26 48
action-ﬁrst-party-collect-in-mobile-app 0.34 0.58 0.43 48
action-third-party-see 0.25 0.40 0.30 43
personal-information-type-personal-identiﬁer 0.23 0.60 0.34 42
notiﬁcation-type-personal-notice 0.79 0.50 0.61 38
audience-type-californians 0.77 0.69 0.73 35
notiﬁcation-type-general-notice-on-website 0.69 0.71 0.70 34
security-measure-secure-data-transfer 0.77 0.61 0.68 33
security-measure-data-access-limitation 0.48 0.39 0.43 33
Average 0.56 0.54 0.54 8956
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Table 6.3 – Classiﬁcation results at the category level.
Category Prec. Recall F1 Support
1st Party Collection 0.77 0.82 0.79 328
3rd Party Sharing 0.76 0.82 0.79 268
User Choice/Control 0.68 0.73 0.70 101
Introductory/Generic 0.79 0.65 0.71 136
Data Security 0.77 0.82 0.80 62
Speciﬁc Audiences 0.73 0.72 0.72 85
Privacy Contact Info 0.71 0.71 0.71 56
Access, Edit, Delete 0.72 0.53 0.61 40
Practice Not Covered 0.60 0.32 0.42 37
Policy Change 0.81 0.88 0.84 33
Data Retention 0.75 0.21 0.33 14
Do Not Track 0.78 1.00 0.88 7
Average 0.75 0.75 0.74 1167
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6.5 Evaluation Methodology & Dataset
We assess the performance of PriBot’s QA ranking approaches from two angles: the predictive
accuracy (Section 6.6) of the QA models and the user-perceived utility (Section 6.7) of the
provided answers. This is motivated by research around recommender systems evaluation,
where the model with the best accuracy is not always rated to be the most helpful by the users
(see the work by Knijnenburg et al., [KWH10]).
In particular, we evaluate PriBot using a set of real-world, user-posed, and privacy-related
questions, collected from Twitter. These questions represent user-company interactions about
privacy practices. This approach has the advantage of avoiding subject bias, which is likely to
happen when eliciting privacy-related questions from individuals, who will not pose them
out of genuine need. We crawled Twitter to obtain questions that represent realistic privacy-
related concerns of users, in their words. This collection methodology allows us to achieve
high ecological validity as we collect real-world privacy questions from real user interactions
with companies in a medium in which PriBot could be employed and without explicitly
soliciting users’ inputs via a survey.
Instead of directly searching for questions on Twitter, we searched for reply tweets that direct
the users to a company’s privacy policy (e.g., using queries such as "filter:replies our
privacy policy" and "filter:replies we privacy policy"). We then backtracked
these reply tweets to the (parent) question tweets asked by customers to obtain a set of
4,743 pairs of tweets. As customary in computational social science research [OLT16], we dis-
till this initial dataset, ﬁltering the noise via heuristics, to reduce the human labeling effort. In
our case, we ﬁltered the question tweets to keep those containing question marks and at least
four words (excluding links, hashtags, mentions, numbers and stop words). We also selected
the pairs where the reply tweet included a valid link. This link is almost always directing users
to the privacy policy, which automates our answer generation during the evaluation of PriBot.
This stage resulted in 260 pairs of valid question-reply tweets.
Next, the author and another member of the research team manually annotated each of the
tweets in order to remove question tweets (a) that are not related to the privacy policies, (b)
to which the replies are not from the ofﬁcial company account, and (c) with inaccessible
privacy policy links in their replies. The level of agreement (Cohen’s Kappa) among both
annotators for the labels suitable vs. unsuitablewas almost perfect (κ= 0.84) [LK77]. The
two annotators agreed on 231 of the question tweets, tagging 182 as suitable. As we will
evaluate the answers to these questions with a user study, our estimates of an adequately
sized study lead us to randomly sample 120 tweets out of the tweets labeled as suitable. We
provide these tweets in Appendix C, and we henceforth refer to them as the Twitter QA Dataset.
The size of our question test set (#= 120) is consistent with other QA evaluation contexts. For
example, the Text REtrieval Conference (TREC) included a question answering track each year
(till 2007) to compare the performance of different QA systems on a given question set. The
number of test questions of a particular type (e.g., those of list or deﬁnition types) is usually
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less than one hundred [VB03, DKL07].
6.6 Accuracy Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the predictive accuracy of the QA models by comparing their
predicted answers against expert-generated ground-truth answers for the questions of the
Twitter QA Dataset from Section 6.5. We consider four evaluation conditions. The ﬁrst three
correspond to the three QA approaches (Retrieval, SemVec and Hierarchical) and the
fourth to a control approach, Random. In the latter, questions are answered with randomly
chosen segments from the policy.
6.6.1 Ground-truth Generation
To generate the ground-truth, skilled annotators, represented the author and another member
of the research team, were given the user’s question (tweet), and the segments comprising
a policy (generated from the privacy policy URL in the answer tweet based on Section 6.3).
Each policy consists of 45 segments on average (min=12, max=344, std=37). Each annotator
selected, independently, the subset of these segments which they consider as best responding
to the user’s question. This annotation took place prior to PriBot generating its answers to
avoid any bias. While deciding on the answers, the annotators accounted for the fact that
multiple segments of the policy might answer a question. For generic or ambiguous questions,
they included, in the answer set, both the general and speciﬁc segments that address the
question. Moreover, given that the annotation is a highly time-demanding task (takes around
6 minutes per question per annotator, excluding consolidation time), we limit the labeling to
60 questions (i.e., to around 2700 segments in total).
After ﬁnishing the individual annotations, the two experts met and consolidated the differ-
ences in their labels to reach an agreed-on set of segments, each assumed to be answering the
question. We call this the ground-truth set for each question. The annotators agree on at least
one answer in 88% of the questions for which they found matching segments, thus signifying
a substantial overlap. For questions with the ground-truth containing two or more answers,
the annotators agreed on at least two of these answers in 76% of the questions.
6.6.2 Accuracy Results
We generated, for each question, the predicted ranked list of answers according to each QA
model. In what follows, we describe our approach for evaluating the predictive accuracy of
these models.
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(a) top-k score (b) Precision@k
(c) Recall@k (d) NDCG
Figure 6.7 – Metrics for various values of k, with the color code being:
Random Retrieval SemVec Hierarchical
QA Metrics
We start by reporting a widely used and easily interpretable metric, the top-k score, which
denotes the portion of questions having at least one correct answer in the top k returned
answers. The top-k score has a direct usability implication: the higher it is for low values of
k, the less information the user has to process before reaching a correct answer. We show in
Fig. 6.7a how the top-k score varies as a function of k. Hierarchicalmodel has the best
performance over the other three models. It achieves 0.30, 0.55, 0.64, and 0.72 for k varying
from 1 to 4. As k increases, the differences between the various models become less signiﬁcant.
At k = 7, the Randommodel is already as good as the Retrieval and the SemVecmodels, which
highlights the importance of achieving higher top-k score at lower k. We also observe that
the Retrieval and SemVecmodels are trading places for the second best performing model,
with the Retrievalmodel being better than SemVec at k = 1. This is not entirely surprising.
We seeded Retrieval, which is based on term-matching, with a large corpus of unsupervised
policies, thus improving its performance on answers with matching terms. However, it falls
short when retrieving the other answers with semantic similarity (those with non-matching
terms) as evident from the higher values of k.
To conﬁrm this observation, we evaluated Precision@k (i.e., average proportion of retrieved
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Table 6.4 – MAP and MRRmetrics with the expert evaluation.
Random Retrieval SemVec Hierarchical Emb.Variant
MAP 0.23 0.33 0.34 0.40 0.28
MRR 0.32 0.47 0.40 0.50 0.35
top-k answers that are correct 4) in Fig. 6.7b and the Recall@k (average proportion of correct
answers that are retrieved in the top-k) in Fig. 6.7c. As evident from both plots, the SemVec
model exhibits a clear advantage over Retrievalwith respect to both metrics for k > 1. Hence,
our decision to consider the semantic similarity between questions and answers pays off as
it exhibits a superior performance over term-matching. It is also clear from both plots that
Hierarchical performs the best among the QA approaches.
Policy Length
The previous metrics (namely top-k score, Precision@k, and Recall@k) suffer from two
shortcomings. They do not capture how presenting the users with more choices affects their
user experience as they need to process more text. Also, because of their nature, these metrics
attain higher values for short policies that have few potential answers. A better metric that
accounts for both shortcomings is the Normalized Discounted Cumulative Gain (NDCG) [JK02].
Intuitively, it indicates that a relevant document’s usefulness decreases logarithmically with




log2(i+1) , where reli is 1 if answer A[i ] is
correct and 0 otherwise. NDCG at k is obtained by normalizing the DCGk with the maximum
possible DCGk across all values of k. We show in Fig. 6.7d the average NDCG across questions
for each value of k. It is clear that the Hierarchical model consistently exhibits superior
NDCG and that the SemVec approach is clearly advantageous over the Retrievalmodel for
k > 1. This indicates that the neural networks models are poised to perform better in a system
where low values of k matter the most. To further focus on the effect of policy length, we
categorize the policy lengths (#segments) into short, medium, and high, based on the 33rd
and the 66th percentiles (we split at #segments of 28 and 46). We then compute a metric
independent of k, namely the Mean Average Precision (MAP), which is the mean of the area
under the precision-recall curve across all questions. Informally, MAP is an indicator of whether
all the correct answers tend to get ranked highly. We see from Fig. 6.8 that, for short policies,
our 3 main models perform very closely, which makes sense given the smaller number of
potential answers. With medium-sized policies, the Hierarchicalmodel is better by a large
margin. This margin is still considerable with long policies, where Retrievalmodel becomes
worse than Randommodel and SemVecmodel as good as Randommodel.
4We note that the absolute value of Precision@k is inherently low as it depends on the total number of correct
answers per policy.
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Figure 6.8 – Variation of MAP across policy lengths.
Pre-trained Embeddings Choice
As discussed in Section 6.4.3, we utilize the GloVe word embeddings, which are trained on 6
billion tokens. Our motivation is that they can capture the relations between layman terms
used in everyday language and legal terms present in privacy policies. We favored that over
word embeddings built using privacy policies alone, due to the limited size of available policies’
corpora (which are at at least 3 orders of magnitude smaller). To validate this decision,
we evaluated the performance of a variant of the Hierarchical model that uses the word
embeddings of Section 6.3, trained on the 16,615 privacy policies we obtained. We show
in Table 6.4 how this model, named Emb.Variant fares in comparison to the other models.







, where rank j is the rank of the ﬁrst correct answer for question j and M is the total
number of questions. Table 6.4 shows that this Emb.Variantmodel performed worse than
all but the Randommodel. We also evaluated the performance of the classiﬁcation model of
Section 6.4.3 with those policies’ embeddings. We noticed that their performance approaches
the case of GloVe embeddings, scoring 0.73, 0.74, and 0.74 on the precision, recall, and F1
metrics respectively (1%-2% lower compared to Table 6.3). This shows that the use of the
more generic, but also more expansive, GloVe embeddings rather than privacy policy speciﬁc
embeddings results in a more robust overall performance on the QA task, likely due to the
larger size of data it is trained on.
6.7 User Study
We conducted a user study to assess the user-perceived utility of PriBot’s answers. Our
methodology is simple; for each QA pair, we collect the evaluations from 10 different individu-
als (via Amazon MTurk). We repeat this assessment for each of the four different conditions
(Retrieval, SemVec, Hierarchical and Random). We evaluated the top 3 responses of each
QA approach to each question. Thus, we assess the utility of 360 answers to 120 questions
(randomly chosen from the Twitter dataset). With four modes, we have 1,440 QA pairs, for
which we obtained 17,790 user evaluations.
142 CHAPTER 6. PRIBOT: AUTOMATED QA FOR PRIVACY POLICIES
Study Design
We used a between-subject design by constructing four surveys, each corresponding to a
different evaluation condition. We provide the study materials in Appendix C. The survey
starts with a series of demographics questions. Second, we include an open-ended Cloze
reading comprehension test (based on [Cra13] and employed by Wilson et al. [WSR+16] and
Reidenberg et al. [RBC+15]). The test consists of an English paragraph with ﬁve missing words.
The respondents ﬁll (by typing in) each blank with a single word best ﬁtting the context. We
utilize this test to assess the reading level of participants and weed out responses failing in
more than 2 blanks.
Next, we display a series of 17 QA pairs (each on a different page). Of these, 15 are a random
subset of the pool of 360 QA pairs (of the evaluated condition); a participant does not receive
twoQApairs with the same question. The other two are randomly positioned anchor questions
serving as attention checkers. The ﬁrst corresponds to a QA pair with a clearly relevant answer,
and the second has a clearly irrelevant answer. We shufﬂe the order of the QA pairs per user,
to account for ordering effects (participant fatigue and practice). Additionally, we enforce a
minimum duration of 15 seconds for the respondent to evaluate each QA pair.
Participant Recruitment
After obtaining IRB approval, we recruited participants using Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk). More than 90% of the respondents were from North America (U.S. and Canada). We
limited the respondent pool in MTurk to those with 95% success rate in their previous tasks.
Across all the conditions, the average completion time of the survey was 14 minutes. In total,
1,186 individuals participated in our study. We compensated each respondent with $1. We
show the breakdown per group in Table 6.5. We limit the Random group to 60 questions (180
QA pairs) and collected ﬁve responses per QA pair. While not fully representative of the general
population, our set of participants exhibited high intra-group diversity, but little difference
across the respondent groups. For all respondents, the average age is 37 years (std=12), 59%
are males, 41% are females, more than 90% have some level of college education and more
than 90% reported being employed (less than 15% are teachers or students).
QA Pair Evaluation
To evaluate the relevance for a QA pair, we display the question and the candidate answer as
shown in Fig. 6.9. In our pilot studies, the respondents were confused about the context of the
question as it might depend on the company. Hence, we decided to display the company’s
name and Twitter Bio, which resulted in a better understanding of the context. Although
there is a potential bias due to the perceived quality of answers to questions pertaining to
well-known brands, this should not favor one QA approach over another as the same set of
questions is presented in the four conditions. Moreover, many of the tweets (questions) and
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Definitely Relevant: It perfectly answers the question.
Partially Relevant: It answers the bulk of the question, though there might be more to say.
Undecided: I find it too difficult to give a judgment on this pair.
Partially Irrelevant: It doesn't answer the question; only has a slight clue.
Definitely Irrelevant: It totally misses the topic of the question.
Question:  .@AskTarget ok thanks but I assume that means yes you all do sell patient names and
addresses?  
Answer:  We may share your personal information with other companies, or organizations which are
not part of Target. These companies and organizations may use the information we share to provide
special offers and opportunities to you. To opt out of our sharing of your personal information with
such companies and organizations, go to the Choices section of this privacy policy. 
How relevant is the candidate answer to the given question?
Figure 6.9 – An example of a QA pair.




k = 1 k = 2 k = 3
Random 66 0.36 0.59 0.75
Retrieval 268 0.52 0.77 0.87
SemVec 271 0.50 0.75 0.84
Hierarchical 291 0.55 0.77 0.91
the policy segments (answers) already contained references to the company’s name.
We asked the respondent to rate the relevance of the candidate answer to the question on
a 5-point Likert scale (1=Completely Relevant to 5=Definitely Irrelevant). Fig. 6.9
depicts the explanation of each item on the Likert scale. We denote a respondent’s evaluation
of a single answer candidate corresponding to a QA pair as relevant if s/he chooses either
Definitely Relevant or Partially Relevant. We consider the response as irrelevant if
the respondent chooses Partially Irrelevant or Definitely irrelevant. Finally, we
label the candidate answer of a QA pair as relevant when more than half of the individual
evaluations for the pair are relevant. At this point, each QA pair from the four approaches is
tagged as either “relevant” or “irrelevant”.
User Study Results
As in the previous section, we compute the top-k score for relevance (i.e., the portion of
questions having at least one relevant answer in the top k returned answers). Table 6.5 shows
this score for the four QA approaches with k = [1,2,3]. We show in Table 6.6 the MAP and the
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Table 6.6 – MAP and MRRmetrics for user-perceived utility.
Random Retrieval SemVec Hierarchical
MAP (3 answers) 0.54 0.74 0.70 0.75
MRR (3 answers) 0.55 0.74 0.70 0.75
MRRmetrics, which are independent of k. We compute these metrics by considering the top 3
answers returned by each model (the ones evaluated in the study).
For all the metrics, the Hierarchical approach clearly outperforms the rest. The respondents
regarded at least one of the top 3 answers as relevant for 91% of the questions, with the ﬁrst
answer being relevant in 55% of the cases. The Retrieval model comes at a close second,
edging the SemVec approach. Our explanation for this result is twofold. First, as we have seen
in Section 6.6.2, the Retrievalmodel has a better predictive accuracy at k = 1, likely due to
the notable portion of the answers which contain terms present in the question. For instance,
this is the case when users ask about particular personal information, such as “Does anybody
know if @EE sell on emails?”. Second, users are likely to perceive answers with matched terms
more positively than answers with non-matched terms but with close meaning.
Still, the main takeaway from these results is that PriBot answers the users’ questions in a
satisfactory manner to them, which highlights its practical signiﬁcance.
6.8 Friendly Summary Generation
The evaluation shows that Hierarchicalmodel outperforms other ranking models in terms
of retrieval accuracy and perceived utility of responses. In addition, we note that the joint
probability distribution across categories and values (Section 6.4.3) has a high-level inter-
pretation. It informs us about the prominent classes present in each segment. We exploit
this property in order to generate abstractive answers (i.e., user-friendly summaries) from the
extractive answers we already have (from the Hierarchical approach). This model, termed
as Friendly-summary, serve the users better by returning simpler and shorter answers.
Fig. 6.10 illustrates our approach. Given an existing answer and the computed joint probability
distribution, we ﬁrst remove the low-quality labels, the ones with probability lower than
a threshold (equal to 0.05 in our implementation). Then, we group the labels under the
high-level category they belong to, as shown in the ﬁgure. Next, for each high-level category,
we generate a summary based on all the labels descending from it. This grouping serves
to preserve the coherence of the generated content. The summary consists of one or more
sentences and is generated based on our custom grammar. Our grammar consists of an
optional introductory sentence about the high-level category, followed by a statement about
each label. Statements describing the same attributes (e.g., information type) follow a similar
structure; they start with an optional introductory phrase, followed by a speciﬁc phrase about
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Float may also transfer personal data to
Float-affiliated companies in other countries.
These may be outside the European
Economic Area and may not have adequate
laws that protect the rights and freedoms of
data subjects in relation to the processing of
personal data. Where this is done, Float shall
take necessary steps to adequately protect
the information transferred. In addition, we
will transfer/share your personal data as
required by law, such as to comply with a
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Summary 1: We share data with third parties. Our
data sharing might involve personal information (like
your user profile info). We need this to respond to
requests from legal authorities (i.e. the government).
Summary 3: We take security measures to guard your
data. We particularly adhere to a special privacy and
security framework.
Summary 2: We have a special section in the policy
on how we handle the data of citizens of other
countries.
Figure 6.10 – The ﬂow diagram of the Friendly-summary approach.
the value (e.g., user proﬁle information). Example summaries are shown in Fig. 6.10. We rank
these answers according to the label of highest joint probability present in them.
Friendly-summary has the beneﬁt of responding back to the user in a simpliﬁed language
while keeping the essence of the extracted answer. These properties are highly desirable in
conversational settings, such as voice-activated devices. We evaluated the perceived utility of
this approach with the same user study protocol and setup as Section 6.7 to compare against
the extractive approaches. Based on the evaluation by 290 users, we obtained a top-k score
of 0.52, 0.69, and 0.83 for a k of 1, 2, and 3 respectively. Comparing with the results of Table 6.5,
we see that the top-1 score of Friendly-summary is the second after the Hierarchical
approach. This is despite the fact that Friendly-summary produces generic answers instead
of returning policy extracts. The answers are also 2.5 times shorter on average. Finally, the
Friendly-summary achieves better readability with an 8.7 score on the Flesch-Kincaid Grade
Level compared to 12.6 for the answers from the policy.
6.9 PriBot Implementation
To demonstrate the practical feasibility of our approach, we implemented PriBot as an online,
text and voice-activated chatbot. As shown in Fig. 6.11, the user poses a question about
the company of his/her choice to which the chatbot responds with the top-ranked answer
according to the Hierarchical approach. In addition, the interface allows checking two more
answers via an accordion interface, expandable via a user click. The chatbot also provides the
option of narrating the answer to illustrate its functionality with voice-activated devices. We
provide several examples of the answers returned by PriBot in Appendix D.
Chatbot System
Fig. 6.13 shows the ﬂow of the chatbot. It follows a client-server architecture; the client consists
of the user-facing interface and the back-end server consists of a chatbot server as well as a
machine learning (ML) server. We implemented the chatbot server using rivescript-js to script
the chatting logic and Node.js to interact with the ML server. The ML server employs the Keras
neural network library (with a TensorFlow backend) for training and running the classiﬁers of
the Hierarchical approach. We run the back-end server on an HP Z280 workstation with
two bridged Nvidia Titan X GPUs. The chatbot server receives the question and the policy’s
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Figure 6.11 – A screenshot of PriBot
identiﬁer from the client and passes them to the ML server. If the question belongs to a
previously unseen privacy policy, the ML server runs the pre-processing logic of Section 6.3.
Then, theML server passes each segment of the policy through the Hierarchical classiﬁers to
obtain their vector representations. The server caches each segment and its associated vector
in Redis, an in-memory data store. This is a one-time effort per policy. If the question belongs
to a pre-processed policy, the ML server passes the question through the same workﬂow
of the segments to obtain its vector representation. Next, an answer ranking component
determines the top three segments matching the user’s question. The chatbot server returns
these segments (the answers) to the client for display to the user.
Timing Measurement
To assess how practical our chatbot is, we measure its delay to generate a response and the
time it takes to read out the response through a speech synthesizer. We measure the chatbot’s
answer generation delay for each of the 120 Twitter questions and the three QA approaches,
Hierarchical, SemVec and Retrieval; the distribution is shown in Fig. 6.12a. Practically, all
approaches return answers in almost real-time, with the Hierarchical taking around 120ms
longer than the fastest model, which is likely an acceptable tradeoff given the higher accuracy
and utility of the responses it provides. Compare that to the 6 minutes taken by the skilled
annotator to decide on an answer.










































































Figure 6.13 – The system ﬂow diagram of our chatbot imple-
mentation.
a chatbot’s answer. We compare between extractive approaches (Retrieval, SemVec and
Hierarchical), which are based on the same segmentation process that returns excerpts of
the policy, and the abstractive approach of Friendly-summary that constructs answer in a
different way. We consider the top 3 answers for the 120 Twitter questions of the extractive
approaches and compare them to those of the abstractive approach. The 75th percentile of
the narration times is less than 30 seconds for the extractive methods and less than 10 seconds
for the abstractive approach. This shows that the chatbot returns reasonably short responses
for the user questions, making it also suitable for voice-based conversational systems.
6.10 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the implications and the challenges for the demonstrated ability to
answer free-form questions from privacy policies.
Ecological Validity
Similar to studies involving users, we employed several decisions that could have impacted the
evaluation of PriBot. First, we tested it in the wild with a social media dataset that is rife with
informal language, complaints, cynicism and jokes. Some questions (e.g., questions 33 and 34
in Appendix C) contained spelling mistakes and Internet acronyms which resulted in returning
wrong segments (we intentionally kept these cases). Note that research on adaptive language
behavior in HCI [PHB+06] indicates that users tend to align their language to that of computer
systems’ with limited perceived capability. We conjecture that in a practical scenario, where
users are aware they are communicating with an automated agent, their wording is expected
to be different, and PriBot’s performance even better. Thus, our evaluation is both realistic as
well as conservative in assessing accuracy.
An avid reader might notice the differences between the predictive models’ accuracy (Sec-
tion 6.6) and the users’ perceived quality (Section 6.7). This is, actually, consistent with the
observations from research in recommender systems where the prediction accuracy does not
148 CHAPTER 6. PRIBOT: AUTOMATED QA FOR PRIVACY POLICIES
always match user’s satisfaction [TMA+04, MAC+02, KWH10]. In addition, users are known to
be biased by the very fact that they are evaluating a speciﬁc answer since it can be considered
as a recommendation [KJ13]. We have tested this aspect by asking the experts to take the user
study with the same 120 questions. We found that the expert-perceived utility of the models,
based on the survey, was consistently higher than the predictive accuracy measured from the
ground truth of Section 6.6 (a 5–10% difference). We can partially attribute this difference to
the potential persuasive effect of the recommendations on the experts themselves.
UI Considerations
Like any QA automated system, PriBot may make mistakes in practice. However, a well-
implemented UI can mitigate the negative effects of potential mistakes. One optimization
is to show automatically classiﬁed labels (e.g., 1st party collection or data security) next to
the answers’ IDs. The user can then glance quickly at multiple answers and click on the
one matching her intention. This allows providing more potentially correct answers without
overloading the user. Another approach consists of PriBot asking the user for a clariﬁcation
about the intended high-level category when there are multiple close matches. This also
suits the voice-based UI. To improve the future predictions, PriBot actually includes an
additional button for users to give feedback on a returned answer’s quality. Furthermore, we
hypothesize that “incorrect” answers from an evaluation perspective can be of educational
value in practice, potentially covering other user concerns.
Another UI-related challenge is displaying potentially conﬂicting answers to the users. One
answer could describe a general sharing clause while another speciﬁes an exception (e.g., one
answer speciﬁes “share” and another speciﬁes “do not share”). To mitigate this issue, we used
the same CNN classiﬁer of Section 6.4.3 and exploited the fact that the OPP-115 dataset had
optional labels of the form: “does” vs. “does not” to indicate the presence or absence of
sharing/collection. This classiﬁer had a cross-validation F1 score of 95%. Hence, we can use
this classiﬁer to detect potential discrepancies between the top-ranked answers. The UI of
PriBot can thus highlight the potentially conﬂicting answers to the user.
Deployment and Legal Aspects
A standalone chatbot is only one of many applications for PriBot. PriBot can be integrated
within a platform like Amazon Alexa or Google Assistant as another way of delivering informa-
tion about privacy policies of third party apps. Also, it can function as a means to facilitate the
comparison of the privacy practices of different companies. PriBot can answer a standard
set of questions from a range of policies to provide researchers, users and regulators with a
scalable and quantiﬁable way to compare privacy policies.
However, PriBot is not intended to replace the legally-binding privacy policy or terms of
services. It offers a complementary interface for users to easily inquire the contents of a
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privacy policy. Following the trend of automation in legal advice [Goo17], insurance claim
resolution [Lev17], and privacy policy presentation [ZB14, LFL16], 3rd parties, e.g., automated
legal services ﬁrms, can deploy PriBot as a solution for their users. As is the standard in similar
cases, these companies should amend PriBotwith a disclaimer specifying that PriBot is an
assistant and does not represent the actual service provider [Hwa13]. The same can be done
in the case of a company deploying PriBot to directly interact with users.
Companies and service providers can also deploy PriBot internally as an assistant tool for
their customer support agents to handle privacy-related inquiries. Putting the human in the
loop allows for a favorable trade-off between the utility of PriBot and its legal implications. For
a wider discussion on the issues surrounding automated legal analysis, we refer the interested
reader to the works of McGinnis and Pearce [MP14] and Pasquale [PC15].
Finally, we note that the quick responses given by PriBot can play a role in privacy policy
debates. In fact, Fig. 6.11 showed the case of Unroll.me, a free service for removing unwanted
subscriptions fromusers’ email. Recently, there has been a lot of backlash against this company
after it was reported to be selling information mined from those emails to third parties (e.g.,
selling data to Uber about the billing emails for customers of its competitor Lyft) [Isa17]. As
Figure 6.11 shows, PriBot answers the question about third-party sharing with the particular
policy segment that describes the practice reported on in the news. This is despite the fact
that the question’s only intersection with the answer is the word “with”.
6.11 Related Work
Several studies have evaluated the effectiveness of privacy policies. Good et al., showed
that users have a limited understanding of these policies and that they have a little desire to
read them [GDG+05]. In a later work, Good et al., found that giving a short summary notice,
in addition to the End User License Agreement, before installing the software signiﬁcantly
reduced the number of installations [GGMK07]. Moreover, they showed that presenting users
with a short summary notice after installation led to a signiﬁcant number of uninstalls.
Privacy Policy Analysis
Accordingly, there have been numerous attempts to create easy-to-navigate and alternative
presentations of privacy policies. We differentiate between approaches that pursued manual
designs of notices and approaches that investigated automated approaches of analyzing the
policies.
Manual Designs
The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) was one of the early works at making privacy
policies more accessible [CLM+02, RC99]. In P3P, websites encode their policies in a machine-
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readable format, and software agents (typically in the browser) parse this information and
display it to the user. Examples of such agents were Privacy Bird [CGA06] and Privacy Bird
Search [BCKM04]. Still, P3P did not have wide adoption, and its working group was closed in
2006, due to the weak adoption from the industry, the limited spread of such agents, and to
the issues of user comprehension and enjoyability [Cra12, KBCR09].
In a later work, Kelley et al., proposed using nutrition labels as a paradigm for displaying
privacy notices [KBCR09]. In their study, users were able to ﬁnd out about data practices
more quickly and had a more enjoyable information seeking experience compared to natural
language policies. Icons representing the privacy policies have also been proposed [HZH11,
CGA06].
In the ﬁnancial sector, the standardization approach of privacy notices has found applica-
bility [GHH+12] in the United States. However, in the general industry, no approach, till
now, has reached the standardization point, and service providers have not voluntarily opted
into one of the proposed approaches. Zimmeck and Bellovin suggest three reasons behind
that: (i) the absence of industry incentives to move from the de facto standard of privacy
policies, (ii) the support for natural language policies from the U.S. governmental agencies,
and (iii) the stronger expressivity of natural language and its ability to relay industry-speciﬁc
nuances [ZB14].
(Semi-)Automated Analysis
Early works on this problem studied the problem of analyzing privacy policies for limited
purposes. Costante et al., targeted the problem of listing the set of data collected by the
website [CdHP13]. In another work, Costante et al., [CSPdH12] developed a solution for
assessing the completeness of privacy policies according to a predeﬁned set of categories.
Stamey and Rossi showed a system for topic modeling on privacy policies, which includes an
ambiguous term extractor [SR09]. Still, these works have been focused on studying a single
aspect of the policies with a limited scope. In this work, we tackle the problem on a much wider
scale and with specialized natural language processing techniques, rather than out-of-the-box
mechanisms (which we also show as sub-optimal).
Recently, several efforts have explored the potential of automated analysis of privacy policies.
For example, Liu et al., have used deep learning to model the vagueness of words in privacy
policies [LFL16]. Zimmeck et al., have been able to show signiﬁcant inconsistencies between
app practices and their privacy policies via automated analysis [ZWZ+17]. These studies,
among others [SSWS16, LWSS16], have been largely enabled by the release of the OPP dataset
by Wilson et al., [WSD+16], containing 115 privacy policies extensively annotated by law
students.
Our work is the ﬁrst to use the OPP dataset for the task of answering free-text questions by
users. This work also falls in the line of automatically generating a data-driven interface to
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privacy policies. In that regard, the closest work to ours is that of the Privee system. Privee
used crowdsourced data from the “Terms of Service; Didn’t Read” service 5 to train a machine
learning classiﬁer on grading a privacy policy according to 6 classes [ZB14]. This system was
deployed in the form of a Google Chrome extension. In contrast, we automate the analysis at
a much more ﬁne-grained level, with more than 90 categories. We also exploit the emergence
from a highly rich annotated dataset in building the core QA algorithms of PriBot. In addition,
we believe that a standalone web application has much more potential to satisfy wider users
need than the limited interface of Chrome extensions.
Automated Question Answering
QA techniques typically tackle two types of questions: factoid questions asking about short
facts (e.g., what is the highest peak in Europe?), and non-factoid questions, which are typically
complex and open-ended (e.g., what losses can auto insurance protect you from?). Evidently,
our work falls into the second category. In the past few years, deep learning methods have
shown superior results to traditional retrieval techniques in this domain. Researchers have
explored several combinations of Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) [FXG+15], Long
short-term memory networks (LSTMs), Attention-based Networks [TdSXZ16], and pointwise
neural networks [RHL16] for this problem in general.
PriBot follows the spirit of many of these previous efforts in that we use word embeddings
as features of a neural network to compute the proximity between sentences. However,
the contributions of PriBot stem from addressing the unique challenges associated with
the privacy policies domain (e.g., the absence of a QA dataset), in developing a custom QA
architecture, and in demonstrating the quality of PriBot’s generated answers with a large-
scale user study.
6.12 Summary
In this chapter, we propose PriBot, the ﬁrst privacy-speciﬁc QA system that is readily available
for public use. It answers user’s free-form questions from previously unseen privacy policies.
We developed two deep-learning algorithms that allow PriBot to return answers from the
privacy policy. We evaluated PriBot using a dataset of 120 real-world questions that we
collected from Twitter. Our user study of 1186 participants revealed the high accuracy and
relevance of PriBot’s answers. Further, we provide a proof-of-concept implementation of
PriBot as a user-facing chatbot and evaluate its usability.
We envision that the techniques developed in PriBot will open the door for the future of
automated privacy specialists in different ﬁelds. It has the potential to replace repeated work
that takes several minutes with a considerably accurate replacement that takes milliseconds.
This can result in a signiﬁcant efﬁciency boost in the customer service domain for example.
5tosdr.org
152 CHAPTER 6. PRIBOT: AUTOMATED QA FOR PRIVACY POLICIES
Such improvements cannot be achieved if each company relies on its small dataset of privacy
related conversations.
7 Conclusion
In this thesis, our goal was to improve the accessibility and usability of data privacy. We tackled
this in an age where users’ personal information is being collected at an enormous scale, data
practices are more and more obscure, and risk communication is signiﬁcantly lagging behind.
We started with three obstacles in mind: scale adaptation, risk communication, and language
complexity. Throughout the previous chapters, we presented our efforts for mitigating these
obstacles. The takeaway messages from this thesis can be summarized as follows:
Feasibility of Sensitivity Assessment over Unstructured Data. We have shown with C3P
that one can tame the complexity of sensitivity analysis in the case of unstructured ﬁles by
accounting for the various context and content features that are associated with such ﬁles.
We have found that this goal can be attained in a privacy-preserving manner too. Another
interesting ﬁnding is that Item Response Theory, despite not being as complex as the recent
machine learning models, is well suited to model the users’ privacy attitudes and the ﬁles’
sensitivity levels.
Improving Risk Communication with Data Analysis and Visualization. We have shown
via PrivySeal that risk communication for unstructured data is not only achievable but can
also be highly effective. Our Far-reaching Insights approach serves towards reducing the
opacity of data processing by exposing, to the user, the possible repercussions of granting
access to over-privileged 3rd party cloud apps. We have also found that not all insights are
created equal. For instance, relational insights, displaying information about users’ relations
with others, were more effective than personal insights about the user only.
Enlightening the Users on Interdependent Privacy Risks via New Privacy Indicators On
top of exposing the extent of interdependent privacy in third party cloud apps, we sought a
way to curtail the privacy loss via privacy indicators. We were able to show that small changes
in the permissions interface (i.e., our History-based Insights) can help the users better account
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for previous decisions.
Building Better Privacy Interfaces with Machine Learning. We have demonstrated that
privacy policies do not have to stay to be the de factomethod for communicating data practices
on the long run. Policies can be rather used as the fuel to power the machine learning models,
which, in turn, can be leveraged to give the users the speciﬁc information they are looking
for. We have shown the efﬁcacy of this approach with users in the case of question answering,
where our new model scored high relevance and accuracy metrics.
On a high level, one of the key differentiators of our work was striving for demonstrability by
putting the systems, whenever possible, in the hands of end-users with minimal effort needed
on their behalf. This was the case for example with PrivySeal, which grew to around 1750
registered users at the time of writing this thesis. It is also the case with PriBot, our newly
released web application.
Looking forward, we highlight both the direct extensions of our work and the long term
ramiﬁcations. To begin with, although the privacy issue in cloud ﬁle sharing has been less
pronounced recently, there are several emerging problems that share a similar DNA. For
example, conducting privacy preserving analytics over users’ interactions with smartphones
has been on the agenda of the top manufacturers. We envision that a lot of interesting analytics
can also be conducted on unstructured data, and there is much work to be done there on
ofﬂine feature speciﬁcation and extraction with machine learning.
When it comes to deterring users from installing over-privileged applications, we have ad-
mittedly attempted at breaking the knowledge imbalance between users and providers with
Far-reaching insights. Hence, using this exact technique is likely to not be in the interest of
platform providers as it can curtail their growth. However, we envision that these techniques
can be alternatively provided by third parties, which offer privacy as a service. These third
parties can be used by the interested individuals or teams in an organization. On the other
hand, highlighting the effects of interdependent privacy and informing users about the exist-
ing parties with access to their data is less of a burden for the platform providers. In the future,
we hope that providers go beyond listing the apps that the user has authorized to visualizing
the parties with access to their data. This includes parties enabled by other users and parties
enabled by the apps themselves (e.g., ad providers, data brokers, etc.). This gives users a more
transparent overview of their data.
Moreover, in the case of privacy policies, our work on PriBot scratches the service of what
is possible. We see a signiﬁcant opportunity of complementing these policies with existing
datasets, such as customer services’ logs, to attain much higher accuracy. Another interesting
extension is to go beyond rule-based summarization to abstractive summarization, where
the policies are encoded in a simpler language. That is another avenue where deep learning
research on summarization, neural machine translation, and text generation can be leveraged.
Additionally, putting PriBot and other similar systems in the hands of user would provide
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a valuable data source for adjusting the models based on users’ feedback. Towards that
end, there is work to be done on the adequate interfaces for collecting feedback and proper
methods for promptly integrating such feedback within the models themselves. Furthermore,
we plan to tackle the UI design challenges of PriBot by investigating the trade-off between
accuracy and usability. We also plan to improve the accuracy of PriBot through a multi-stage
conversation. For example, we want to narrow down the answers by allowing PriBot to ask
whether the user is concerned about the third parties or the ﬁrst party.
To look further, one of the major outcomes of this thesis is that unstructured privacy interfaces
are feasible and effective. We distinguish these interfaces from the traditional structured
privacy interfaces, such as permission dialogs with pre-scripted text, predesigned privacy
labels, or privacy information within application stores. It has often been the case in the
user experience domain that “the best interface is no interface” [Kri15]. This has been further
reafﬁrmed with the emergence of new devices where “the only interface is no interface”.
Accordingly, privacy indicators should not be restricted by a form or a medium. In fact, the
emerging trend of virtual assistants calls for virtual privacy specialists that can effectively
communicate to the user the data practices of all the new parties receiving users’ information.
In such specialists, we see a lot of potential for applying our data-driven techniques in risk
communication. Talking to the user using their data as a language is one of the most effective
methods as we have seen, not only because it swiftly relays the message but also because it
reduces habituation and serves as an educational tool.

A Study Material for Chapter 2
In this appendix, we present the material used in the user study reported in Chapter 2. The
full vocabulary on which we build is presented in Figure A.1. The questions were split over 9
surveys with a similar structure. The surveys are all presented next (we kept them as they were
originally, with the replicated instructions).
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B Study Material for Chapter 5
In this appendix, we provide the material for the study reported in Chapter 5.
B.1 Introductory Material
First the participants were presented with the instructions presented in Figure B.1 and B.2.
Next, they answer the introductory survey in Figures B.3 and B.4.
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Instructions
Overview
What is this about?
Cloud storage services (e.g. Dropbox, Google Drive, OneDrive, etc.) are now being used by a lot of people for various purposes. People store their documents,
photos, or music on these services, so that they can access these ?les from any device at any time. 
Also, many companies have developed applications that you can connect to your Dropbox or Google Drive accounts. For example, you can allow an image
editing app to access your Dropbox in order to edit an image you have stored there. You can also use an app for signing documents you already have on
Google Drive. 
These apps are made by companies other than Google or Dropbox, but they provide users with a lot of services by connecting to their Google Drive or
Dropbox accounts. That's why they are called 3rd Party Apps. 
We are conducting a user experiment to check how people make decisions when they install such 3rd party apps.
Are you eligible?
To qualify for completing the tasks, you will have to be:
a user with a good familiarity with one of the cloud storage services.
have actually utilized these services to store ?les
How is the study paid? (Read this please)
All participants will automatically receive the first payment after completing the study.
All the participants who complete the study without randomly ?lling answers will receive an amount equal to 2.5 times the first payment as a bonus
(for example first payment will be $0.5 and bonus will be $1.25)
This is especially important in the part where the answer is in the form of text input. You will be provided with guidelines on how to not answer
these questions. After we manually check these answers for quality, we will issue the bonus to all participants who have answered according to
the guidelines.
Why is this important?
Your contribution will lead to better process of cloud apps' installation.
You will a?ect how apps are presented to the users in the future.
Example Apps
To make sure you understand how these apps work, here are two examples: 
This is an application called ILoveIMG that allows importing photos from Google Drive and then cropping them. 
Figure B.1 – First part of the instructions given to the participants at the beginning of the study
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Here is another application called PandaDoc that allows importing a letter from Google Drive and then signing that letter. 
Process
You will ?rst go to our study's webpage on the given link.
You will answer a survey.
You will be given a set of tasks related to cloud services.
Then you will be asked to ?ll a ?nal short survey.
At the end, you will be given a code that you have to enter in CrowdFlower interface in order to get the payment.
Do Not
Do Not Refresh the study's page or close it until the end of the study where you get your completion code. Refreshing it will make you lose the
progress and start your task from the beginning.
Do Not press the Back or Forward buttons on your keyboard to go to the previous or next page during the study. Only click on the given buttons in
order to go to the next step.
Do Not use a tablet or smartphone to do this study: only use a computer/laptop/desktop
Do's
Please try to do the experiment without interruption as some parts are related.
Think well about your decisions during the experiment.
Check all the possible choices before making your mind on a decision.
Figure B.2 – Second part of the instructions given to the participants at the beginning of the
study
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Survey
Please answer in English the following questions (and the subsequent study).  
Make sure you have read well the instructions on CrowdFlower. You can also see them on this page:
https://privyseal.epfl.ch/#!/hisExp/instructions
1. 
What is your CrowdFlower Contributor ID?
2. 
What is your age (in years)?
3. 




What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? If currently enrolled, highest degree received.
 High school 
 Trade/technical/vocational training 
 Associate or Bachelor’s degree 
 Post Graduate Degree
5. 
What is your occupation?
 full-time employee 
 student 









Please list the names of cloud storage service(s) that you use to store your files?
8. 
Select all the purposes for which you use these providers?
 Storing photos 
 Storing documents 
 Sharing photos with others 
 Collaborating on documents 
9. 




Suppose you have friends who don't use cloud storage services. What is the one feature/advantage that you can mention to
convince them to use such services.
11. 
Have you previously given 3rd party applications access to some/all of your cloud files?
 Yes 
 No
Figure B.3 – First part of the initial survey that the participants ﬁll
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12. 
If you answered Question 11 by 'Yes', to how many 3rd apps approximately have you given access?
 1-5 
 5-10 
 more than 10
13. 
If you answered Question 11 by 'Yes', what was the purpose of those 3rd party application(s)?
14. 
If a 3rd party application requests the permission to: "View and manage the files in your Google Drive (or Dropbox)", what do
you think that means?
 The app can immediately view all my ?les. 
 I can give the app access to speci?c ?les when I want
15. 
If a 3rd party application requests the permission to: "View and manage Google Drive (or Dropbox) files and folders that you
have opened or created with this app.", what do you think that means?
 The app can immediately view all my ?les. 
 I can give the app access to speci?c ?les when I want
16. 




 more than 10
Done. Go to experiment
Figure B.4 – Second part of the initial survey that the participants ﬁll
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B.2 Material for Modules
The participants are then presented with the modules summarized in Figure B.5. Figure B.7
to B.17 show screenshots of different steps in the modules. The captions in those ﬁgures refer




























































Figure B.5 – High level overview of the modules of the experiment;














???????????????? ????????????????? ?????????????????????? ????????? ????????????????????????????????????
????????????????
Figure B.6 – Instructions that participants see before each module
Module 1
Figure B.7 – Module 1-a: the participant is asked to install an application from a speciﬁc
company.
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Figure B.8 – Module 1-a: the participant sees the traditional permissions interface to install
the app.
Figure B.9 – Module 1-a: the participant is notiﬁed again of the company name in order to get
familiarized with it.
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Figure B.10 – Module 1-b: the participant is asked to install an app of a certain purpose; two
apps satisfy this purpose and are shown (in a random order) on the top row.
Figure B.11 – Module 1-b: the participant is shown the permissions interface, depending on
the experimental group; here we show the case of HB group.
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Figure B.12 – Module 1-b: the participant is asked to provide a justiﬁcation for their choice.
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Module 2
For this module, we show the case of Module 2-d and 2-e in Figure B.5. The case of Module
2-b and 2-c follow a similar structure.
Figure B.13 – Module 2-d: the participant is made aware that a collaborator has installed an
app from a speciﬁc company by requesting her to type company URL in the box. We randomly
selected the name between Lisa or John for each user in our study. Here, we show the case of
Lisa. Afterwards, the participant gets a conﬁrmation as in Figure B.9.
Figure B.14 – Module 2-e: the participant is asked to install an app of a certain purpose; two
apps satisfy this purpose and are shown (in a random order) on the top row. One of these
apps has been installed earlier by Lisa. The participant sees an installation interface similar to
Figure B.11 and has to justify as in Figure B.12.
192 APPENDIX B. STUDY MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 5
Module 3
Figure B.15 – Module 3: at the beginning of the module, the participant is made aware that
Lisa has more of the shared ﬁles than John.
Figure B.16 – Module 3-a: the participant is made aware that Lisa has installed an app called
PDF Mergy; a conﬁrmation like in Figure B.9 is then shown.
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Figure B.17 – Module 3-b: the participant is made aware that John has installed an app called
PDF File Merger; a conﬁrmation like in Figure B.9 is then shown.
Figure B.18 – Module 3-c: the participant is asked to install an app of a certain purpose; two
apps satisfy this purpose and are shown (in a random order) on the top row. One of these apps
has been installed earlier by Lisa and the other by John. The participant sees an installation
interface similar to Figure B.11 and has to justify as in Figure B.12.
B.3 Final Survey
After ﬁnishing the modules, the participants are requested to ﬁll a ﬁnal survey, shown in
Figure B.19.
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Thanks for completing the experiment. We have some ?nal questions for you. After you answer them,
click on the button below to access the Completion code that you can enter in CrowdFlower for getting
your reward.
1. 
If you knew that your friend (let's call him John) has connected an application to his Google Drive and has given it access to all





You were asked several times to choose between two apps to install. Select all the reasons from below that aﬀected your
decisions.
 Permissions the apps requested 
 Whether the app name looked professional/cool 
 How much the app's company knew previously about me 
 Whether the company has a professional-looking name 
 I was actually confused and selecting randomly 
 Others (please specify:) other reason(s)
3. 
Given two apps with the same permissions. App A is from a company that you have previously given access to your Google
Drive. App B is from a company that you haven't given access in the past. Which app, in your opinion, would give you better
privacy?
 App A 
 App B 
 Both apps give me the same privacy.
4. 
Assume you have installed an application called YouMusic from a company called Musicana and gave it access to all your files
on Google Drive. Now you are considering installing an application called YouVideo from the same company. How do you think
that this application will aﬀect your privacy:
 It will a?ect my privacy negatively. 
 It will a?ect my privacy positively. 
 It will not have an e?ect on my privacy. 
Please justify your answer: 
5. 
If you connect an application to your Google Drive and you give it access to all files (including those you share with your





(Optional) Please feel free to provide any general feedback below.
Done. Show me the finishing code.
Figure B.19 – Final survey presented to the participants
C Study Material for Chapter 6
In this appendix, we provide the material for the study reported in Chapter 6.
C.1 Introductory Material
The participants are presented with the instructions in Figure C.1, followed by a demographics
survey (Figure C.2 and C.3) and a reading test (Figure C.4).
We are researchers from the University of Michigan in the U.S. and ?EPFL in Switzerland. We are trying
to understand the mindset of individuals regarding the privacy practices of the different services, apps
and websites they use.
?
To help us in our research, we need you to evaluate a set of question-answer pairs about the privacy
policies of different companies. In particular, we need your feedback regarding how
relevant/satisfying you find the displayed answer to each question.?
?
Please Note: We have a minimum duration of 15 seconds before you can move to the next question.
?
Before we jump in to the main study task, we will ask you to answer few background questions. Please 
answer those questions honestly. The answers to those questions will NOT impact your participation in 
this study or the received compensation.
Figure C.1 – General instructions at the beginning of the study
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male
female




Some college - no degree
Associates/2 year degree
Bachelors/4 year degree
Graduate degree - Masters, PhD, professional, medicine, etc.
Demographics
?
Please answer the following questions honestly. The answers to those questions will NOT impact your participation 
in this study or the received compensation.
Please provide your age (in years):
Please provide your gender: 
Which of the following best describes your highest achieved education level?
Figure C.2 – First part of the demographics survey
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Administrative support (e.g., secretary, assistant)
Art, writing, or journalism (e.g., author, reporter, sculptor)
Business, management, or financial (e.g., manager, accountant, banker)
Computer engineer or IT professional (e.g., systems administrator, programmer, IT consultant)
Education (e.g., teacher)
Engineer in other fields (e.g., civil engineer, bio-engineer)
Homemaker
Legal (e.g., lawyer, law clerk)
Medical (e.g., doctor, nurse, dentist)
Retired
Scientist (e.g., researcher, professor)
Service (e.g., retail clerks, server)





North America (United States, Canada)
South America
Europe
Asia & Middle East
Africa
Australia
Which of the following best describes your primary occupation?
Please provide your place of residence:
Figure C.3 – Second part of the demographics survey
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Please read the text below and think of the word which best fits each space. Use
only one word in each space.?
In fiction, robots have a personality, (1) _______________?reality ?is disappointingly different.  Although 
sophisticated (2) _______________  to assemble cars and assist during complex surgery, modern robots 
are dumb automations, (3) _______________of striking up relationships with their human operators. 
?However, change is (4) _______________ the horizon. Engineers argue that, as robots begin to make
 (5) _______________ a bigger part of society, they will need a way to interact with humans.  To this end 






Figure C.4 – Cloze reading test, with 5 blank values, used to judge the reading comprehension
abilities of the participants and to remove the low-performing ones.
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C.2 Answer Evaluation
The participants are then shown the instructions in Figure C.5, followed by 17 question-answer
pairs. Figure C.6 shows an example of each pair.
For the rest of this study, we will present you with 17 question-answer pairs.
At each step, we will give you a question somebody asked about the privacy
practices of a company.
Below the question, you will find a candidate answer, which might or might not be
relevant.
Please read both the question and the candidate answer carefully, and indicate how
relevant do you find the candidate answer to the posed question.
We have given you the company name and Twitter bio to supply you with additional
context, in case you need it.
You have to choose one of 5 choices, ranging from Definitely Relevant to Completely
Irrelevant.
 
Beware: There are some steps, where the evaluation is very obvious, so if you are
filling it without reading carefully, this will lead to rejecting your HIT.
Figure C.5 – Instructions for the answer evaluation part
Definitely Relevant: It perfectly answers the question.
Undecided: I find it too difficult to give a judgment on this pair.
Partially Relevant: It answers the bulk of the question, though there might be
more to say.
Definitely Irrelevant: It totally misses the topic of the question.
Partially Irrelevant: It doesn't answer the question; only has a slight clue.
Company:  nswpolice
Twitter Description: The Official Twitter account of the NSW Police Force. Please do not
report crime here. For emergencies, contact 000 or 131 444 for non urgent matters. 
Question:  @nswpolice what sort of data do you track outside the questions for
visitors to the link? 
Answer:  Please note that mobile phone users accessing this website should be
aware that most phone applications enable their user's mobile phone details (and in
some phone applications, also their user's geographic location) to be recorded by the
NSWPF's website host. That information will be kept secure, confidential and private,
in accordance with the applicable laws. 
How relevant is the candidate answer to the given question?
Figure C.6 – Example question-answer pair, given to the participants for evaluation
We list below the 120 questions around privacy policies that we use in our evaluation (collected
from Twitter and agreed on during the annotations by the author and another member of the
research team.).
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1. @Monsterjobs_uk Are you legally responsible for any loss of claimants’ data that may occur on Universal
Job Match?
2. @Kenshoo I know I can just check your website, but are you taking any personal data while you are looking
for our search queries?
3. Just tried to change my details at @theregister and it now wants my address and phone number. Why?
4. @NorthumbrianH2O thanks. Do you pass on customer addresses to 3rd parties? Got interiors catalogue
addressed to me here. How did they know?
5. @EE May I please request what companies my details have been passed on to? I am getting calls from
various elec suppliers. Many thanks.
6. @creditkarma Does cancelling an account also delete all associated data (especially SSN) from your system?
Want to know before I sign up. :)
7. @yewknee @Simplify does it simplify sharing your banking data with advertisers?
8. @TechSmith Do you collect information and provide it to third parties?
9. @moneysupermktUK Hi - if I use your service will there be ANY telephone calls from you or 3rd party
company or is it 100% web based?
10. @Viber So, can everyone in your contacts see the photos you have shared on Viber even if not originally
shared with them? @ﬁt_gurl
11. @TradeMe Isn’t releasing information under the Privacy Act voluntary? I.e to protect users you could make
the Police follow formal process?
12. @FitbitSupport is data stored on the cloud? I heard of leaks from the cloud.
13. @SparkMailApp Is there more information about sync settings via cloud. Security? Possible to delete what’s
been synced?
14. @nswpolice what sort of data do you track outside the questions for visitors to the link?
15. @weebly shocked at the unsolicited emails and calls I’m getting since I signed up with your web service.
Did you REALLY sell my information?
16. @Prezi Guys, small question: the email addresses you collect from Prezi accounts, are they being used for
third parties? If so, why?
17. @myen Are Evernote notes encrypted at rest?
18. @quip quick question if I connect my accounts can you access all my info? Or it still remains just for me to
see?
19. .@AngiesList so do you sell your mailing list to everyone??? My junk email has increased exponentially since
joining. #sheesh
20. @fullcontact do you have a warrant canary statement that you’ve never provided users’ address books to
authorities? If not, can you?
21. @getspeedify, does Speedify encrypt my trafﬁc or is it an unencrypted VPN? Also, do you keep logs of users?
If so, for how long?
22. @duckduckgo You don’t log user info, but what bout cookies ? Do you use them every time we log on ?
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23. @AskSubaruCanada So that makes it ok for you to give them personal info to spam customers with every
day? Where was the opt out option?
24. @skulpt_me Very interested in your device! Can you tell us how our personal info and data are used and/or
resold with your app?
25. @loseit how about you guys? Do you #share the data we log in your app? #Privacy https://t.co/qTH6Ir905A
26. @EuclidAnalytics are you able to isolate a MAC address’ data and provide it to law enforcement?
27. @threatspikelabs what data do u store, if any, how long u store for? 3rd party compliance? If served with
warrant what’s ur steps to protect
28. @Adobe do you sell Mail Adresses??!!
29. @FreePPICheck do you keep or pass over any personal information after completing your ppi check??
30. Hey @Optus why am I getting calls from people wanting to sell me funeral insurance? Have you sold my
phone number to a call centre?
31. @nest Do you keep your customer’s emails private after you have obtained an email during installation
setup?
32. @smallpdf are your applications HIPAA compliant?
33. @SpotifyCares where is the opt out option for shareing personal info. If I opt out of the terms I am told that
I cannot use Spodify?
34. @msg @ProductHunt @service Curious how personal info is protected, assuming u have to give it out for
most cust serv resolutions?
35. Also, @HotDocOnline you make no mention on your site of how patient data is secured. Would you like to
elaborate in public?
36. Does anybody know if @EE sell on emails? I’ve been inundated with junk mail since I got my new contract
the other week...
37. @carmillaseries how secure is the merch store? I want to buy myself something for my birthday but I’m
afraid to use my credit card online.
38. @carshare hey folks, what’s the best way to reach you about security disclosure of your service and potential
access to customer data?
39. @submittable why do I suddely need to enable cookies? Is there an opt out, or am I switching back to
stamps?
40. Latest @bankoﬁreland iPhone app update wants constant background access to my location. For security,
marketing, or something else?
41. MT @Remind101 @cellyme ...What do you do with the phone numbers that are archived? Your current
policy?
42. @AirsideInsider Could you provide some technical docs about the security used for the #MobilePassport
apps? Saved locally, encryption, etc.
43. Ok @HRBlock, why would @Ghostery report over 16 advertising trackers from your supposedly secure
online tax application?
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44. @angrybirds is this true? http://t.co/gCBoFIcZ you send people’s contacts to 3rd parties without permis-
sion?
45. @LinkedInHelp so someone is selling my email address from you and signing me up? Are you saying that
you’ve nothing to do with this email?
46. @ﬂoatapp how secure are your servers? Can you direct me to the security info on your website please?
47. @Gopit_Search @PrivacyMatters what’s your privacy statement and what data do your store from your
users?
48. .@AskTarget ok thanks but I assume that means yes you all do sell patient names and addresses?
49. @opendns I’d like to know if there’s any security concern, like whether the DNS provider can track my
browsing. What are the privacy issues?
50. @swiftkey can your app NOT collect my passwords and credit card numbers? How is that legal?
51. @HootSuite_Help If I sign up: Where’s the option on your website to opt out of your sharing my personal
info?
52. Also, can anyone at @TrustifyPI guarantee that the emails people put in to check against this “list” won’t be
sold off? No TOS on app.
53. @SagiGidali Hi Sagi, what’s your stance on keeping customer logs, and where is your company/customer
data based for legal reasons?
54. @Telstra just wondering what’s the extent of your monitoring on customers (me). Link me to pds if possible?
55. @TTChelps Yes, how will you manage my travel records and contact info, under what circumstances will
you release to 3rd parties?
56. @AirbnbHelp you already have my phone number, my linkedin and my proﬁle pic + feedback from previous
hosts. So why you want my ID? @Airbnb
57. @hushmail Q: does hushmail collaborate with NSA to spy on its users’ emails? http://t.co/aZqiuL6sja
looking for alternative to Google mail
58. @EtsyHelp is it safe putting my banking info to etsy?? I have unpaid student loans, and I don’t want them
paying off @Etsy for my info :P
59. @troyhunt @FreedomeVPN do they log trafﬁc ? Port open for upload ? Rhanks :)
60. @onavo Can I ask - why is it free? and how do u guarantee that data is anonymised? Ta :)
61. So @stripe has entered the UK market (nice) shouldn’t they declare if they share user data with any one?
62. @asiaelle @graceishuman I like Evernote for some things but I worry about data security. Who can see my
pages ?
63. The @nest needs to collect your in and out patterns for all your family. Who owns that data? Can it be
subpoenaed? federated? @mdrasch #IoT
64. @tigerVPN Can’t wait for the IOS app! It seem that I can’t ﬁnd info if u log or no log to guarantee our privacy?
65. @duckduckgo –is it really private. Does duckduckgo–follow me and watch me and spy on me? Can I truly
search in total privacy?
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66. @Telus @Shawhelp @Shawinfo Can you verify if you provide customer information without a warrant to
law enforcement but upon request? #bcpoli
67. @nest Is Nest sharing data with Google still optional? Will it remain that way for the foreseeable future?
68. @duggan My money is on marketing plus hubris. @bankoﬁreland, how conﬁdent are you that data won’t
leak?
69. .@ﬁtbit What are you doing to protect customers’ privacy?
70. @TMobileHelp where’s the part of my contract where I gave you permission to log my urls and location?
71. @Netﬂixhelps The Perfect World Peanut Labs offer to earn zen for signing up. Will my information be
conﬁdential or is it shared with PWE?
72. Hey @indeed, do you sell info to 3rd party sites?
73. @Jawbone how do you protect all the information tracked by your wearables? #CIS210
74. I understand that @airbnb want to see my ID’s before booking, but can I know what they are doing with
that data ? #privacy #matters
75. @privatewiﬁ Will do more research, but how do I know VPN software isn’t gathering my data/personal info?
76. @mysms Can you elaborate on prvcy polcy? Can employees access sms? If so, when/when would they?
What safeguards exist to prevent abuse? Thx!
77. @mrgunn @colwizSupportWhat kind of data do you collect from users? What do you do with it? Who
stands to gain from it ﬁnancially? How?
78. @Viber is that truth you are spying on users’s calls ??
79. @22seven - do you, would you, could you ever share personal data with SARS? Is there anything in your
T&C’s prohibiting you to do so?
80. Hey @GoDaddy why do you guys sell my information every time I buy a domain from you? I’m assuming I
gave you permission at some point?
81. @sprintcare @sprint - What’s up with the new privacy contract you guys just did? Giving away our info to
random businesses ? #Sketchy #Smh
82. @opera Do you track and store people’s data like Google, Microsoft, Facebook and all their other cronies? If
you don’t I’ll switch to you.
83. Does @Ofﬁcial_GDC have a privacy statement anywhere re: the personal data of attendees & how it’s shared
w/ exhibitors, speakers, etc.?
84. Is this correct? @VodafoneIreland cc rep said they don’t retain customer information predating your existing
or last contract. cc: @ComReg
85. Hey @HostGator can you not sell my phone number to telemarketers? Paying for privacy protection should
protect me from YOU TOO
86. With the rapid rise in so called encrypted messaging apps, how do you feel @viber competes on security?
#cgc14
87. @UnrollmeHelp is there a way i can be sure that you’re not just the nsa reading my mails? #faq
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88. @evernotehelps are my notes being saved encrypted on your servers per default? Or is only manually
encrypted text encrypted?
89. @Telstra So nothing more than absolutely necessary to meet legal interception and not used unless required
under law?
90. @Viber if I sign up with viber, do you load my iphone contacts into your servers? Thanks #viber
91. @AutomaticHelp hi! how is the sensitive data my Automatic collects encrypted and stored?
92. @truecallerhelp good, thx. The question was different: will they be removed from your servers or not?
Which is the procedure to remove them?
93. Sean: What Mobile Apps Know & Transmit About You: @AngryBirds sends my contacts to third parties?
#WTF #FAIL http://t.co/IKVYc6l7
94. @simpletaxca What personal information do you retain after I do my taxes on your site?
95. @MailChimp Does Mail Chimp retain our list and use or sell them elsewhere ?
96. @FreePPICheck if I were to give you my phone #, how many people will you sell it to?
97. @TripCase how safe isthe personal info?
98. @ﬁtbit@FitbitSupportWhere can I go to seewho you soldmyprivate health data too? http://t.co/Rd64dKWGFb
99. @VentraChicago How do you use our personal data once we’ve registered with Ventra? #AskVentra
100. @bitly Thanks for the response. Does bitly have access to the links? What if I wanted to send a ﬁle to a
friend and it’s personal?
101. @jobsdotie Also, no data privacy guarantee, or info on who gets access to my CV (is it just the advertising
company or also jobs.ie staff?).
102. @nest Privacy question, does Nest share usage patterns or anything with third parties? cc @joshmend
103. The @tapjoy ad framework uploads my UDID *and* my MAC address? Is that *really* necessary? :|
104. Dear @eBay I don’t appreciate my buyers having access to my phone number! Why is this person calling
me at 9pm? #totallyinapprpriate
105. Soooo, I joined @mint about a week ago and today I’ve received 7 credit card offers in the mail... selling my
info much?
106. Hi @auspost how can a person opt out on Australia Post storing phone numbers ?
107. .@MGMResortsIntl do you sell your mlife member contact information? Receiving calls from sports betting
tip line since staying @ NYNY.
108. Im conﬂicted 2 clicking “accept” to your policy changes. Why do you need my birth date, friends info, etc.?
@SpotifyUSA #TaylorMightBeRight
109. @AdblockPlus https://t.co/3Awum5BwRF How much control will users have over their personal data?
#tracking #adblock
110. @clue just curious. do you share users information with third parties? i’m getting targeted ads for tampons
etc. after using your app.
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111. @theTunnelBear nice! Given the recent U.K. change in law, do you have any details about your logging
privacy etc?
112. Is customer credit card info stored encrypted? Even if it is storing password in plain text kind of kills that.
@RSComponents
113. @davidsbridal whenpeople sign up for your site, do you sell their info? I have received numerous unsolicited
calls on my cell phone.
114. @Cabelas Do you or your partners sell, share, or otherwise disseminate your customer’s mailing addresses
directly or indirectly to the @NRA?
115. @Spotify Due to the complete lack of respect for privacy in the new T&C I wonder where to delete my
account? stopped subscription already.
116. @hubspot Why must I enable third party cookies in your browser settings? Is there a workaround? DM pls
117. @Viber Hi, is your service secured against spying by the nsa and gchq?
118. .@automatic Who owns my driving data? Will my driving behavior be aggregated and sold?
119. @ProtonMail @ProtonMailHelp E.g.: If I use my IOS to access emails, what data is stored by you guys? Is
there a link to explain?
120. @Nosgoth - is it mandated to link our steam account to Square in order to play the game ? What securities
are in place for protection of acc
C.3 Final Survey
Finally, the participants are presented with a short survey to check their legal expertise (Fig-
ure C.7).







No legal training, but my background in another field
provides me with some legal experience
Knowledgeable in legal matters, but no formal legal training
Studied law





Please answer the following questions honestly. The answers to those 
questions will NOT impact your participation in this study or the 
received compensation.
How easy or difϐicult is it for you to understand legal texts, e.g., a privacy policy 
of a website or a legal contract.
What is your level of legal training?
Do you work in a position that requires legal expertise (e.g., working as a 
paralegal, lawyer or attorney)?
Figure C.7 – Final survey for checking the legal expertise of the participants
D Example Cases for PriBot
In this appendix, we show PriBot in action with questions about multiple companies.
Figure D.1 – The ﬁrst answer about third-party sharing in the case of the headphones company
“Bose” [Bra17]
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Figure D.2 – The second answer about third-party sharing in the case of the headphones
company “Bose” [Bra17]
FigureD.3 – The third answer about third-party sharing in the case of the headphones company
“Bose” [Bra17]
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Figure D.4 – The ﬁrst answer about mobility tracking in the case of Google. Notice the semantic
matching between mobility and location data.
Figure D.5 – The ﬁrst answer to an informal question about providing data to the NSA in the
case of Google. “NSA” is semantically matched to “government”.
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Figure D.6 – The ﬁrst answer to a question about data retention in the case of Twitter. Notice
the absence of matched terms between the question and the answer.
Figure D.7 – The second answer to a question about data retention in the case of Twitter.
Notice the different duration given for a different data type, showing the interesting patterns
that can be observed by comparing the top answers.
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Figure D.8 – The ﬁrst answer to a question about data control in the case of Twitter. Again,
opting out is a form of data control, and the answers are in this spirit.
Figure D.9 – The second answer to a question about data control in the case of Twitter. Other
forms of data control are provided in this answer.
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Figure D.10 – The ﬁrst answer to a question about data control in the case of Khan Academy.
Notice the semantic matching between “kids” and “child” and the high levle understanding of
the user’s interest in data control options.
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